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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the relation of Kant’s theory of free will to that of K.L. Reinhold. I
argue that Reinhold’s theory addresses several problems raised in the reception of Kant’s
practical philosophy, particularly the problem of accounting for free immoral acts. Focusing on
Reinhold’s account of free will as a condition for the conceivability of the moral law shows that
the historical focus on Reinhold’s break from Kant’s own account and his alleged reliance on
facts of consciousness obscures Reinhold’s decidedly ‘Kantian’ argument. This approach
provides a new foundation for free will and demonstrates the significance of Reinhold’s practical
philosophy as an attempted corrective to Kant.
Chapter 1 examines the influence of Rehberg, Ulrich, and Schmid on Kant’s and
Reinhold’s respective theories of free will. Chapter 2 investigates the epistemic foundation of
Reinhold’s theory of free will and, contrary to the dominant view in scholarship, argues that his
account is not based merely on facts of consciousness. Chapter 3 illuminates a tension between
the phenomenology of moral agency and Kant’s account of free agency. It is argued that while
Kant talks about overcoming inclinations and adopting maxims by virtue of their lawful form,
which would seemingly have to take place at the phenomenal level and be available to
consciousness, Kant’s account of free agency is restricted to the noumenal, which precludes
availability to consciousness. Reinhold’s theory of free will avoids this tension by positing
consciousness of possible courses of action as a necessary condition for self-determination to one
such action. Chapter 4 discusses the relation of Reinhold’s theory of free will to Kant’s Religion,
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a text that Reinhold uses as a basis for his charge that Kant’s theory is either “unintelligible” or
“untenable.” I argue that although Reinhold fundamentally misunderstands Kant’s doctrine of
supreme maxim adoption, Reinhold is correct in his assertion that Kant is committed to the thesis
that the free spontaneity of the power of choice is a necessary condition for moral responsibility.
Chapter 5 explicates the Kant-Reinhold Controversy to argue that given Kant’s own commitment
to the conditions for moral responsibility, Reinhold was ultimately correct that free will ought to
be defined as choosing for or against the moral law.

iv

INTRODUCTION
Karl Leonhard Reinhold is a pivotal figure in the history of philosophy who was not only largely
responsible for the popularization of Immanuel Kant, but also greatly contributed to the
development of German Idealism. Volumes I and II of his Letters on the Kantian Philosophy
(Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie) were not volumes of correspondence, but rather a series
of articles originally published in the Teutsche Merkur, a scholarly journal popular at the time.
The first series of articles, published between 1786-1787, was instrumental in popularizing
Kant’s Critical Philosophy.1 These first articles were then published as a single volume in 1790,
followed by a second volume of subsequent articles published in 1792. Both volumes address
such themes as morality, religion, free will, and the existence of God; however, the two volumes
differ in their underlying motivation and in their significance to the history of philosophy. While
writing the articles that comprise the first volume of the Briefe, Reinhold was very much a
disciple of Kant. By the time he wrote the articles comprising the Briefe II, Reinhold had
already published his Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögen
(1789) and had begun to drift from his adherence to Kant. It is precisely this philosophical
divergence that makes the Briefe II of particular interest.
Notwithstanding Reinhold’s departure from Kant’s philosophy in respect to its proper
theoretical foundation, Reinhold’s development in practical philosophy was largely motivated by
reactions to Kant, most notably A.W. Rehberg, J.A.H. Ulrich, and C.C.E Schmid.

1

See: Karl Ameriks, Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, 81ff.; Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason, 226ff.

1

In his Versuch einer Moralphilosophie, Schmid asserts, in what he takes to be the spirit
of Kant’s own theory of freedom, the doctrine of intelligible fatalism, i.e. that all acts are
determined by intelligible causality. Acts with immediate determining grounds in sensible,
temporal circumstances (sinnliche Zeitumstände) are ultimately grounded in an intelligible
Naturfatalismus, “i.e. the assertion of the natural necessity of all acts of a rational being
according to laws of causality of things in themselves.”2 In regard to morality, Schmid thought it
was enough to believe that Zeitumstände cannot compel us to act irrationally (i.e. immorally) and
that pure reason can provide a determining ground for moral acts through the moral law.3 Thus,
both immoral acts and non-moral acts (acts with no moral significance) are grounded in an
intelligible causality underlying objects of experience and moral acts are grounded in an
intelligible causality underlying the agent as a thing in itself, i.e. moral acts are grounded in the
intelligible causality of pure practical reason. This doctrine leaves no room for attributing moral
responsibility to agents for immoral acts.4 Karl Leonhard Reinhold found this interpretation of
Kantian freedom absolutely repugnant.
In the wake of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of
Practical Reason, the late 1780s and early 1790s became a hotbed for debate over the proper
conception of free will. The related problems of reconciling free will with determinism and
developing a conception of free will robust enough to account for moral culpability for immoral
acts figured prominently. Following Rehberg’s review of the Critique of Practical Reason, a
slew of ‘Kantian’ philosophers, including C.C.E Schmid, expounded what they took to be Kant’s
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Schmid, C.C.E. Versuch einer Moralphilosophie. Jena, 1790. §257, p. 211
ibid, p. 198ff
4
To some extent this leaves no room for attributing moral responsibility to agents for any acts whatsoever
insofar as the doctrine does not include an Entscheidung or Wählen on behalf of the agent whereby he
would make the act his own, but rather the agent is simply a reed swept this way or that by the winds of
intelligible causality of either objects as things in themselves or himself as a thing in itself.
3

2

theory of freedom.5 According to Reinhold, most of these authors take freedom to be nothing
other than the independence of practical reason from sensible determining grounds (LII
185/267). While Reinhold admits that this certainly belongs to freedom of the will, it does not
solely constitute it. By mistaking the self-activity of practical reason with an act of the will, i.e.
by defining freedom only in terms of the self-legislation of practical reason and its independence
from natural necessity, Reinhold thinks it is impossible for there to be free immoral acts (LII
185/267). Reinhold, at least in the Briefe II, does not identify these problems of ‘Kantian’
freedom with Kant’s own theory of freedom; rather, he takes these problems to be the result of
mistaken exegesis on the part of Kant’s adherents. Thus, Reinhold writes that it is not Kant’s
fault if his students have taken certain expressions, which Kant employed as mere expositions, to
be definitions (LII 186/268–69). And so Reinhold takes it upon himself to re-present Kant’s
theory of freedom, which, according to Reinhold, Kant had only gestured toward but not
determinately formulated (LII 183/263).
Not only does the Letters II embody an original contribution to the question of free will
and moral agency within the general framework of Kant’s Critical philosophy, it also served as a
turning point in Kant and Reinhold’s relations, culminating in a dispute in 1797 on the nature of
free will. As already mentioned, Reinhold at first took his theory of the will in the Letters II to
be a re-presentation of Kant’s own theory, and thus not something distinct from the latter;
however, in Kant’s Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals (1797) Kant explicitly denies the
very conception of free will that Reinhold put forth in the Letters II and again in Contributions II

5

See Abicht, J.H. Ueber die Freyheit des Willens; Ewald, J.L. Ueber die Kantische Philosphie in Hinsicht
auf gewisse Bedürfnisse unsers Zeitalters. Auch Briefe an Emma. Bremen 1791, 33ff., 88ff.;
Heydenreich, K.H. Betrachtungen über die Philosophie der natürlichen Religion. Bd. 2. Leipzig 1791;
Jakob, L.H. Grundriß der Erfahrungs-Seelenlehre. Halle 1791; Kiesewetter, J.G.C.C. Ueber den ersten
Grundsatz der Moralphilosophie; Kraus, C.J. Rezension von Ulrichs Eleutheriologie; Maimon, S.
Philosphisches Wörterbuch; Snell, C.W. Ueber Determinismus und moralische Freiheit
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(1794). Aghast, Reinhold vehemently replied to Kant’s critique, the repercussions of which are
still being felt in philosophical scholarship today.
The nature of free will and its relation to moral agency are still subjects of discourse,
particularly within Kantian circles. The 12th International Kant Congress in 2015 was devoted to
the relation between nature and freedom. Furthermore, in the 6 international Reinhold
conferences that have taken place since 1998, Reinhold’s theory of freedom and its relation to
Kant have figured prominently.
This dissertation examines how these concerns shaped the development of Reinhold’s
theory of free will and Kant’s presentation of free immoral action in Religion within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason and investigates the Kant-Reinhold Controversy of 1797 where,
seemingly at odds with his view in Religion, Kant flatly rejects Reinhold’s definition of free will
as choosing for or against the moral law.
I have chosen to bracket the issue of whether Kant’s theory of free will as presented in
the 1st Critique, the Groundwork, and the 2nd Critique was restricted to moral action.
Admittedly, Kant often suggests that this is the case. Regardless, in Religion (1792) Kant
unambiguously gives an account of free will that necessarily includes freedom to act immorally.
Kant may have first presented a theory of free will such that only moral actions could be
considered free and later revised this theory to include immoral action. Or perhaps Kant had
maintained all along that immoral actions are freely performed and had first restricted merely his
discussion of free will to its relation to moral action. Perhaps given the aim of the Groundwork
to present the supreme principle of morality and the subject matter of the 2nd Critique to a
supposed demonstration that pure reason is practical, Kant simply did not include discussion of
free immoral action in his account. Although I am not sure how convincing I find this latter
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possibility, it should be noted that Kant’s lectures on moral philosophy from the 1770s show that
he was committed to free immoral action prior to his Critical works:

However, all moral evil originates from freedom, for otherwise it would not be morally
evil. However much nature predisposes us, evil actions nevertheless originate from
freedom, and for that reason they can be imputed to us as vices.6
Woe is the opposite of wellbeing. Evil originates from freedom and thus comes entirely
from us, but woe comes from nature!7

If we take Kant’s lectures on ethics to be reliable evidence of his position at that time, then it
would seem that Kant held that freedom is a necessary condition for moral evil in the 1770s as
well as in 1792.8 Regardless of whether his Critical works of the 1780s constitute a change of
doctrine or merely a change of the scope of presentation, it is clear from Religion that Kant’s
considered view is that moral evil must be the product of freedom. My chief concern is to
examine Kant’s theory of free will on the supposition that it is robust enough to encompass free
immoral actions in relation to Reinhold’s own theory. We will find that while both Kant and
Reinhold are committed to freedom as a necessary condition for moral responsibility, their
respective conceptions of freedom are quite distinct.
I have also chosen to bracket the issue of whether Kant’s theory of free will encompasses
action without moral significance. Reinhold’s theory of free will is unequivocally restricted to
actions with moral significance. Thus, every free act for Reinhold is moral or immoral. Because
this dissertation is chiefly concerned with Kant’s theory of free will in relation to Reinhold, I
have opted to restrict my consideration of Kant’s theory of free will as it relates to actions with
moral significance. Accordingly, I am concerned with free will as it relates to the fulfillment or
6

Stark, Werner (ed.), Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie, 98–9/125. See also L-E/Collins 27:295.
ibid. See also L-E/Collins 27:366.
8
Scholarly use of the 1770s lectures will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
7
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transgression of duty. Perhaps there are other morally relevant choices associated with agency;
however, consideration will not be given to them.

6

Chapter 1
Context after the 2nd Critique: The Reception of Kant’s Theory of Freedom

This chapter examines three philosophers who reacted to Kant’s theory of free will in the late
1780s: August Wilhelm Rehberg, Johann August Heinrich Ulrich, and Christian Carl Erhard
Schmid. These thinkers raised concerns about the relation between free will and moral agency,
e.g. how a merely formal principle thought as the effect of a noumenal activity of pure reason
can serve as a principle for action for phenomenal agents, and how free will, which seems to be
necessarily tied to determination by the moral law, can pertain to immoral actions. These issues
were of paramount importance to K.L Reinhold’s development of his theory of free will, and can
be seen as a catalyst for Kant’s treatment of free immoral actions in Religion within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason in 1792.

1.1

AUGUST WILHELM REHBERG

August Wilhelm Rehberg (1757–1836) was both a philosopher and a statesman.9 He is known
for works such as On the Relation of Metaphysics to Religion, “On the Relation of Theory and
Practice,” Investigations on the French Revolution along with Critical Tidings from the Most
9

For a general biographical discussion, see Heiner F. Klemme and Manfred Kuehn, The Bloomsbury
Dictionary, 605–608.
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Noteworthy Writings Published in France on that Topic, along with several influential reviews.
We are interested solely in Rehberg’s review of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. It appeared
in two parts, both on August 6th 1788 in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung [ALZ]. This review is
significant for its wide readership in general as well as its influence on other thinkers, including
Kant himself. Christian Gottfried Schütz, editor of the ALZ, actually sent Kant a copy of the
review on June 23rd, 1788 prior to its subsequent publication in August (C 10:541). Kant’s 1791
essay “On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials” can be seen in part as a response to
Rehberg’s claim that although the categorical imperative is indeed the formal principle of
morality, it cannot serve as an incentive to moral action.10 Kant’s footnote in the Introduction to
the Critique of the Power of Judgment (CPJ 5:177) as well as his footnote in the Preface to the
1st edition of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason can also be seen as a reaction to
Rehberg.11 Furthermore, Rehberg’s review was cited directly by L.H. Jakob just one month after
its publication in ALZ;12 it was also cited by K.L. Reinhold in the Preface to his Letters on the
Kantian Philosophy Volume II (LII 5/IX–X).
Rehberg begins his review with a recapitulation of the main ideas of the Critique of
Practical Reason. He notes that the Groundwork proceeds analytically from the common
concepts of morality to establish an ultimate practical principle capable of being cognized a
priori, and that this practical law of reason leads to the idea of metaphysical freedom.13 These
ideas are then carried out synthetically in the first part of the Critique of Practical Reason.14

10

di Giovanni, George and Allen Wood. “Translator’s Introduction,” 22–3
di Giovanni, George and Allen Wood. “Editorial Notes.” In Religion and Rational Theology, 456 n.2.
For an extensive treatment of the influence of Rehberg’s review on Kant’s Critique of the Power of
Judgment and Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason see Eberhard Günter Schulz, Rehbergs
Opposition gegen Kants Ethik, 122–72.
12
Jakob, L.H. “On Freedom,” 19
13
Rehberg, A.W. “Rehberg Review,” 345.
14
ibid
11
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Rehberg repeats Kant’s claims that because objects belong to the world of sense, a law of reason
can contain no object and must therefore be formal.15 Accordingly, freedom of the will consists
in independence from the sensible world and determination by the moral law: “a will determined
by mere form is free, for metaphysical freedom consists in the complete independence of all laws
of the sensible world. Such a free will can reciprocally be determined by nothing other than by
the law, by virtue of its form.”16 He goes on to take issue with Kant’s table of the categories of
freedom, specifically the category of modality. According to Kant, the categories of modality
consist in “the permitted and the forbidden, duty and what is contrary to duty, and perfect and
imperfect duty” (CPrR 5:66). According to Rehberg, the categories of modality should instead
consist in “the permitted…and the forbidden, that which is in conformity to duty…and its
opposite, and finally that which is holy…and that which is unholy.”17 He holds that the division
of perfect and imperfect duty should instead belong to the categories of quantity.18 Rehberg goes
on to highlight the main points of the Dialectic and Doctrine of Method before making a
fundamental objection to the 2nd Critique. It is to this objection that we now turn our attention.
Rehberg affirms Kant’s claim that the moral law must be categorical and that necessity is
to be found in pure reason alone.19 In this way, Rehberg affirms that the moral law is the
principium diiudicationis of morality. However, Rehberg denies that the moral law can also
serve as the principium executionis, i.e. Rehberg affirms that the moral law is the supreme
normative principle of morality, but denies that this principle can actually serve as a principle for
acting morally.20 This denial is rooted in two related subordinate objections: first, that there is a

15

ibid
ibid, 345–6
17
Rehberg, A.W. “Rehberg Review,” 347
18
ibid
19
ibid, 351
20
Schulz, Eberhard Günter. Rehberg’s Opposition gegen Kants Ethik, 11–12
16
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fundamental disconnect between the phenomenal and noumenal self, and second, that the moral
law itself cannot function as an incentive to morality through respect. Let us consider both of
these constituent objections in turn.
Although we can conceive of pure reason (as noumenon) as the cause of the good, which
would be the effect of reason, and can conceive of the synthetic connection of pure reason as
cause through freedom, this is warranted only insofar as it “belongs to the domain of ideas.”21
But, per Rehberg, it is an altogether different question how this is supposed to connect to the
sensible world and its reality. The demonstration that pure reason really is practical (and not just
an empty object of thought) can only occur “directly as by means of consciousness of itself, as
pure reason, as free will, and possessor of the absolute good.”22 But self-consciousness of pure
reason is impossible and consciousness of free will would depend upon consciousness of pure
reason.23 The moral law can find no traction in the phenomenal world as a motivating principle
for action and at the same time maintain its formal purity. George di Giovanni sums up
Rehberg’s position: “precisely because the idea of the law transcends the entire realm of
individual experiences, it explains the possibility of moral action without, however, being able to
afford content to any particular act.”24 Thus, we cannot be conscious of the moral law as such,
because our phenomenal consciousness would pervert the purely formal and intelligible nature of
the moral law. This disconnect between the phenomenal and the noumenal allegedly makes it
impossible for us to demonstrate that pure reason really can be practical, and makes it impossible
for the moral law to be the principium executionis of any particular moral act. In fact, Rehberg

21

ibid, 352
ibid
23
ibid
24
di Giovanni, George. “Rehberg, Reinhold und Schmid,” 106
22
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takes the disconnect between the phenomenal and the noumenal to be problematic for
transcendental idealism in general, and not just the domain of practical philosophy:

Concepts of the understanding and ideas of reason can be thought, and sensible sensation
can be intuited, but how it happens that sensible sensation is subsumed by concepts of the
understanding, how intelligences intuit sensible objects, thus how the world of ideas can
be connected with the real world, and really be connected, that is a problem whose
insolubility gives rise to the idea of an ultimate infinite original being in which the
connection of the intelligible world and phenomenal world is grounded.25
According to Rehberg, this disconnect leads to the idea of God. This line of thought reflects
Rehberg’s belief that metaphysics leads to Spinozism, a claim Rehberg had already made in
1787 in his On the Relation of Metaphysics to Religion.26 For our purposes, we will bracket
Rehberg’s predilection for anti-metaphysics and turn to our treatment of Rehberg’s second
objection constituting his denial that the categorical imperative is the principium executionis of
morality.
Rehberg is well aware that Kant’s notion of respect functions as the bridge between the
phenomenal and noumenal in moral agency. In his recapitulation of Kant’s main claims,
Rehberg notes that respect is “not an incentive to morality, but rather morality itself as
incentive.”27 To be sure, this is a reference to Kant’s claim that there is “no antecedent feeling in
the subject that would be attuned to morality” (CPrR 5:75) and, more precisely, that “respect for
the law is not the incentive to morality; instead it is morality itself subjectively considered as an
incentive” (CPrR 5:76). Thus, Rehberg is aware that respect does not function in Kant’s system
as a sensible feeling that subsequently motivates one to act on the basis of the moral law; instead,

25

Rehberg, A.W. “Rehberg’s Review,” 356
For discussion of this point see George di Giovanni, Freedom and Religion, 125–36.
27
Rehberg, A.W. “Rehberg’s Review,” 348
26
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it functions as a unique rationally generated feeling that is the effect of the moral law itself as
incentive. However, Rehberg simply denies that respect can have this function:

The thought that the law itself, but not pleasure in the law, must be the incentive of
morality is itself enthusiasm [Schwärmerey]. For what else is it but enthusiasm? (that
consists in the fiction of supersensible objects) when respect for the law is supposed to be
a feeling and yet not a sensible sensation?28
Thus, Rehberg rejects Kant’s claim that sensible feeling is merely the condition but not the cause
of the feeling of respect, which is “practically effected” (CPrR 5:75).29 By rejecting the role of
respect as the bridge between the phenomenal and the noumenal, Rehberg is thereby rejecting
that the purely formal moral law can serve as the principium executionis for moral agents such as
ourselves, whose conscious representations of possible courses of action are phenomenal.30

1.2

JOHANN AUGUST HEINRICH ULRICH

28

ibid, 355
For a discussion of how Rehberg’s objection misinterprets Kant see Schulz, Rehbergs Opposition
gegen Kants Ethik, 18–23. Schulz claims that Rehberg holds Kant accountable for having to demonstrate
via respect that pure reason is practical when Kant in fact already presupposes that pure reason is practical
and then seeks to demonstrate, given this assumption, “in what way the moral law becomes the incentive”
(CPrR 5:72). I do not wish to speak to the merit of Rehberg’s objection. Nevertheless, it should be noted
that Rehberg neglects to address anywhere in his review Kant’s account of our awareness of the moral
law as an a priori fact of reason.
30
The role of respect as a link between the phenomenal and the noumenal will be discussed in more detail
in Chapter 3. Rehberg maintained that because the merely formal moral law cannot explain particular
actions that occur at the phenomenal level, these actions must instead be explained by principles
established at the phenomenal level and that account for the satisfaction of sensible desires. On this point
see George di Giovanni, Freedom and Religion, 130.
29
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Johann August Heinrich Ulrich (1746–1813) was a prominent professor at Jena who was one of
the first philosophers to lecture on Kant.31 Although Ulrich seemed to be a disciple of Kant,32
his 1785 Institutiones logicae et metaphysicae was so critical of Kant that it stands to reason that
Ulrich’s ‘allegiance’ to Kant was only a stratagem in order to use Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason as a propaedeutic to his own neo-Leibnizian metaphysics.33 Regardless of the status of
Ulrich’s initial tenuous devotion to the Critical philosophy, Ulrich soon became an ardent enemy
of Kant, constantly polemicizing against him in his lectures.34 Ulrich went on to publish
Eleutheriology or On Freedom and Necessity in 1788,35 a work that challenges Kant’s theory of
free will and its relation to morality. It is this work that is significant to our investigation.
Before presenting the important claims in Eleutheriology, let us briefly explain the significance
of the work as a whole.
Eleutheriology was generally influential in discussions on freedom and determinism at
the time. Johann Friedrich Flatt used the text in his lectures in 1790, which were attended by the
young G.W.F. Hegel.36 More importantly, Kant himself sent his personal notes on the text to
C.J. Krauss to use as the basis for the latter’s review of Eleutheriology.37 Furthermore, Kant
addresses Ulrich’s text in his letter to Reinhold on March 7, 1788, claiming that Ulrich “is not
31

For a discussion of Ulrich and his relation to the reception of Kant’s philosophy see Frederick Beiser,
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going to increase his following with his recent proclamation of a mechanistic theory of nature
under the empty name of freedom, supported as it is by those old, familiar sophistries.”38 Thus,
already in 1788 Reinhold was aware of Eleutheriology and its tension with the Critical
conception of free will and morality. As we shall see in Section 4 of the present chapter,
Ulrich’s text would also have significant influence on Schmid’s Attempt at a Moral Philosophy.
For now, let us present Ulrich’s primary claims in Eleutheriology, followed by the Kantian
refutations found in the Kraus review.
Ulrich presents a doctrine of strict determinism and argues that determinism does not
undermine morality. He grounds his determinism in an account of necessity. Ulrich maintains
that there is physical as well as moral necessity. By the former, he understands: “by positing
certain conditions something else is inevitably posited, and that under absolutely identical
conditions the converse is not possible.”39 By “moral necessity” Ulrich understands “the
thought, or the cognition of our reason, that something ought to happen, even though it does not
always really happen.”40 According to Ulrich, even when the representation of the ought is
efficacious such that it brings about volition, this too is an instance of natural necessity.41 By
contrast, “chance” denotes “an arising, a becoming that has no determinative grounds, but when
something occurred, the opposite could have occurred under absolutely identical
circumstances.”42 Following his definitions of “necessity” and “chance,” Ulrich defines
determinism as a doctrine of necessity, i.e. that everything that occurs, including our volitions,
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intentions, and decisions, has its determinative grounds and could not have been otherwise.43
Indeterminism, on the other hand, “fancies that the human mind, or even any rational being,
possesses the capacity to will or not to will under absolutely identical internal and external
circumstances, in absolutely the same aggregate condition conceived as entirely unaltered, or
even to be able to will the opposite of what he actually decides to do.”44 Ulrich asserts that there
is no middle path between these two perspectives, i.e. either a rational being has the ability to do
otherwise in a given set of circumstances or not.45 Having laid forth these fundamental concepts,
Ulrich turns to a treatment of Kant’s theory of freedom.
Ulrich claims that Kant’s doctrine is not indeterministic insofar as with respect to
appearances and man’s empirical character, which is the perspective from which the
indeterminist proceeds, Kant is a determinist and denies freedom.46 With respect to man’s
intelligible character, Kant avoids natural necessity insofar as natural necessity involves
determination by temporally preceding conditions, and the intelligible transcends temporal
conditions; however, this does not entail that the intelligible character is not determined by other,
non-temporal grounds, in which case the intelligible character would still be necessitated.47
Furthermore, Ulrich draws a distinction between a capacity and the exercise of that
capacity. Even if man’s intelligible character should have the capacity to initiate a state by itself
(in such a way that is represented as non-temporal), the exercise of this capacity cannot be
thought as independent of time-determination.48 Ulrich paraphrases Kant’s claims in the 1st
Critique that blameworthy action is to be imputed to the omission of reason such that, regardless
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of empirical circumstances, the agent ought to have determined his behavior otherwise.49 In
addition to the difficulty of reconciling the exercise of the intelligible capacity with its alleged
non-temporality, the question arises why the capacity is exercised in certain actions and not
others: “either something is present that on one occasion contains the ground of exercise and in
another case contains the ground of omission, or not. In the first case [there is] necessity, in the
second chance.”50 Accordingly, in the first case there is determinism and in the second case
there is a lack of sufficient reason to attribute the omission of reason in the blameworthy act to
the agent.51
Ulrich also mounts an objection against the role of reason in agency with respect to
conscious representations. Ulrich claims that Kant must have two aspects of reason in mind, an
empirical and an intelligible aspect. All representation of reason and consciousness of reason’s
demands including the thought of the ought must be attributed to empirical reason insofar as
these representations presuppose arising and disappearing, and thus time-determination.52
Accordingly, these representations would only be the effects of the intelligible faculty of reason.
Ulrich repeats his criticism that it is unclear how “immutable, intelligible reason,” which is
supposed to be coterminous with all human actions in temporal circumstances and yet not itself
in time, can “bring about such quite distinct effects in appearance at different times.”53 In mock
answer to this question, Ulrich speculates Kant’s reply:

“What does all that matter,” Kant will reply, “even if, as it is, it may be simply
incomprehensible, this does not entail impossibility. It shall merely be a transcendental
49
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hypothesis in polemical use. It is enough that there exist grounds that compel us to
presuppose such a merely intelligible faculty, whose effects admittedly have a
beginning, but whose causality itself does not have a beginning, and in which no
alterations take place.”54
Ulrich goes on to present his own account of moral freedom “the mutability of our volition by
moral means,”55 that is, “the perfectibility of our practical cognition in extension and intension,
and by means of this also of our way of thinking, of our dispositions and decisions.”56 For
Ulrich, this conception of freedom is completely consistent with strict determinism and simply
denotes the capacity of the will to progress toward moral perfection by means of representations
of good and evil. However, we are not concerned with Ulrich’s neo-Leibnizian doctrine.
Instead, let us turn to Kant’s own reply to Ulrich’s criticisms via the Kraus review of
Eleutheriology.
The Kraus review begins with a presentation of the Kantian position that the distinction
an agent makes between taking himself to be subject to natural laws and crediting to himself “a
spontaneity independent of nature” is necessary and without this distinction, the agent would
either have to renounce the “essence of morality” or the “use of the understanding” (RevUlrich
8:453). Insofar as both of these standpoints are necessary, the agent “becomes aware that he is
in the presence of a mystery” and “the way in which nature and freedom are joined in him cannot
be fathomed” (RevUlrich 8:453–4). To some extent, Ulrich’s conjecture at Kant’s response to
his criticisms is not far off the mark. However, what is most significant, particularly for our own
investigation, is the Kantian claim that morality is unintelligible without freedom.
If one tries to regard morality in the same way we regard events conditioned by laws of
nature, then this results “in a fatalism that does not allow the genuine concepts of obligation and
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imputation to further exist” (RevUlrich 8:455). Indeed, the preclusion of obligation and moral
imputation as a result of fatalism was seen in Schulz’s Attempt at a Doctrine of Morals for all
Human Beings (RevUlrich 8:455).57 Instead, one must regard moral agency as the manifestation
of freedom: “ought presupposes can, and hence the ought that is independent of all that actually
happens presupposes the can that is likewise independent of all that actually happens – or, moral
obligation presupposes the original spontaneity that is really what has to be thought as freedom”
(RevUlrich 8:455–6). As we shall see, the notion that freedom is a necessary condition for the
intelligibility of the moral law figures prominently in Reinhold’s formulation of his own theory
of free will (Chapter 2). Furthermore, the explicit argument from duty and moral imputability to
freedom is crucial to Kant’s treatment of free immoral action in Religion within the Boundaries
of Mere Reason (Chapter 4). For now, let us turn our attention to another key player in the
discussion on free will preceding Reinhold’s Letters II, C.C.E. Schmid.

1.3

CARL CHRISTIAN ERHARD SCHMID

Carl Christian Erhard Schmid (1762–1812) was the teacher of Frederick von Hardenberg, aka
Novalis, before becoming a professor at Jena in 1793.58 Schmid is perhaps best known for his
role in the early reception of the Critical philosophy and for his disputes with K.L. Reinhold and
Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Schmid was critical of Reinhold’s theory of free will as well as his
theoretical Elementarphilosophie. In fact, Schmid’s review of Reinhold’s On the Foundation of
Philosophical Knowledge may have played a role in Reinhold’s ultimate renunciation of this
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theoretical project.59 Moreover, Reinhold specifically names Schmid in the title of a polemical
1793 essay against Schmid’s position on free will.60 However, we are not so much concerned
with Schmid’s dispute with Reinhold as with Schmid’s doctrine of intelligible fatalism, his
interpretation of Kantian free will, and their possible role in the development of Reinhold’s
theory of free will and Kant’s position in Religion.
Schmid’s first philosophical work, Critique of Pure Reason in Outline along with a
Lexicon for the Easier Use of the Kantian Writings (1786), was significant in the reception of
Kant’s philosophy, which was often criticized as being abstruse. Schmid went on to publish
another edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in Outline as a standalone text without the
Lexicon in 1788. The Lexicon was reprinted in 1788, as well as in 1795 and 1798. Reinhold
actually cites the 2nd edition of Schmid’s Lexicon in the “Eighth Letter” of the Letters on the
Kantian Philosophy Volume II, and argues against the definitions of will that Schmid presents.
As we shall see, particularly in Chapter 5, Schmid’s understanding of free action as moral action
would come to be a crucial counterpoint to Reinhold’s own position on free will. Also of
significance to our investigation is Schmid’s Attempt at a Moral Philosophy, originally published
in 1790 and reprinted in 1792, 1795, and 1802. In this work, Schmid puts forth his doctrine of
intelligible fatalism and attempts to reconcile Ulrich’s determinism with Kantian freedom. The
relation between Schmid and Reinhold has received attention in the scholarship on Reinhold’s
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theory of free will.61 The dominant view in the scholarship is that Schmid adopts the
determinism presented in Ulrich’s Eleutheriology. However, Paul Guyer has recently asserted
that Schmid actually presents intelligible fatalism merely as a portrayal of Ulrich’s view, which
Schmid supposedly does not share.62 I will argue below that Guyer is mistaken. But Guyer’s
misunderstanding gives us occasion to examine Schmid’s position more closely. After all, if
Ulrich’s position of thoroughgoing determinism rejects Kant’s notion of noumenal freedom, and
instead asserts “everywhere necessity,”63 how can Schmid simultaneously advocate Ulrich’s
determinism and Kantian freedom? The scholarship up to now has noted that Schmid maintains
these two positions; however, an examination of how Schmid attempts to reconcile
comprehensive necessity (even at the noumenal level) with what he takes to be Kantian freedom
is needed. Accordingly, we shall use this lacuna in the scholarship as a backdrop for presenting
those aspects of Schmid’s position on free will relevant to our investigation.
In his Attempt at a Moral Philosophy (1790), Schmid addresses what he calls “intelligible
natural fatalism,” or “the natural necessity of all actions of a rational being according to laws of
the causality of things in themselves.”64 Guyer notes that Reinhold presents his theory of free
will in opposition to Schmid’s account of free will. According to Guyer, however, “Reinhold
had not understood that he was on the same page as Schmid!”65 Ironically, it is Guyer who has
misunderstood Schmid. Nowhere in the 1790 edition of Attempt at a Moral Philosophy does
Schmid reject intelligible fatalism. Instead, Schmid asserts: “Determinism, if it is conceived as a
philosophy that denies any chance in nature and plainly rejects any explanation of an event from
61
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chance, is the only true and sound philosophy, since to the contrary, indeterminism, or the claim
of lawless effects in nature, renders any theoretical and practical use of reason impossible.”66 To
be sure, this definition of determinism offered by Schmid may only pertain to “nature,” i.e. the
phenomenal world; however, he is explicit that he takes the doctrine of necessity to extend to
things in themselves. In Section §255 Schmid asserts:

If we do not want to allow any (irrational) chance, then there remains nothing left
but necessity, for there is absolutely no middle path between the two. Thus,
something must be thought as present with the existence of reason that determines
its efficacy on appearances and the particular degree of this efficacy in a given
instance. This something is indeed not an appearance, since an appearance cannot
determine a thing in itself. However, even if sensibility, as it is sensibly represented
and cognized itself, cannot determine and restrict reason in itself, it by no means
follows that what underlies sensibility and its appearances in itself is incapable of
restricting reason’s effects in appearance. And, if we want to escape
groundlessness i.e. theoretical irrationality in explaining immorality, then we must
think this problematic thought assertorically.67
Schmid actually titles this section “Yet everywhere necessity” as a tribute to Ulrich. Schmid
even has a footnote in this section where he asserts: “this claim by the determinists, e.g. by Mr.
Privy Councilor Ulrich in His Eleutheriology (Jena 1788) §9ff. has not been attacked or doubted
by any reasonable person, let alone refuted.”68 Schmid is taking up the issue raised by Ulrich of
how it is to be explained that reason is sometimes efficacious in determining our actions and
sometimes is not.69 Because chance is irrational, we must presuppose that in those instances in
which reason is not efficacious, “it could not be efficacious,”70 as a result of something that is not
itself appearance. Indeed, in the 1792 edition of Attempt at a Moral Philosophy Schmid is
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explicit that intelligible fatalism is a necessary presupposition: “intelligible fatalism…is a
necessary thought of reason.”71 In Guyer’s defense, Schmid is far from clear in presenting his
position and does reject determinism in a certain respect. In fact, it is precisely the section in
Attempt at a Moral Philosophy where Schmid rejects determinism in a qualified sense that Guyer
cites as justification for his interpretation.
Guyer claims Schmid insisted that “to apply determinism to the ‘finite rational being, the
human being,’ that is the noumenal self and its will, would be ‘indemonstrable,’ provable neither
by an ‘analogy from experience’ nor from the ‘logical principle of the ground,’ thus that the
noumenal self is free to choose to act on the moral law or ‘other (non-rational) powers.’”72
However, Guyer overlooks Schmid’s qualification of this determinism. Schmid does not claim
that determinism, in general, cannot be applied to finite rational beings. Instead, Schmid claims:

a determinism that subjects the I (finite rational being, man) in every respect – thus,
not merely as an appearance, but also as a thing in itself (which he normally does not
distinguish) with respect to all of his actions, the rational and the animal, and with respect
to everything that constitutes an action, according to the form (mode of action) as well as
the matter, or according to the internal and external objects acted upon – to the necessary
influence of appearances in time without qualification, and derives actions exclusively on
this basis is…indemonstrable.73
This passage serves as the main clause to which Schmid connects several bulleted points over
three pages. Accordingly, Schmid claims that such a determinism is: “indemonstrable,”
“inconsistent,” “practically detrimental,” (i.e. detrimental to practical philosophy), etc. Guyer
mistakenly takes Schmid to be denying the application of determinism in general to the finite
rational being, whereas Schmid is actually denying a determinism that subjects the finite rational
71
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being (construed both as appearance and thing in itself) to the necessary influence of appearances
in time. It is this and only this specific conception of determinism that Schmid declares
“indemonstrable,” “inconsistent,” etc.
Furthermore, contrary to Guyer’s claim, Schmid never held that the noumenal self is
“free to choose to act on the moral law or ‘other (non-rational) powers.’” In fact, Schmid
restricts free will to moral acts. In his 1788 Lexicon Schmid defines practical freedom in the
negative sense as “independence of the power of choice from all empirical, all sensible
inclinations and impulses” and in the positive sense as “dependence of the will upon reason,
which determines it immediately, upon the pure moral law; autonomy of the will.”74 To be sure,
these definitions are consistent with Kant’s own formulations from the Groundwork and 2nd
Critique, and do not necessarily entail that Schmid was committed to the restriction of freedom
to moral acts. Schmid’s commitment to the restriction of freedom to moral acts is more strongly
suggested in his definition of autonomy: “To act freely, automatically, and morally good are
synonyms.”75 Schmid is even more explicit about this commitment in the 1792 edition of
Attempt at a Moral Philosophy, where he asserts: “The actuality of non-moral as well as
immoral dispositions and actions (§229) directly proves their possibility. The possibility of nonmoral and immoral actions cannot be sufficiently grounded in precisely that which grounds the
possibility of moral dispositions and actions – thus it cannot be grounded in moral freedom, but
rather in the lack of moral freedom.”76 Schmid continues: “some include the capacity to act
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immorally in moral freedom. But this contradicts the concept of a moral capacity, and such a
freedom would be a capacity to act in contradictorily opposed ways, which amounts to a
contradiction.”77 Precisely because Schmid does not include the capacity to act immorally in his
conception of moral freedom, he asserts that he does not understand Kant in the 2nd Critique
where he claims that in acting immorally, an agent is aware that at the time of the action he was
free (and thus could have acted otherwise and is morally responsible for having acted
immorally):

Likewise, I do not understand the passage from Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason p.
176 whatsoever, because I deem it necessary to assert that man is never entirely in his
right mind at the time that he commits injustice, i.e. he does not have use of his moral
freedom. Nevertheless, at that very moment he can possess practical or psychological
freedom, and therefore act prudentially or skillfully. If he had been able to use moral
freedom, if the influence of the pure will had extended to his sensibility up to that
moment, then I do not doubt at all that he would have also acted morally.78
Thus, Schmid restricts free will to moral acts and takes the efficacy of pure practical reason to be
sufficient for determination of the will. Accordingly, immoral actions must be explained by the
postulation of some intelligible hindrance to the efficacy of pure practical reason. Having
refuted Guyer’s recent interpretation of Schmid, let us examine how Schmid attempts to
“comparative” freedom in the 2nd Critique. This type of freedom is completely consistent with
phenomenal determinism. Thus, after 1790 “moral freedom” refers to the kind of practical agency that
presupposes transcendental freedom.
77
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reconcile a system of universal necessity with moral responsibility. After all, if immoral actions
are the result of an external hindrance to the efficacy of pure reason, then how is the agent to be
held culpable for failing to act according to the moral law? Contrary to what one might expect,
Schmid is still committed to a notion of moral culpability for immoral actions.
I am not endorsing Schmid’s position. However, in presenting his position, I will argue
that it is at least more attractive than scholars such as George di Giovanni have intimated. Di
Giovanni constructs a dichotomy of options open to Schmid given his commitment to Kant’s
conception of the moral law:

On the one hand, he can follow up on the implications of Kant’s standpoint. In this case,
a new world of meaning would open up for him, one in which the apparently mere
physical component in the description of human behavior carries from the beginning a
completely different meaning than it would have in purely theoretical discourse. The
character of an action is defined first and foremost ideally, with reference to the law.
This is a world where ‘killings’ are relevant only inasmuch as they are to be adjudicated
as either ‘manslaughters’ or ‘murders’…None of these characterizations are reducible to
purely physical predicates…On the other hand, Schmid can revert to Ulrich’s traditional
conflation of physical and moral – that is, he can consider the law, however much now
formally defined in Kantian style, as still the conscious by-product of a given particular
nature…There is no doubt that Schmid opted for this second alternative – or, more
precisely, since it is doubtful that he ever understood the possibility of the first, that he
fell in line with it as if instinctively.79
Thus, according to di Giovanni, Schmid can either enter into a “world of meaning” independent
of physical descriptions, or accept Ulrich’s system of thoroughgoing necessity. The first disjunct
entails the irreducibility of the normative to physical descriptions. Hence di Giovanni’s claim
that “manslaughters” and “murders” cannot be reduced to “purely physical predicates.” The
problem with di Giovanni’s characterization is that he has created a false dichotomy.80 A
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commitment to the irrationality of chance does not exclude a commitment to the irreducibility of
the normative to physical descriptions.81 In fact, Schmid relies on the practical/theoretical
distinction in order to maintain his commitment to both. Schmid asserts:

Intelligible fatalism of nature…can provide no determining ground of these actions nor a
principle of inactivity, since only what we are acquainted with can have a determining
influence on our actions, whereas the limits that define rational activity are absolutely
indeterminable for us. For morality it is enough to know or to believe that everything
with which we are acquainted, and all temporal circumstances cannot force us to act
irrationally, and hence cannot cut us off from the obligation of always making the moral
law the rule and guideline of our actions, although, from a theoretical point of view, it
cannot really be the determining rule of our actions at all.82
Schmid’s point, as obvious as it may seem, is that rational agency is to act on the basis of
reasons. Thus, volition requires the representation of reasons on the basis of which we can act.
Only “what we are acquainted with,” i.e. representations of which we are conscious, can be
considered determining grounds of our actions. From the practical standpoint, morality is
secured by the fact that as rational agents nothing can force us to act irrationally. And so even if
from the theoretical standpoint all events are ultimately grounded in a thoroughgoing
determinism at the intelligible level, this determinism is inaccessible to us as agents (it is only a
theoretical presupposition), and cannot infringe upon the way in which we conceive rational
agency from the practical standpoint. Accordingly, I regard as unfounded di Giovanni’s claim
that Schmid never “understood the possibility” of the first disjunct, i.e. of carving out an account
81

It might be argued that the second disjunct already entails the reduction of the normative to the physical
insofar as di Giovanni characterizes the second disjunct as “Ulrich’s traditional conflation of physical and
moral.” On this reading, di Giovanni’s disjunction would not be a false dichotomy. Instead, di Giovanni
would have presented a straw man of Schmid’s position. Regardless of which fallacy we attribute to di
Giovanni, the point is that he mischaracterizes Schmid’s position as incapable of reconciling
thoroughgoing necessity with a commitment to the independence of the normative from reduction to
physical descriptions.
82
Schmid, C.C.E., Attempt at a Moral Philosophy, §257, 211

26

of rational agency from the practical perspective that would be secured from reduction to his
commitment to an ultimately deterministic state of affairs. Be that as it may, that Schmid is not
guilty of di Giovanni’s charge does not immunize his position from difficulties.
The main problem with Schmid’s account of imputability is not so much due to his
commitment to intelligible fatalism, but rather due to his claim that only moral actions are to be
conceived as the result of the activity of pure reason, and therefore free. Schmid asserts that
even though immoral actions do not stem from the efficacy of reason, but rather are due to other
non-rational forces, reason still imputes to itself its omitted activity, because “reason is not
acquainted with the obstacles of this self-activity…and therefore cannot take them into
account.”83 Schmid goes on to say: “With regard to these concepts and the judgments of
imputation, we suppose that, regardless of all circumstances, [the faculty of] reason of the
rational being that erred could have had a higher degree of self-active efficacy. For nothing
existing in time, nothing cognizable could have restricted the efficacy of reason.”84 Thus,
Schmid’s conception of imputability relies on the agent’s ignorance of the underlying intelligible
obstacles that hinder the efficacy of reason to determine the will. Of course, it does not follow
that because nothing cognizable and existing in time could have restricted reason, that therefore
it could have been efficacious. By his own admission, Schmid holds that when reason is
inefficacious, “it could not be efficacious.”85 Schmid has little recourse to rely on the
practical/theoretical distinction, i.e. that from the practical standpoint we must suppose that in
immoral action reason could have been more efficacious, because he maintains that immoral
actions are not free. As we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, Kant and Reinhold are committed to a
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more robust libertarian account of free will as a condition for moral imputability. Reinhold in
particular takes issue with Schmid’s restriction of freedom to moral acts.

1.4

CONCLUSION

The reception of Kant’s theory of free will was crucial to Reinhold’s development of his own
theory. Given that Kant never addressed free immoral actions in his Critical works until
Religion, there is good reason to think that the philosophical discussion on free will in the 1780s
prompted Kant to address this issue in 1792. We can sum up the contributions of the foregoing
thinkers as follows. Rehberg questioned how Kant’s merely formal moral law can serve as a
principle for the performance of action for the sake of this supreme norm. Rehberg contended
that such a principium executionis would have to be present to empirical consciousness and
would therefore no longer maintain its purely formal status. Rehberg’s position may have
influenced Reinhold to conceive free will as a conscious choice to conform to or transgress the
moral law. Ulrich criticized Kant’s conception of “freedom” as only being able to avoid
necessity by avoiding temporally determined necessity. According to Ulrich, this does not entail
that freedom qua causa noumena is not ultimately subject to ineluctable necessity at the
noumenal level. C.C.E Schmid, following Ulrich’s doctrine of thoroughgoing determinism,
interprets Kantian freedom a la intelligible fatalism. According to Schmid, freedom is restricted
to moral action and consists in the self-activity of reason whereas immoral action is not free, but
rather is to be conceived as due to a hindrance to the efficacy of reason. Reinhold would go on
to argue against Schmid, claiming that such a conception of free will undermines moral
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imputability and therewith, the intelligibility of the moral law. Indeed, as we will see in Chapter
2, Kant himself rejects free will as restricted to moral action in Religion.
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Chapter 2
Freedom and Facts of Consciousness

K.L. Reinhold presents his conception of free will in his Letters on the Kantian Philosophy
Volume II (Letters II). According to Reinhold, we have two fundamental drives: the selfish drive,
which expresses the demand of desire, and the unselfish drive, which expresses the demand of
the moral law (LII 134–36/181–84). The will is the capacity to determine oneself for or against
the demand of the unselfish drive viz. the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of the selfish drive (LII
135/183). That is, the will is the capacity to determine oneself for or against the moral law given
the demand of desire. The two drives are connected in such a way that the demand of the
unselfish drive, i.e. the demand of the moral law, always relates to the possible fulfillment of a
given desire. For instance, Reinhold would interpret Kant’s false-promise example as follows.
An individual is confronted with a desire to make a false promise (presumably for some
advantage). This desire to make a false promise is the demand of the selfish drive and can either
be satisfied or not satisfied. This same individual is also confronted with a feeling that he ought
not make the false promise. This “moral feeling” is the demand of the unselfish drive, the
expression of pure practical reason, viz. the moral law.86 The agent can either heed the demand
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of the moral law and not make the false promise, or transgress the moral law by making the false
promise. The choice to act morally or immorally constitutes a decision (Entschluss)87 executed
by the power of choice (Willkür). This decision is independent of the two drives and is an
instance of spontaneous self-determination.
Reinhold frequently claims that our knowledge of free will is simply a “fact of
consciousness” (Tatsache des Bewusstseins). The secondary literature on Reinhold’s theory of
free will has taken this phenomenological fact to be Reinhold’s epistemic foundation for free
will. This is often considered a fatal flaw in Reinhold’s account. Faustino Fabbianelli claims
that Reinhold had difficulty “extricating himself from a psychological conception of freedom,
because his discussion remains grounded in mere facts of consciousness.”88 Similarly, Günter
Zöller claims “with Reinhold, practical philosophy remains in the domain of facts of moral
consciousness and of their logical-analytical explication within the scope of moral
psychology,”89 and that Reinhold proceeds in the phenomenological style of the popular
philosophers, connecting empirical results with their theoretical penetration.90 However, not all
commentators take a disparaging stance on Reinhold’s seemingly psychologistic account of free
will.91 Daniel Breazeale notes that Reinhold’s appeal to facts of consciousness can be seen as an
anticipation of existentialist thinkers who take our phenomenal experience of free will to be

grounded in the unselfish drive via moral feeling, to be an attempt to bridge the phenomenal/noumenal
gap found in Kant’s philosophy (“The Fate of Kantian Freedom,” 106).
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fundamental to the human condition.92 To be sure, on the one hand there is something offputting about making philosophical claims on the basis of facts of consciousness, and a serious
worry that this practice amounts to making bald assertions. On the other hand,
phenomenological approaches to certain philosophical issues, or to philosophy in general, should
not be rejected out of hand. However, rather than weigh in on the merits of Reinhold’s alleged
grounding of our knowledge of free will in facts of consciousness, I contend that this is not the
most charitable interpretation of Reinhold’s argumentative strategy after all, or, better yet, that
the appeal to facts of consciousness tells only half the story. I argue that while Reinhold indeed
grounds our knowledge of free will in facts of consciousness (1), this fact is not a bald assertion
grounded in empirical psychology, but rather, per Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, follows a
priori from our indubitable consciousness of the moral law (2). Having assumed Kant’s doctrine
of the fact of reason, Reinhold then provides an argument for free will as a necessary condition
for moral responsibility, and thereby, as a condition for the normative force of the moral law (3).
Scholars up to now have failed to recognize the implicit argument for free will, specifically with
respect to immoral actions, in Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Using the
Lectures on Ethics, I demonstrate Kant’s commitment to the biconditional relation between
moral obligation and imputability in order to explicate this implicit argument, and show that this
argumentative strategy parallels Reinhold’s own argument implicit in the Letters II (4).

2.1

THE FACT OF FREEDOM
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Breazeale, Daniel, “The Primacy of the Practical and the Freedom of the Will.” Although he does not
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“contemporary practitioners of phenomenology” is asserted by Breazeale in “The Fate of Kantian
Freedom,” 120–21.
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Reinhold makes clear in “Letter Six” of his Letters on the Kantian Philosophy Volume II that his
presentation of the fundamental concepts of ethics (including the concept of free will) is not
based on metaphysics at all, but rather is based on the original and universal faculties of human
cognition, which make themselves known through facts of consciousness (LII 133/180).
Reinhold even says that while his assertions would normally require arguments and proofs to be
accepted by philosophers, his claims in “Letter Six” are neither argued for nor proven (LII
133/180). He considers himself justified in making these bald assertions insofar as this is a
prerogative that “every philosophizing author has exercised on every occasion” (LII 133/180–
81). Accordingly, Reinhold considers himself to be secure in these assertions insofar as no one
will be able to deny Reinhold this prerogative without, at the same time, “compelling himself to
eternal silence” (LII 133/181). In short, Reinhold’s position amounts to the proverbial
declaration: “let he who has not made bald assertions cast the first stone.” He admonishes that
whoever tries to refute his fundamental concepts will have a hard time when Reinhold denies the
presuppositions underlying the attempted refutation (LII 133/181), i.e. “if you deny my
assertions, then I’ll deny yours.” Reinhold at least promises a more precise argument for these
assertions (LII 134/181), presumably to be derived from the first principle of his
Elementarphilosophie. However, Reinhold abandoned the idea of deriving these practical results
from a single first principle. Nevertheless, he did not abandon the assertions themselves. The
fundamental concepts of ethics he presents in the Letters II (1792) are largely consistent with his
“Foundation of Ethics” in Contributions to the Correction of Previous Misunderstandings of
Philosophers Volume II (1794) as well as with his lectures from 1796 on the “Principles of
Ethics and Natural Right.”93 Without the redemption of his promissory note for a more explicit
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proof, Reinhold’s justification for these assertions seems to be only a slightly more sophisticated
formulation of the playground retort “I know you are but what am I.” We shall see that already
in the Letters II, there is an implicit argument for Reinhold’s conception of free will. But first,
we must examine Reinhold’s presentation of free will as a fact of consciousness.
Reinhold asserts as facts of consciousness: “First, that in volition as well as in
involuntary desire, that drive, which can be moved to action only by pleasure and displeasure, is
active – Second, that in volition, in addition to that drive, reason is also active in a particular
way” (LII 173/244). By asserting these facts, Reinhold takes himself to have established the
basic structure of agency in general, and volition in particular. The first fact establishes that in
any act (i.e. in both volition and involuntary desire) the selfish drive is active. As has already
been mentioned above, the selfish drive expresses the demand of desire, i.e. the demand
grounded in pleasure and displeasure. Acts that are grounded only in desire, are not volitions,
but are instinctual and animal (LII 174/246). The second fact establishes that in volition, reason
is active by means of expressing the demand of the moral law through the unselfish drive.
Reinhold goes on to assert that it is also a fact of consciousness that in volition an act of decision
takes place as “the special act of our I (the person in us)” (LII 173/244–45). Reinhold is careless
in sometimes characterizing the act of decision as performed by the I, i.e. the person, and at other
right of compulsion, duty to compulsion, etc., the “Foundation of Ethics” from Contributions II does not
address these concepts. Nevertheless there is significant overlap in the “Foundation of Ethics” with the
“Sixth Letter,” “Seventh Letter,” and “Eighth Letter” from Letters II, specifically concerning the concepts
of the will, free will, moral action, acts with no moral significance, etc. For the similarity between Letters
II and Contributions II, see Faustino Fabbianelli’s editorial notes within the “Foundation of Ethics” with
references to corresponding passages in Letters II (Faustino Fabbianelli (ed.), CII). It should be noted
that Reinhold abandons his employment of “selfish drive” and “unselfish drive” in Contributions II.
However, this variance is merely terminological. Reinhold still maintains in Contributions II that
freedom of the will consists in the satisfaction or non-satisfaciton of a demand of desire (which in
Contributions II he sometimes also refers to as the “drive to gratification”) in light of the demand of the
moral law. In the second edition (1793) of his Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung Fichte criticizes
Reinhold’s use of “selfish” and “unselfish” drives (See Daniel Breazeale, “The Fate of Kantian Freedom,”
100f.). Fichte’s criticism may have prompted Reinhold’s terminological shift.
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times as performed by the power of choice. Reinhold does not hold that the decision is merely a
rational activity of the I, which is then subsequently carried out by the power of choice. It is the
power of choice that makes one of the occasioning grounds of the demands of the selfish and
unselfish drives into a determining ground of volition (LII 191–92/279). It is this act that is the
“genuine fact of freedom” (LII 192/279–80). We will see in Chapter 3 that Reinhold sometimes
characterizes this activity as the activity of the I insofar as he holds that the act of decision,
which is sufficient for volition, is necessarily a conscious self-determination. In this way, the
power of choice is the self-determining capacity of the intentional subject. According to
Reinhold, this free self-determination “is completely comprehensible to me from its effects,
through which it emerges among the facts of consciousness, and to this extent it is no object of
faith, but rather an object of the most real knowledge for me” (LII 194/284). The fact of freedom
points to a basic faculty that is “therefore none the more incomprehensible than every other basic
faculty of the mind, i.e. as sensibility, the understanding, and reason, which reveal themselves to
consciousness only through their effects, but whose causes are incomprehensible insofar as they
contain in themselves the ultimate supposed ground of their modes of activity” (LII 194/284).
While it is undeniable that Reinhold does assert our knowledge of free will as a fact of
consciousness, I argue that Reinhold accepts Kant’s claim in the 2nd Critique that our
consciousness of free will follows directly from our consciousness of the moral law as a fact of
reason. Reinhold then offers an implicit argument on the basis of moral responsibility in order to
establish freedom to choose against the moral law. This argument becomes crucial in the KantReinhold Controversy of 1797.

2.2

FREEDOM AND THE FACT OF REASON IN THE 2ND CRITIQUE
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Reinhold asserts: “The Kantian works have only just prepared, and by no means delivered, the
determinate concept that contains the logical character of the will” (LII 186/268). To be sure,
Reinhold takes it to be his task to deliver this determinate concept, and in such a way that it
builds on the path already prepared by Kant. More explicitly, Reinhold states: “the claim «that
the concept of freedom first receives its reality through consciousness of the moral law» from the
Critique of Practical Reason is incontestably true” (LII 190/276). Thus, Reinhold presupposes
Kant’s “fact of reason” from the 2nd Critique:

Consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of reason. (CPrR 5:31)
Moreover, the moral law is given, as it were, as a fact of pure reason of which we are a
priori conscious and which is apodictically certain. (CPrR 5:47)
How does consciousness of the moral law give reality to the concept of freedom? In order to see
the move from moral law to freedom that Reinhold takes over from Kant, it will be necessary to
examine Kant’s own position in the 2nd Critique.
Consciousness of the moral law entails consciousness of that law as binding upon oneself
insofar as the moral law is the “supreme principle of pure practical reason” (CPrR 5:39) and is
“thought as objectively necessary only because it is to hold for everyone having reason and will”
(CPrR 5:26). The moral law is the “sole principle that can possibly be fit for categorical
imperatives” (CPrR 5:41), which are rules “indicated by an ‘ought,’ which expresses the
objective necessitation to the action” (CPrR 5:20). Kant takes our consciousness of the moral
law as supremely authoritative to lead “directly to the concept of freedom” (CPrR 5:29). It is not
immediately clear how consciousness of the moral law is supposed to lead to the concept of
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freedom. I take Kant to ground this move from the concept of the moral law to the concept of
freedom in the implicit premise that ought implies can, as evidenced by his illustration that
“experience also confirms this order of concepts in us” (5:30). The illustration is of a man
pressed by his prince to give false testimony under threat of execution. If asked whether he
could overcome his love of life and be put to death in order to fulfill his moral duty, “He would
perhaps not venture to assert whether he would do it or not, but he must admit without hesitation
that it would be possible for him. He judges, therefore, that he can do something because he is
aware that he ought to do it and cognizes freedom within him” (CPrR 5:30). Paul Guyer has
recently claimed that the move from consciousness of the moral law to the concept of freedom
does not rely on “ought implies can.” Because “ought implies can” plays a significant role in
Kant’s account of free will in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, it is worth
investigating the role of this premise in the 2nd Critique. It will be argued in Section 3 that,
similar to Reinhold, Kant presupposes the fact of reason in his argument for free will in Religion.
As evidence for his claim that Kant does not rely on “ought implies can” in the 2nd
Critique, Guyer cites the following passage:

But how is consciousness of that moral law possible? We can become aware of pure
practical laws just as we are aware of pure theoretical principles, by attending to the
necessity with which reason prescribes them to us and to the setting aside of all empirical
conditions to which reason directs us. The concept of a pure will arises from the first, as
consciousness of a pure understanding arises from the latter. (CPrR 5:30)94
Guyer claims that Kant’s reference to “ought implies can” is only made after his initial claim that
awareness of pure practical laws leads directly to the concept of a pure will, just as awareness of
pure theoretical principles leads to awareness of a pure understanding. Accordingly, Kant only
94
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makes use of “ought implies can” to show that “experience also confirms this order of concepts
in us” (CPrR 5:30).95 Guyer claims that awareness of the moral law leads to freedom insofar as
Kant equates “pure practical reason with a pure will when he says that the consciousness of a
pure will arises from the necessity of pure practical laws.”96 Guyer’s interpretation is well suited
to account for the passage cited above where Kant compares our inference to a pure will from
practical laws to the inference to a pure understanding from pure theoretical principles.
However, if this is indeed Kant’s position, it falls far short of showing how our consciousness of
the moral law leads directly to the concept of freedom.
To be sure, our awareness of the purity of practical laws may lead to awareness of the
purity of the faculty that legislates those laws, reason, but it by no means follows from this that
we have the freedom to will on the basis of those laws.97 It is only once “ought implies can” is
presupposed that we can move from our awareness of pure practical laws to awareness of our
capacity to act on those laws. A closer examination of Kant’s commitments to the nature of the
moral law and his discussion of the fact of reason will be helpful in making sense of Kant’s line
of thought. Kant of course held that if there is a moral law, then it must be a priori (and therefore
universal and necessary). He also held: “All practical principles that presuppose an object
(matter) of the faculty of desire as the determining ground of the will are, without exception,
empirical and can furnish no practical laws” (5:21). Thus, only the lawgiving form of a maxim
can constitute the determining ground of the will in moral volition. Indeed, it is because the
moral law is formal, i.e. the “universal lawgiving form [of maxims]” (CPrR 5:28–9) that we
“become immediately conscious” of that law “as soon as we draw up maxims for ourselves”
(CPrR 5:29). Kant goes on to say that we become immediately conscious of the moral law
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“inasmuch as reason presents it as a determining ground not to be outweighed by any sensible
conditions and indeed quite independent of them” (CPrR 5:29–30). Provided that the will is the
“capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws” (G 4:412),98 the premise of
“ought implies can” entails that insofar as we have a will and we are aware of the moral law,
then we have the capacity to act according to the representation of the moral law independent of
sensible conditions, i.e. then we are free.
Admittedly, Kant’s talk about free will often lends itself to Guyer’s interpretation that
Kant equates the pure will with pure practical reason and that Kant takes himself to establish free
will insofar as he has established the purity of reason in its spontaneous self-legislation of the
moral law: “independence, however, is freedom in the negative sense, whereas this lawgiving of
its own on the part of pure and, as such, practical reason is freedom in the positive sense” (CPrR
5:33). However, as we saw above, Kant consistently defines the will in both the Groundwork
and the 2nd Critique as the capacity to determine itself on the basis of rules, or representations of
laws. It would be a serious oversight on Kant’s part to hold that the will is a capacity for selfdetermination on the basis of the representation of laws, and then take a free will to be
tantamount to the legislation of a law. We can, in part, attribute Kant’s ambiguity on this matter
to the fact that he had not yet introduced the Wille/Willkür distinction that delineates the
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somewhat careless with his phrasing insofar as his considered position is not that the will is not a capacity
for action, but rather a capacity to make a possible determining ground a determining ground of volition:
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legislative and executive components of volition.99 Furthermore, given “ought implies can,” the
lawgiving of pure practical reason is sufficient for free will. Thus, Kant may have simply taken
for granted that in establishing the former, he was also establishing the latter. Regardless, it is
enough for our present purposes to acknowledge that in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant
took the fact of reason of our consciousness of the moral law to lead directly to the concept of
free will. We will see in the Section 2.4, following our examination of Reinhold’s argument that
presupposes the fact of reason, that Kant took a similar path in Religion within the Boundaries of
Mere Reason.

2.3

REINHOLD’S IMPLICIT ARGUMENT IN THE LETTERS II

In his “Eighth Letter” of the Letters II, Reinhold argues for the concept of free will, viz. the
capacity for spontaneous self-determination for or against the moral law, from the premise that
free will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. His argument is imbedded in his
response to the Schmidian conception of free will. Reinhold first notes that identifying free will
solely with autonomy, i.e. reason’s self-legislation of the moral law and the capacity to act on its
basis, entails the impossibility of free immoral acts (LII 185/267). However, as we saw in
Chapter 1, Schmid explicitly admits that freedom of the will is restricted to moral acts. And so
merely stating that a notion of free will restricted to moral acts precludes freedom for immoral
acts is not sufficient to refute a Schmidian interpretation of Kantian free will. Reinhold needs to
show that this conception of free will is inherently problematic. Reinhold concedes that at least
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moral law.
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Schmid is consistent enough to recognize that if free will is restricted to moral acts, then the
ground of immoral acts must “be sought outside of the will in external obstacles” (LII 200/296).
However, if the ground of immoral acts is posited in external obstacles, then the ground of moral
acts would consist in the absence of such obstacles, i.e. “Moral acts would inevitably take place
through a completely involuntary activity of practical reason as long as there was no obstacle
there; and both moral and immoral acts would thus have to be attributed solely to the presence or
absence of such an obstacle” (LII 200/296–97). Of course, Reinhold’s argument as it stands is
rather underdeveloped. It only establishes that if we are morally responsible for our actions, then
a conception of free will that is restricted to moral actions would undermine that moral
responsibility insofar as immoral actions would be directly grounded in the presence of obstacles
hindering the efficacy of pure practical reason and moral actions would ultimately be grounded
in the absence of such obstacles. The argument is a nonstarter if the antecedent is not established,
i.e. it must be established that we really are morally responsible for our actions. I contend that
Reinhold’s underdeveloped argument must be read as already presupposing the results of the
Critique of Practical Reason.
If we take Reinhold to presuppose that the fact of reason entails moral responsibility, then
we can see Reinhold’s seeming underdeveloped argument is actually an extended argument.
Thus, given that we are bound by the moral law, we are morally responsible for our actions.
Suppose that we were only free to obey the moral law. Then moral responsibility would be
undermined, because, as we saw in Reinhold’s treatment of Schmid, immoral actions would be
grounded in obstacles preventing moral action, and moral action would in turn be grounded in
the absence of those obstacles. If moral responsibility were undermined, then so too would our
being bound by the moral law. Our consciousness of the moral law is a priori necessary
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according to the fact of reason from the 2nd Critique. Therefore, the supposition that we are only
free to obey the moral law contradicts our a priori consciousness of the moral law as binding
upon us. The contradiction is lifted if we grant our freedom to transgress the moral law. In this
way, Reinhold’s conception of freedom as choosing for or against the moral law is established by
accepting the result of the Critique of Practical Reason that we are free to obey the moral law,
and then, given the premise that moral obligation entails moral responsibility, arguing by
reductio ad absurdum that we must also be free to transgress the moral law.
Why should we accept the premise that moral obligation entails moral responsibility?
Reinhold offers no argument for this claim. Given his admission that he has accepted the results
of the Critique of Practical Reason and his attempt at a reductio, it is clear that he presupposes
this premise. I contend that we may gain insight into Reinhold’s line of thought by turning to
Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Interestingly, Kant’s claims in Religion
lend themselves to a commitment to an implicit argument that is strikingly similar to Reinhold’s.
Kant also seems to hold that moral obligation entails moral responsibility. However, this
premise is unargued in Religion. We find support for Kant’s commitment to this premise in the
Lectures on Ethics. Let us turn to Kant’s claims in Religion and examine his implicit
presuppositions.

2.4

KANT’S ARGUMENT FROM MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

To make sense of Kant’s claims we will need to do some heavy interpretation. On the face of it,
it looks like Kant does not make an argument in Religion for free will at all, but rather just makes
a series of assertions. These assertions posit freedom as a necessary condition for moral

42

responsibility, or “imputability” (Zurechnungsfähigkeit).100 Kant claims that the subjective
ground of the exercise of freedom must “itself always be a deed of freedom (for otherwise the
use or abuse of the human being’s power of choice [Willkür] with respect to the moral law could
not be imputed to him, nor could the good or evil in him be called “moral”)” (R 6:21). With
respect to the disposition that serves as the ground of the adoption of particular maxims, Kant
claims: “This disposition, too, however, must be adopted through the free power of choice, for
otherwise it could not be imputed” (6:25). For our present purposes, we will bracket an
examination of what Kant means by the ground of the adoption of particular maxims.101 Our
chief concern is Kant’s claims that a deed must be free, i.e. an act of the free power of choice
[Willkür], otherwise it could not be imputed to the agent. Thus, freedom is a necessary condition
for moral imputability.102 We can set up the relation as a conditional: if an action is morally
imputable, then it was performed freely. Kant’s argument is underdeveloped and he seems to
think that these claims are sufficient to establish freedom, particularly with respect to immoral
actions. Obviously, the argument is woefully incomplete if the antecedent is not established.
Like Reinhold, Kant seems to presuppose that moral obligation entails moral responsibility.
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Kant uses the related forms of “imputation (Zurechnung)” and “can be imputed (zugerechnet werden
kann)” more frequently than “imputability (Zurechnungsfähigkeit).” Interestingly, “Zurechungsfähigkeit”
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Unfortunately, Kant does not expound on this assumption in any of the critical works. However,
several passages in the Metaphysics of Morals and the Lectures on Ethics support our reading.

2.4.1

Obligation, Imputability, and Freedom

In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant asserts: “An action is a deed insofar as it comes under
obligatory laws and hence insofar as the subject, in doing it, is considered in terms of the
freedom of his choice. By such an action the agent is regarded as the author of its effect, and
this, together with the action itself, can be imputed to him, if one is previously acquainted with
the law by virtue of which an obligation rests on these” (MM 6:223).103 The “hence” in the first
sentence suggests the conditional:

A: If an action comes under obligatory laws, then the action is to be considered [in
terms of] a free choice.
The second sentence literally forms a conjunction, i.e. an agent can be regarded as the author of
such an action and the action can be imputed to the agent; however, I take Kant to be suggesting
a conditional:

B: If the agent is regarded as the author, then the action can be imputed to him.
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“That heißt eine Handlung, sofern sie unter Gesetzen der Verbindlichkeit steht, folglich auch sofern
das Subject in derselben nach der Freiheit seiner Willkür betrachtet wird. Der Handelnde wird durch
einen solchen Act als Urheber der Wirkung betrachtet, und diese zusammt der Handlung selbst können
ihm zugerechnet werden, wenn man vorher das Gesetz kennt, kraft welches auf ihnen eine Verbindlichkeit
ruht.” It is unclear whether “man” in the last clause refers to “der Handelnde” or to one who would be
able to impute the agent.
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I take the content of the antecedent of the second conditional (an agent is regarded as the author)
to be tantamount to the content of the consequent of the first conditional (an action is to be
considered a free choice). On this reading, by hypothetical syllogism it follows:

C: If an action comes under obligatory laws, i.e. moral laws, then the action can be
imputed to the agent.
Another passage from Metaphysics of Morals is significant: “A person is a subject
whose actions can be imputed to him. Moral personality is therefore nothing other than the
freedom of a rational being under moral laws (whereas psychological personality is merely the
ability to be conscious of one’s identity in different conditions of one’s existence)” (MM
6:223).104 This passage is difficult to unpack. Kant’s use of “therefore” (also) clearly indicates
that he takes the fact that a person is a subject whose actions can be imputed to him to somehow
entail something about freedom and being bound by moral laws, but it is not clear how this
relation is to be cashed out. An examination of passages from the Lectures on Ethics are useful
in making sense of Kant’s position on the relation between freedom, moral responsibility (or
imputability), and moral obligation.
Lectures on Ethics were not written by Kant himself but were written by students on the
basis of his lectures. Of course, Kant’s published works must take precedence over the Lectures
for reasons of reliability and accuracy. Our use of the Lectures is unproblematic insofar as we
use them here as a supplement to elucidate passages in Kant’s published writing rather than as
the basis for a divergent reading. We will see in the next section (2.4.2) how Kant’s apparent
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“Person ist dasjenige Subject, dessen Handlungen einer Zurechnung fähig sind. Die moralische
Persönlichkeit ist also nichts anders, als die Freiheit eines vernünftigen Wesens unter moralischen
Gesetzen (die pychologische aber bloß das Vermögen, sich der Identität seiner selbst in den
verschiedenen Zuständen seines Daseins bewußt zu werden)…”
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treatment of freedom, imputability, and obligation correspond with his position on free immoral
action in Religion. Here we draw chiefly from the notes written by Johann Friedrich Vigilantius.
These notes are well suited to our investigation insofar as they were based on lectures that began
in the same year in which Religion was published (1793).105 Vigilantius was a lawyer and good
friend of Kant;106 thus, given his intellectual capabilities evidenced by his profession and his
close relation to Kant, we have every reason to think that his notes of Kant’s lectures are
generally accurate. Let us turn to the relevant passages:

1)
2)

3)

Freedom of the will as such is the accountability, or mode of human action that
can be imputed to the agent, and morals is the name for the use of freedom
according to laws of reason. (L-E/Vigilantius 27:480)
All actions can be regarded either as occurrences in nature, or under the
condition that we have a certain obligation to them, and only in the latter case
can they be accounted to us. An occurrence in nature is the determination of
things insofar as they follow in time according to laws of nature, in which case,
that is, the actions follow each other from moment to moment…If, on the other
hand, there is an obligation to the action, it can be imputed. For this to happen,
however, it is requisite that somebody can be regarded as the originator of the
action, i.e. as its complete first cause. (L-E/Vigilantius 27:503)
Now the object of imputation is determined under the following considerations:
(I) nothing can be imputed, save what is subject to laws, and in respect of
which we are obligated ad aliquid ommittendum vel commitendum. For only
an action that rests on freedom is imputable, and freedom itself is nothing more
than the capacity to be held accountable (receptivitas imputationis). Hence the
factum is also called actio libertatis, in contrast to an eventus that was due to an
actio physica. (L-E/Vigilantius 27:564)

It is not immediately clear from Passage (1) what Kant means when he says that freedom is the
mode of human action that can be imputed. And it is not immediately clear what Kant is
claiming in Passage (2). In Passage (2) Kant again asserts that imputability is a necessary
condition for obligation, i.e. if an action is obligatory, then it is imputable. But it is not clear
105
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See Paul Guyer, Virtues of Freedom, 160 n19.
Schneewind, J.B., “Introduction” to L-E, xviii.
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how he conceives the relation of freedom to obligation and imputability when he then states that
“for this to happen, however, it is requisite that somebody can be regarded as the originator of
the action.” The third passage from Lectures on Ethics is helpful in elucidating this relation.
Passage (3) from Lectures on Ethics suggests the following conditional:

If an action can be imputed, then it is subject to laws [of obligation].

Given our treatment of the Metaphysics of Morals and proposition C, it follows that Kant
conceives the relation between imputability and obligation to be a biconditional:

An action can be imputed iff it falls under obligatory laws.

Having established this biconditional, we can derive the following conditional by hypothetical
syllogism given proposition A:

If an action is imputable, then the action is to be considered a free choice.

This conditional along with proposition B forms the following biconditional:

An action is imputable iff it is considered a free choice.

Lastly, with this biconditional we can derive:
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An action is considered free iff it falls under obligatory laws.

Thus, Kant conceives a tripartite reciprocal relation between imputability, obligation, and
freedom. On the basis of this tripartite relation, the passage from Metaphysics of Morals as well
as passages (1) and (2) from the Lectures on Ethics become coherent. Bearing this tripartite
relation in mind, let us turn back to Religion to flesh out Kant’s implicit argument.

2.4.2

Kant’s Implicit Argument in Religion

While Guyer denied Kant’s reliance on the principle that “ought implies can” in
establishing free will in the Critique of Practical Reason, he argues that Kant does rely on the
principle to establish free will in Religion:

He [Kant] just assumes the binding force of the moral law and appeals exclusively to the
principle that ought implies can for assurance of the possibility of choosing good even if
we have previously chosen evil as well as for the danger of once again choosing evil even
if we have already chosen to convert from evil to good – which this principle allows
because of course “ought implies can” does not imply that “ought implies does.”107
Although Guyer does not mention the relation between Kant’s assumption of the binding force of
the moral law and the fact of reason of the 2nd Critique, it would be rather uncharitable to Kant to
interpret this assumption as an arbitrary development when it can readily be accounted for as a
consistent premise in Kant’s critical works after 1788.108 Furthermore, Kant explicitly describes
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Paul Guyer, The Virtues of Freedom, 183
One may object that the fact of reason itself is a bald assumption of the binding force of the moral law.
Be that as it may, the matter at hand is not to defend Kant’s doctrine of the fact of reason, but rather to
show that his commitment to the same is part of his argumentative strategy in both the Critique of
Practical Reason as well as in Religion.
108
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the move from moral obligation to free will as an inference from our consciousness of the moral
law to our capacity to obey that law, given that ought implies can:

We can quickly be convinced that the concept of the freedom of the power of choice does
not precede in us the consciousness of the moral law but is only inferred from the
determinability of our power of choice through this law as unconditional command. We
have only to ask whether we are certainly and immediately conscious of a faculty
enabling us to overcome, by firm resolve, every incentive to transgression, however
great…Everybody must admit that he does not know whether, were such a situation to
arise, he would not waver in his resolve. Yet duty equally commands him
unconditionally: he ought to remain true to his resolve; and from this he rightly
concludes that he must also be able to do it, and that his power of choice is therefore free.
(R 6:49)109
To be sure, this passage from Religion, which establishes our freedom to act on the basis of the
moral law from our consciousness of the binding force of that law, lends credence to our
interpretation of the Critique of Practical Reason as appealing to “ought implies can.” Of
course, “ought implies can” is not sufficient to establish freedom to act against the moral law. In
the passage from Guyer cited above, he only claims that because “ought implies can” does not
entail “ought implies does,” that there is room for choosing evil.110 However, Guyer then seems
to claim that freedom of immoral actions is somehow established by “ought implies can”:
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In the quotation, it is not immediately clear what “determinability of our power of choice through this
law as unconditional command” (Bestimmbarkeit unserer Willkür durch dieses [Gesetz], als unbedingtes
Gebot) means. I contend that Kant must mean something akin to the ability of the power of choice to be
attuned to the command of the moral law. By virtue of this attunement, or the ability of the power of
choice to be responsive to the command of the moral law, we can infer our freedom to be able to do what
duty commands. Kant cannot mean “determinability” in the sense of “the ability/capacity to be
determined” in a causal sense. This would be tantamount to saying that by virtue of the power of choice
being determined [to action] by the moral law, we can infer that the power of choice can act on the basis
of the moral law. This would, of course, be completely circular. On Kant’s various employments of
“determination” and “determinability” see Joshua Rayman, Kant on Sublimity and Morality, 57ff.
110
See Paul Guyer, The Virtues of Freedom, 183

49

he [Kant] simply asserts that the command of the moral law “resounds unabated in our
souls” without attempting to derive it from anything at all, and then derives the actuality
of our freedom to fulfill this demand from the principle that we must be able to fulfill our
duty, which is also asserted without any argument at all. Since he does not derive the
command of morality from anything at all, it is not derived from any conception of the
pure rationality of the noumenal self or will that would make the moral law the causal
law of the noumenal will, so that will is free to choose evil as well as good. And since
“ought implies can” does not imply “ought implies does,” as far as that principle is
concerned the noumenal self is free to choose evil as well as good.111 [my emphasis]
Guyer seems to conflate the logical possibility of acting freely against the moral law with the
establishment that a free will can actually do so. At best, in his account of Kant’s conception of
free will in Religion, Guyer has simply disregarded Kant’s attempted justification of the most
salient feature of that conception, namely the freedom to choose to act immorally. At worst,
Guyer has mistakenly thought that because freedom to choose evil does not contradict the
principle that “ought implies can,” therefore we are free to choose evil. Using our results from
the examination of Kant’s Lectures on Ethics, let us look at what Kant must have presupposed if
he is not to be guilty of a complete non sequitur in Religion.
From our examination of the Lectures on Ethics, we arrived at the following three
premises:

We are morally responsible for our actions iff those actions fall under obligatory laws.
We are morally responsible for our actions iff we perform them freely.
Actions fall under obligatory laws iff we perform them freely.
It will be necessary to introduce the following premise:
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ibid

50

We are morally responsible for actions iff we are morally responsible for morally good
and morally evil actions.
That Kant is committed to this premise is supported by the following passage:

The human being must make or have made himself into whatever he is or should become
in a moral sense, good or evil. These two [characters] must be an effect of his free power
of choice, for otherwise they could not be imputed to him and, consequently, he
could be neither morally good nor evil. (R 6:44) [my emphasis]
Thus, both good and evil must be imputable or neither good nor evil are imputable.
Furthermore, that moral responsibility must entail responsibility for both good and evil follows
from our biconditional: “We are morally responsible for actions iff they fall under obligatory
laws.” Immoral actions fall under obligatory laws just as much as moral actions. To be sure, it
is precisely because immoral actions fall under obligatory laws that they are immoral in the first
place. Given the fact of reason from the 2nd Critique that establishes our being bound by the
moral law, we are morally responsible for those actions that fall under that law. Furthermore,
those actions must be performed by our free choice (otherwise we could not be imputed to us).
Therefore, we are free to perform both moral and immoral actions.

2.5

CONCLUSION

Of course, the reader may not be convinced by Kant’s apparent argument. The argument
in the 2nd Critique secures freedom to act morally. Reinhold assumes this argument and the fact
of reason in the Letters II. Reinhold then expands on this argument by appealing to moral
imputability and attempting to show by reductio ad absurdum that the capacity to freely act
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immorally is a necessary condition for the intelligibility of the moral law. Interestingly, in
Religion and the Vigilantius lectures Kant also appeals to imputability in order to secure freedom
to act immorally. However, instead of arguing by reductio ad absurdum like Reinhold, Kant
seems to rely on three biconditionals: freedom if, and only if, moral obligation; imputability if,
and only if, moral obligation; and freedom if, and only if imputability. The biconditional
assumptions are clearly doing a lot of heavy lifting. Although argument itself does not
technically beg the question, the premises are simply asserted and so the (lack of) sub-arguments
for those premises could be said to beg the question. However, our investigation is not
concerned with the merit of Kant’s argument, but rather with the strategy, namely of establishing
freedom for immoral actions by appealing to moral responsibility. As we saw in Section 2.2, this
was Reinhold’s general strategy as well. Although Reinhold certainly thought that the reality of
freedom was something that could be recognized as a fact by even the most common
understanding, he is not guilty, as he has often been accused, of grounding knowledge of free
will in mere empirical facts of consciousness. Instead, Reinhold assumes the results of the
Critique of Practical Reason, and argues by reductio ad absurdum that we must be free to
choose immoral actions. We will see in Chapter 5 that in his “Some Remarks” essay, Reinhold
conceives his argumentative strategy to parallel that of Kant’s in Religion.
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Chapter 3
The Fate of the Faculty of Desire:
Kant and Reinhold on the Will and the Moral Worth of Actions

Kant’s transcendental turn enabled him to break with the traditional conception of the will as
rational desire. The transcendental turn made room for the possibility of transcendental freedom
and the postulation of pure practical reason as a possible determining ground of the will through
the moral law. As we saw in Chapter 2, K.L. Reinhold was convinced that an interpretation of
Kant’s theory of free will following that of C.C.E Schmid would abolish moral responsibility for
freely willed immoral acts.112 Consequently, Reinhold put forth a theory of free will in the spirit
of Kant’s own theory, albeit with a stronger emphasis on an agent’s capacity for choice, Willkür.
While scholarship has engaged with the relation between Kant’s and Reinhold’s respective
theories of free will in the Kant-Reinhold Controversy of 1797, little work has examined the role
of consciousness in these thinkers’ accounts of free will.113 I argue that while Kant’s account of
the will is a significant revision of the traditional rationalist conception of the will as the faculty
of desire, his commitment to transcendental idealism precludes a conception of free will that
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See Section 2.3. See also LII 200/296f.
The Kant-Reinhold Controversy refers to the dispute between Kant and Reinhold on the correct
formulation of the concept of free will. For discussion of this controversy, see: Henry Allison, Kant’s
Theory of Freedom, 133–36; Manfred Baum, “Kants Replik auf Reinhold”; Martin Bondeli, “Freiheit”;
Martin Bondeli, “Einleitung,” in Karl Leonhard Reinhold, LII; Martin Bondeli, “Willensfreiheit”; Martin
Bondeli, “Einleitung,” in Karl Leonhard Reinhold, VS II; Martin Bondeli, “Freiheit, Gewissen und
Gesetz”; Daniel Breazeale, “The Fate of Kantian Freedom”; Paul Guyer, “The Struggle for Freedom.”
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allows for a conception of free agency constituted by spontaneous adoption of particular maxims.
The spontaneous adoption of particular maxims requires an intentional act of self-determination
performed by an intentional subject, i.e. a conscious intentional act, and his account of free will
only permits an act of self-determination performed by intelligible Willkür.114 I argue further
that Reinhold’s theory of free will is able to account for just such an act.
This chapter uses the relation of the will to the faculty of desire as a backdrop because it
is precisely this relation that served as the occasion for fundamental developments in the
conception of the will for both Kant and Reinhold. Part 1 examines the traditional conception of
the will as the faculty of desire (3.1.1), Kant’s conception of free will in the 1770s as evidenced
by the Kaehler manuscript (3.1.2), and Kant’s revision of the traditional conception in light of
transcendental idealism (3.1.3). In Part 2 an interpretation of Kant’s account of free agency that
includes agents consciously incorporating incentives into their particular maxims is considered
(3.2.1), and it is argued that this conflicts with Kant’s account of free will as dictated by the
constraints of transcendental idealism insofar as a transcendentally free act is by definition
114

Here I employ “intentional” in two senses, which are connected with respect to the possibility of moral
action for both Kant and Reinhold. By “intentional subject,” I mean intentional(ity) in the sense of the
aboutness or referential nature of certain mental states. Thus, an intentional subject is the subject of
mental states, or representations, that are about something, or that at least purport to be about something.
By “intentional act,” I mean intentional in the sense of an intended or purposive act, i.e. an act that
involves the deliberate (and of course rational) setting of an end to be accomplished through the act.
Perhaps the best analogue of “intentional” in Kant and Reinhold would be “willkürlich.” This could also
be rendered as “voluntary” (see Guyer’s translations of willkürlich in the Cambridge edition of the
Critique of the Power of Judgment at 5:264; 322; 431, et al) or “willful” (see Gregor’s translation of
Metaphysics of Morals at 6:208). It must be noted that Kant sometimes employs “willkürlich” as
“arbitrary” whereas Reinhold rarely uses “willkürlich” in this way, but rather almost always has in mind
that which pertains to Willkür, the power of choice, literally the Kür (choice, vote, decision) of the Wille
(will). See LII 206/307–8). However, as we will see in the present chapter, Kant and Reinhold’s
conceptions of free Willkür are not commensurate insofar as Reinhold conceives free Willkür as a
capacity to choose between particular occasioning grounds as possible courses of action, whereas Kant
conceives free Willkür as a noumenal capacity that is precluded by the constraints of transcendental
idealism from choosing between particular maxims. Although Kant typically uses “willkürlich” as
pertaining to sensible Willkür (which is phenomenally determined), I avoid the potential confusion by
simply using the contemporary English “intentional.”
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noumenal and cannot be performed by an intentional subject under the bounds of inner sense
(3.2.2). Part 3 shows that Reinhold takes his conception of the will as independent from both
practical reason and the faculty of desire to be essential to his postulation of a constituent
intentional act of self-determination in any volition (3.3.1), and that Reinhold takes this
intentional act performed by an intentional subject to be a necessary condition for action with
moral significance (3.3.2). Part 4 examines two objections to Reinhold’s conception of the
intentional subject qua “person”: Prauss’ objection that the inconsistency in Reinhold’s account
of the person undermines his account of free will (3.4.1) and Zöller’s objection that Reinhold’s
account of free will is guilty of the homunculus fallacy (3.4.2).

3.1

3.1.1

KANT’S REVISION OF THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF THE
WILL AS THE FACULTY OF DESIRE
The Traditional Conception

Kant inherits the general framework of what I call the traditional conception of the will as the
faculty of desire. This conception was espoused by the rationalist, neo-Leibnizians Christian
Wolff and Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten. On the faculty of desire, Baumgarten writes:

If I endeavor or make an effort to produce some perception, i.e. if I determine the power
of my soul, or myself, to produce some perception, I DESIRE. The opposite of what I
desire, I AVERT. Therefore I have a faculty of desiring and averting (§216), that is, a
FACULTY OF DESIRE (will, more broadly speaking, cf. §690). My very endeavors, or
efforts, or determinations of my powers, are the DESIRES (appetites) of my desiring, and
the AVERSIONS of my averting. (BM 240)
According to this conception, desires are not merely inert intentional mental states, but rather
have moving force to incite action. “Desire” signifies both an intended object—or rather,
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“perception” of an object—to be realized as well as the endeavor to bring this realization
about.115 Desire is grounded in pleasure, i.e. an object is desired insofar as it is represented as
pleasing (BM 240).116 In a given desire, the intention to realize an object is grounded in an
incentive, which is the “impelling cause” of the desire (BM 241). There are two types of
incentives corresponding to the two components of the faculty of desire, the lower faculty of
desire and the upper faculty of desire. The lower faculty is associated with sensible desires, while
the upper faculty is associated with reason. Incentives for action are either stimuli or motives
(BM 247). Stimuli are incentives of the lower faculty of desire (BM 244–45). Motives are
incentives of the upper faculty of desire (BM 247). Thus, pleasure is the basis of representations
(either sensible or rational) that serve as impelling causes to endeavor to realize an object
through action. According to this conception, the will proper is equivalent to rational desire, i.e.
to action grounded in the upper faculty of desire.117
The traditional conception of volition includes a faculty of choice (arbitrium) whereby
the agent consciously determines himself according to his preference (BM 253). Baumgarten
differentiates between sensitive choice as “sensitively desiring and averting according to one’s
own preference” and free choice as “the faculty of willing or refusing according to one’s own
preference” (BM 255). Accordingly, a substance with choice can either have sensitive choice,
pure freedom, or freedom mixed with sensitive choice.118 As Reinhold notes, this conception of
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Baumgarten and Wolff inherit the Leibnizian conception of perception as a representation in which a
multiplicity is expressed in a unity. On Leibniz’s account of perception see Robert Brandom, “Leibniz
and Degrees of Perception.”
116 Thus, the object of desire to be realized is a perception that is in some way pleasing.
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According to Wolff, “Dicitur autem appetitus rationalis Voluntas” (Psychologia empirica, §880;
WoGW II/5, 663) as cited in Martin Bondeli, LII 371 n212. According to Baumgarten, “Appetitio
rationalis est volitio” (Metaphysica, §690) as cited in Martin Bondeli, LII 371 n212.
118
Ibid. Note the parallel in Metaphysics of Morals: “That choice which can be determined by pure
reason is called free choice. That which can be determined only by inclination (sensible impulse,
stimulus) would be animal choice (arbitrium brutum). Human choice, however, is a choice that can
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the will is completely consistent with determinism (LII, 184–85/264–66). Indeed, Wolff and
Baumgarten adopt Leibniz’s deterministic conception of “freedom.”119 Wolff defines freedom as
“the faculty of spontaneously choosing that which pleases it from many possible things, when it
is not determined by essence toward any of these” (WPE §941). Spontaneity, as it is employed
here, is completely consistent with determinism. All actions, insofar as they are determined by a
principle intrinsic to the agent, are spontaneous, whereas an “action” necessitated by an external
principle is not an action properly speaking, but rather a suffering (BM 251–52). According to
Baumgarten, a spontaneous action is “an action depending on a sufficient principle that is inside
the agent” (BM 251).120 In fact, insofar as all the actions of the soul are spontaneous and
“something that alters itself is called an AUTOMATON, then the soul will be an automaton”
(BM 251). Accordingly, spontaneity in this traditional sense is completely consistent with
determinism insofar as actions that proceed from an internal chain of representations could be
considered both spontaneous (proceeding from an internal principle) and causally determined by
the chain of representations. Thus, the exercise of freedom, or spontaneous choice, amounts to
choosing that which pleases the agent on the basis of the agent’s internal representations of that
which is desirable when this choice “is not determined by essence,” that is, when this choice is
not absolutely, or logically, necessary, but nevertheless hypothetically necessary given the state
of affairs of this world (or any given possible world under consideration). In the next section, we
will see that Kant himself was committed to this traditional conception of the will in the Nova
indeed be affected but not determined by impulses, and is therefore of itself (apart from an acquired
proficiency of reason) not pure but can still be determined to actions by pure will” (MM 6:213).
119
According to Leibniz, an act is “free” if it is not absolutely (as opposed to hypothetically) necessitated.
Thus, free acts are still determined within a given possible world. See: G.W. Leibniz, “On Freedom and
Possibility,” in Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (eds), G.W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, 19–23; G.W.
Leibniz “On Freedom,” in ibid, 94–98; G.W. Leibniz, “Letter to Coste, On Human Freedom,” in ibid,
193–96.
120
According to Wolff, “actions are called spontaneous insofar as the agent determines these through a
principle intrinsic to oneself” (WPE §933), as cited in BM 251.
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Dilicudatio. Already in the 1770s Kant had rejected this conception in favor of a more robust
sense of “undetermined” freedom; however, this intermediary position was replaced by Kant’s
Critical conception of freedom as grounded in transcendental idealism.

3.1.2

Kant’s Pre-Critical Conception

In his 1755 Nova Dilucidatio, Kant affirmed the traditional conception of the will and argued
against the “freedom of indifference” espoused by Crusius. In that work, Kant recapitulates
Crusius’ objection that a conception of free will grounded in the principle of sufficient reason
undermines morality. According to Crusius, if all events can ultimately be traced back to a first
state causally sufficient for the series of events, then an agent cannot be held morally responsible
for what he could not have failed to do: “responsibility for the misdeeds committed does not fall
on me, for, bound as I was by the connected series of grounds which have determined each other
from the very beginning of the world, I could not have failed to have done whatever I did do”
(ND 1:401). Instead of the Leibnizian compatibilist notion of freedom, Crusius maintains a
libertarian notion of free will that includes the freedom to do otherwise:

I should think that if you eliminate everything which is in the nature of a connected series of
reciprocally determining grounds occurring in a fixed order, and if you admit that in any free
action whatever a person finds himself in a state of indifference relative to both alternatives, and
if that person, even though all the grounds which you have imagined as determining the will in a
particular direction have been posited, is nonetheless able to choose one thing over another, no
matter what – if all that is conceded, then I should finally admit that the act had been freely
performed. (ND 1:402)

Accordingly, Crusius holds that freedom to do otherwise is a necessary condition for moral
responsibility.
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Kant concedes to Crusius that the distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity
does not change the fact that a given event in the causal chain is fully determined (ND 1:399f).
After all, that the opposite of an event is logically possible does nothing to undermine the
determination of that event in reality, i.e. the event is still determined by the initial state
pertaining to the possible world to which it belongs. Despite Kant’s concession of this point, he
still maintains that our actions are free in a morally relevant sense:

So, too, in the case of the free actions of human beings: in so far as they are regarded as
determinate, their opposites are indeed excluded; they are not, however, excluded by grounds
which are posited as existing outside the desires and spontaneous inclinations of the subject, as if
the agent were compelled to perform his actions against his will, so to speak, and as a result of a
certain ineluctable necessity. On the contrary, it is in the very inclination of his volitions and
desires, in so far as that inclination readily yields to the blandishments of his representations, that
his actions are determined by a fixed law and in a connection which is most certain but also free.
(ND 1:400)

Kant’s position here hinges on a conception of freedom defined by action according to an inner
principle. This is precisely what differentiates the free actions of humans, which are determined
by inner motives, from the “physic-mechanical” actions of animals, which are merely responses
to external stimuli (ND 1:400). Thus, freedom is not a question of whether, but whence an action
is determined: from an external determining ground or from a motive internal to the agent.
Thus, because the determination of all events according to causal laws is consistent with our
actions arising from an internal principle, then freedom and determinism are not contradictory.
Kant also takes on the traditional conception of spontaneity: “For spontaneity is action
which issues from an inner principle” (ND 1:402). Furthermore, like the traditional conception,
Kant defines freedom as action issuing from an inner principle in accordance with one’s
preference: “When this spontaneity is determined in conformity with the representation of what
is best it is called freedom” (ND 1:402). Lastly, like the traditional conception of free will,
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Kant’s account of free agency in the Nova Dilucidatio entails that the agent acts consciously:
“To act freely is to act in conformity with one’s desire and to do so, indeed, with consciousness”
(ND 1:403). Because an agent consciously performs free acts according to motives stemming
from his own desires, “it is clearly apparent that the evils have to be attributed to the sinners
themselves” (ND 1:405). Of course, Kant would later reject this conception of free will, likening
it to the freedom of a turnspit. Before turning to Kant’s Critical conception of the will, it will be
useful to examine Kant’s account from the 1770s where he already rejects the deterministic
traditional conception, but still maintains that consciousness is a necessary condition for free
agency.
Our source for Kant’s position on the free will in the 1770s is the Kaehler manuscript.
The Kaehler manuscript are notes on Kant’s lectures on moral philosophy. The manuscript date
written on the manuscript is 1777 and so the notes must be based on lectures from Summer 1777
or earlier. It is thought to be based on the lectures from the Winter Semester of 1773/1774 or
1774/1775.121 The Kaehler manuscript serves as the basis for twelve other manuscripts,
including: Brauer, Kutzner, parts of Mrongovius, Collins, and Brandt.122 While it will always
remain an open question how accurate the manuscript corresponds to Kant’s oral delivery of the
lecture (Kant did not prepare a written manuscript for his lectures), the complex structure of the
manuscript and several stylistic elements idiosyncratic to Kant indicate that he is indeed the
speaker behind the text.123 The proliferation of the manuscript also gives credence to its
accuracy. Given that the Kaehler manuscript served as the basis for manuscripts of Kant’s
lectures on moral philosophy for some 15 years, it stands to reason that the content of the

121

See Werner Stark (ed.), Immanuel Kant:Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie, 392–404.
ibid
123
ibid, 396–99. For example, the idiosyncratic “es frägt sich” or “frägt man” appears frequently
throughout the text.
122

60

manuscript coincides with what Kant said during his lectures, that is to say, if the manuscript was
not accurate, it would not have continued to be used by subsequent students.
There are two aspects in Kant’s conception of free will in the 1770s significant to our
investigation: (1) Kant rejects the deterministic conception of free will that he had espoused in
the Nova Dilucidatio and (2) he maintains the role of consciousness in free agency. Let us
examine these aspects of Kant’s conception in the Kaehler manuscript.
Kant posits a conception of free will that includes complete causal independence, i.e.
absolute spontaneity: “No free acts are determined by nature nor by any law; thus freedom is a
terrifying thing, because [free] acts are not determined at all.”124 Thus, while Kant takes all
animal acts to be determined, human actions, insofar as they are free, are not determined at all:

All animal acts are regular, for they take place according to rules that are subjectively
necessitated. In the entirety of non-free nature we find an inner, subjectively necessitating
principium, whereby all acts in the entirety of non-free nature take place according to a rule.
Now if I take freedom in the case of humans, then there is no subjectively necessitating
principium of the regularity of acts. If there were, then there would not be freedom.125

Furthermore, Kant takes this freedom as a necessary condition for the moral significance of
actions: “However, all moral evil arises from freedom, for otherwise it would not be morally
evil. However much nature predisposes us thereto, evil acts nevertheless arise from freedom,
and for that reason they are also attributed to us as vices.”126 Aside from exemplifying Kant’s
shift from the traditional conception of the will in the Nova Dilucidatio to an incompatibilist
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conception of free will necessary for moral significance, this passage is also illuminating as a
precursor to Kant’s later position in Religion that free will is a necessary condition for moral
imputability.
Kant asserts awareness of one’s motive as a condition for free agency in his discussion of
imputability:

The degrees of imputation depend upon the degrees of freedom. The subjective conditions of
freedom are: the capacity to act, and further, that one knows what belongs thereto, that one
knows the motive and the object of the act. In the absence of these subjective grounds, no
imputation takes place.127

Guyer uses the Collins’ analogue of this passage as support for his argument that Kant’s
conception of imputability is based on an empirical, and not transcendental, notion of freedom.128
Guyer claims that Kant’s position on the kind of freedom that pertains to the imputability of
others is therefore consistent with determinism. This line of thought is rather misguided. As we
saw above, Kant explicitly maintains in the 1770s lectures that free acts are not determined:
“free acts are not determined at all.” It is not clear what degrees of freedom could signify if not
degrees of determinism, i.e. the less an act is free the more it is determined. I concede to Guyer
that the “conditions of freedom,” or perhaps more accurately, the conditions for the performance
of a free act, namely the capacity to act and knowledge of the motive and end of the act, are
empirically determined; nevertheless, one need not accept that free actions themselves are
determined. A closer examination of these conditions will elucidate this point.
The second of the conditions, namely that one knows the motive and object of the act, is
most significant for our purposes. In this case, I take knowing the motive and object of one’s act
127
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to be tantamount to being conscious of one’s motive and the object of the act.129 Thus,
consciousness of one’s motive and intended object of action is a necessary condition for the
exercise of freedom. This is further supported by the subsequent sentences in the 1770s lectures
where Kant asserts that we cannot impute acts committed in a state of drunkenness. Kant clearly
has modus tollens in mind when he states: “in the absence of these subjective conditions [of
freedom], no imputation takes place.” Accordingly, if an act is imputable, then it is free.130
Because a drunk person is not in a state of mind in which he can be considered to be conscious of
the motive and object of his action, his act cannot be considered free, and for this reason, is not
imputable to him.
Referring back to Guyer’s claim that because an agent’s capacity to perform an action
and an agent’s cognitive state are empirical facts and therefore determined, it follows that
freedom is also determined, we can accept that the subjective conditions for the exercise of
freedom may be determined while still maintaining that free actions are not causally determined.
Thus, it may be determined whether Jones cognitive state allows for the exercise of freedom;
however, once this condition is satisfied, we may conceive of Jones’ act as independent of causal
determination. Admittedly, it is indeed the case that the empirical state of affairs conditions the
possibility of the exercise of freedom. Be that as it may, this fact alone is not inconsistent with
then conceiving the action as free once these conditions are satisfied. Of course, there may be
other concerns with this conception of freedom. To be sure, Kant offers no clue in the 1770s
lectures as to how empirical causality is to be reconciled with freedom independent of
determinism, especially since this conception of free agency occurs at what Kant would later
129
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consider the phenomenal level. This concern surely contributed to Kant’s Critical conception of
freedom as noumenal and thus entirely independent of phenomenal determinism.

3.1.3

Kant’s Transcendental Turn

Although Kant adopts the general framework of the lower and upper faculties of desire, he
breaks with the traditional conception insofar as he divorces any admixture of sensible
determining grounds from volitional acts associated with the upper faculty of desire:

All material practical rules put the determining ground of the will in the lower faculty of
desire, and were there no merely formal laws of the will sufficient to determine it, then
neither could any higher faculty of desire be admitted. (CPrR 5:22)
Either there is no higher faculty of desire at all or else pure reason must be practical of
itself and alone, that is, it must be able to determine the will by the mere form of a
practical rule without presupposing any feeling and hence without any representation of
the agreeable or disagreeable as the matter of the faculty of desire. (CPrR 5:24)
Thus, according to Kant, only the merely formal law of pure practical reason, i.e. the moral law,
can be a determining ground of the upper faculty of desire.131 Kant criticizes the traditional
conception for positing pleasure as the determination of the upper faculty of desire, despite the
fact that it involves a rational representation of pleasure:

It is surprising that men, otherwise acute, believe they can find a distinction between the
lower and higher faculty of desire according to whether the representations that are
connected with the feeling of pleasure have their origin in the sense or in the
understanding. For when one inquires about the determining grounds of desire and puts
them in agreeableness expected from something or other, it does not matter at all where
the representation of this pleasing object comes from but only how much it pleases.
(CPrR 5:23–24)
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Regardless of where the representation connected with the feeling of pleasure comes from, if the
determining ground of the faculty of desire presupposes pleasure, then the determining ground is
connected to the lower faculty of desire, is empirical, and is therefore determined by natural
necessity.
Independence from natural necessity establishes the negative aspect of freedom for
Kant.132 He associates the positive aspect of freedom with the lawgiving of pure reason insofar as
this can be practical, i.e. insofar as the moral law as the formal law that demands conformity to
the standard of universal lawgiving can be a determining ground of the will.133 Furthermore,
Kant rejects the traditional conception of spontaneity and likens this notion of freedom to “that
which a projectile accomplishes when it is in free motion, in which case one uses the word
‘freedom’ because while it is in flight it is not impelled from without; or as we also call the
motion of a clock a free motion because it moves the hands itself, which therefore do not need to
be pushed externally” (CPrR 5:96). Kant deems this kind of freedom “comparative” and
“psychological” freedom, which is still subject to natural necessity, regardless of whether it
stems from an “internal chain of representations” (CPrR 5:96). A being with this kind of freedom
is an automaton spiritual (CPrR 5:97). And such a notion of freedom is “nothing better than the
freedom of a turnspit, which, when once it is wound up, also accomplishes its movements of
itself” (CPrR 5:97). Instead of the traditional conception of spontaneity as merely operating
according to an internal principle, Kant posits a conception of spontaneity as an uncaused
cause.134 An act of spontaneity is an act of transcendental freedom, which is defined as “the
capacity to begin a state from itself” (CPR A533/B561).
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According to Kant, without transcendental freedom the moral law and imputability in
accordance with it are impossible (CPrR 5:97). Indeed, it is precisely Kant’s transcendental turn
that enables him (in his eyes) to salvage morality from the determinism of the traditional
conception of the will. Kant distinguishes objects as they are in themselves from objects of
experience as they appear to us, i.e. objects subject to a priori epistemic conditions. Similarly, by
drawing a distinction between the agent as an appearance and as a thing in itself, between
causality as applicable to appearances under temporal conditions and noumenal causality, Kant is
able to maintain both the mechanistic natural necessity of the empirical world and a robust
notion of spontaneity as uncaused cause valid for noumena.135

3.2

UPSHOT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL TURN: PRECLUSION OF
THE INTENTIONAL SUBJECT OF INTENTIONAL ACTION

While Kant is committed to the claim that transcendental freedom is a necessary condition for
moral action and he has made room for the possibility of transcendentally free acts through his
modification of the traditional conception of the will as the faculty of desire, this modification
ultimately precludes the kind of free agency that takes place at the level of agents choosing
particular courses of actions. I take for granted that there must be an executive component of the
will whereby the agent determines himself to a given course of action as opposed to some other
possible course of action.136 For otherwise, “acts” would have to be regarded as “random
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happenings” or as completely causally determined.137 As we shall see, the nature of this
executive component of the will is the source of the tension between Kant’s and Reinhold’s
accounts of moral agency and their accounts of free agency. Kant’s account of moral agency
requires an intentional subject to adopt particular maxims; however the constraints of
transcendental idealism preclude this adoption from being constitutive for free agency as such.
Instead, freedom is presupposed as an activity of noumenal Willkür inaccessible to
consciousness. Choosing a particular course of action via particular maxim adoption, which
occurs at the phenomenal level and is therefore causally determined, is supposed to be the effect
of the free choice that occurs at the noumenal level.

3.2.1 Consciousness of the Moral Law as Condition for Moral Action
Kant’s account of the possibility of the moral worth of an action—namely acting for the sake of
the moral law—requires recognition of the moral law as binding upon us. Given that the moral
law demands that one act on particular maxims that conform to universal lawgiving and given
that this kind of maxim adoption occurs at the phenomenal level, one might think that selfdetermination to action for the sake of the moral law must be performed by an intentional
subject. As we will see, Kant’s commitment to transcendental idealism precludes this. I
examine two interpretations of Kant’s account of respect as the incentive to moral action in order
to bring to light the tension between the kind of self-determination that would be required for a
robust conception of free will that comprises spontaneous adoption of particular maxims and
Kant’s own account of free self-determination dictated by his commitment to transcendental
idealism.
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To be sure, from the standpoint of our common sense philosophical intuitions, it seems
obvious that moral agency must be able to be available to consciousness. Kant defines the will
as “the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws” (G 4:412) and asserts that
“nothing other than the representation of the law in itself, which can occur only in a rational
being, insofar as it and not the hoped-for effect is the determining ground of the will, can
constitute the preeminent good we call moral” (G 4:401). Furthermore, Kant asserts: “in the case
of what is to be morally good it is not enough that it conform with the moral law but it must also
be done for the sake of the law” (G 4:390). Acting “for the sake of” something implies acting on
the basis of reasons. It seems obvious that in order for an agent to act on the basis of a
representation of a law, or to act on the basis of reasons, the agent must be able to consciously
represent the law and make the representation a determining ground for action. After all, it
seems a basic requirement of rational agency that the agent take himself to be acting on the basis
of some reason, i.e. that the agent be able to be conscious of the representation on the basis of
which we can call such agency rational.
The moral law requires that agents “act only in accordance with that maxim through
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (G 4:421). The moral law
commands that agents ought to act on maxims that can be universalized, and insofar as ought
implies can, it follows that agents can act on maxims that can be universalized. A maxim, as a
“subjective principle of volition” (G 4:401), is “a rule that the agent himself makes his principle
on subjective grounds” (MM 6:225). It is clear throughout all of Kant’s practical works that
adopting particular maxims as subjective principles for volition is an activity available to
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consciousness.138 To be sure, it is because we can consciously represent maxims as subjective
principles for possible volition that we can thereby test their fitness for universality. This basic
fact of particular maxims, namely their representability to consciousness, underlies all of Kant’s
examples of moral agency.139 Kant claims that we become “immediately conscious” of the
moral law “as soon as we draw up maxims of the will for ourselves” (CPrR 5:29). That is, it is
only in drawing up particular maxims, of which we are conscious, that we become immediately
conscious of the ought that demands adoption of those maxims in conformity with universal
lawgiving. Given Kant’s commitment to the thesis that ought implies can, if the moral law is not
a mere chimera, then it must be possible for the agent to fulfill this law. Indeed, it is precisely on
the basis of the connection between the normative demand of the moral law and our necessary
capacity to fulfill it that Kant claims that our consciousness of the moral law “leads directly to
the concept of freedom” (CPrR 5:30). Given that the moral law demands “that subjective
principles of actions, that is, maxims, must always be so adopted that they can also hold as
objective, that is, hold universally as principles” (G 4:449), and that the adoption of maxims
must be available to consciousness, it would seem that the fulfillment of this demand also be
something available to consciousness. Otherwise, the moral law would be demanding something
that requires consciousness (namely, adoption of maxims in conformity with universal
lawgiving) that at the same time cannot be consciously performed.
Accordingly, one might have thought that Kant’s explicit account of the moral worth of
actions would go as follows. Kant claims that only acts performed from duty (as opposed to
138
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merely in accordance with duty) have moral worth (G 4:398). Kant defines respect as
“consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law without the mediation of other
influences on my sense” (G 4:402). Thus, one would might thought that consciousness of the
subordination of our will to the moral law is a necessary condition for the moral worth of actions
that conform to that law. To act morally would be to act for the sake of the moral law by virtue
of our consciousness of the subordination of our will to that law. Because actions can have moral
worth only by virtue of our consciousness of the moral law, i.e. only through the representation
of the moral law by an intentional subject, it would follow that self-determination to action on
the basis of that representation must also be performed by an intentional subject. To be sure, a
conscious act of self-determination on the basis of our consciousness of the subordination of our
will to the moral law would be precisely what must distinguish an act from duty from an act
merely in conformity with duty. Such a reading of Kant’s account of respect can find support not
only in Section I of the Groundwork, where Kant proceeds from common rational to philosophic
moral cognition, but also in the Critique of Practical Reason.140
In Chapter III of the 2nd Critique, Kant treats the incentives of pure practical reason.
Kant asserts: “What is essential to any moral worth of actions is that the moral law determine the
will immediately” (CPrR 5:71). Of course, this does not mean that reason’s self-legislation of the
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moral law is automatically sufficient for moral action; this would only be true of a holy will.141
In moral action, the incentive, or the subjective determining ground of the will, must be the same
as the objective determining ground, i.e. the moral law. That is to say, in moral action, the moral
law must itself be an incentive. Indeed, the task of Chapter III is to show “in what way the moral
law becomes the incentive” (CPrR 5:72). Kant is explicit that respect is precisely this incentive:
“Respect for the moral law is therefore the sole and also the undoubted moral incentive” (CPrR
5:78). Just as in the Groundwork, Kant characterizes respect as a feeling “produced solely by
reason” (CPrR 5:76) in the 2nd Critique as well. Thus, although this feeling presupposes
sensibility insofar as sensibility is the condition of its possibility, the feeling is not
“pathologically effected,” but rather is “practically effected” (CPrR 5:75) and “known a priori”
(CPrR 5:79).142 Furthermore, as in the Groundwork, Kant’s characterization of respect in the 2nd
Critique entails consciousness of the authority of the moral law:

Recognition of the moral law is, however, consciousness of an activity of practical
reason from objective grounds…Therefore respect for the moral law must be
regarded as…the incentive to compliance with the law. (CPrR 5:79)
The consciousness of a free submission of the will to the law, yet as combined with an
unavoidable constraint put on all inclinations though only by one’s own reason, is respect
for the law. (CPrR 5:80)
Thus, as in the Groundwork, Kant’s conception of respect in the Critique of Practical Reason is
a special feeling produced by reason that entails consciousness of the subordination, or
submission, of our will to the supreme authority of the moral law. Moral action, i.e. action not
141
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merely in conformity with duty but from duty, “requires of the action objective accord with the
law but requires of the maxim of the action subjective respect for the law, as the sole way of
determining the will by the law” (CPrR 5:81).
Given Kant’s characterization of the moral law as something of which we become
conscious as a result of our consciousness of particular maxims, and given the implicit
requirement that fulfillment of the moral law be performed by an intentional subject insofar as
the moral law demands something that itself requires consciousness (namely, the adoption of
particular maxims by virtue of their universalizability), one might have thought that Kant’s
account of respect as an incentive to moral action would play a role in the (presumably free) selfdetermination of the agent to the moral law. Josefine Nauckhoff offers an interpretation where
respect, as the effect of our recognition of the moral law, is an incentive that must be
incorporated into an agent’s particular maxims. That is, in the adoption of particular maxims, the
agent chooses to act for the sake of the moral law (by incorporating the incentive of respect into
his maxim) or to act for the sake of some other end (by incorporating an incentive grounded in
self-love into his maxim). Nauckhoff’s interpretation is motivated by the need to provide an
account of (freely) acting for the sake of the moral law consistent with the kind of agential
activity that accords with our phenomenological experience of moral agency, namely the
adoption of particular maxims by virtue of their lawful form:

If we are to be held accountable for our actions, and indeed for our moral character, we
need freedom of the will: “Man himself must make or have made himself into whatever,
in a moral sense, he is or is to be become. Either condition must be an effect of his free
choice; for otherwise he could not be held responsible for it and could therefore be
morally neither good nor evil” (R:44). Freedom must then be defined in terms of
something we can be held accountable for; and that, according to Kant, is our capacity to
adopt maxims, i.e. intentions which take the form of personal “policies” of action. The
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adoption of maxims thus presupposes freedom of the will, or the ability to choose and do
otherwise.143
As justification for her interpretation, Nauckhoff refers to the passage in Kant’s Religion that
serves as the basis of what Henry Allison calls the Incorporation Thesis: “freedom of the power
of choice has the characteristic, entirely peculiar to it, that it cannot be determined to action
through any incentive except so far as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim” (R
6:23–4).144 Nauckhoff’s interpretation is also admirable for its treatment of passages where Kant
talks about respect as the effect of an “immediate determination of the will by means of the
[moral] law” (G 4:401).145
When Kant says that the feeling of respect is only possible “through a preceding
(objective) determination of the will,” it seems as if Kant is making a causal claim. That is, the
will is determined immediately by the moral law (presumably at the noumenal level), and respect
is simply the effect of this noumenal determination. To circumvent such a reading, Nauckhoff
refers to Kant’s distinction in his Lectures on Ethics between objective and subjective
determining grounds:

We first have to take up two points here: (I) The principle of appraisal of obligation, and
(2) the principle of its performance or execution. Guideline and incentive [Triebfeder]146
have here to be distinguished. The guideline is the principle of appraisal, and the
incentive [Triebfeder] that of carrying-out the obligation…If the question is: What is
morally good or not?, that is the principle of appraisal, whereby I judge the goodness or
depravity of actions. But if the question is: What moves me to live according to this law?,
that is the principle of incentive [Triebfeder]. The appraisal of the action is the objective
ground, but not yet the subjective ground. That which impels me to do the thing, of which
143
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understanding tells me that I ought to do it, is the motiva subjective moventia. The
supreme principle of all moral judgment lies in the understanding; the supreme principle
of the moral impulse to do this thing lies in the heart. This incentive is the moral feeling.
Such a principle of incentive [Triebfeder] cannot be confused with the principle of
judgment. The latter is the norm, and the principle of impulsion is the incentive
[Triebfeder]. (L-E/Collins 27:275–75)
Nauckhoff takes Kant to presuppose this distinction in the Groundwork and the 2nd Critique.
Accordingly, when Kant talks about the determination of the will, he is talking about the
objective determining ground and simply means that the moral law serves “as an absolute
standard of obligation”147 and “determines the will directly and objectively only as an
incontestable standard of judgment.”148 Indeed, this coincides with Kant’s occasional
qualification of the objective determination of the will as pertaining to judgment: “the moral law
determines the will objectively and immediately in the judgment of reason” (CPrR 5:78).149
Thus, per Nauckhoff, the effect of what Kant called the “judgment of appraisal” in the Lectures
on Ethics, and what he called the “objective determination of the will” in the 2nd Critique, is “the
feeling of respect, which is the impetus for choosing and acting on dutiful maxims.”150 This
reading of “determination” is also advocated by Joshua Rayman in his Kant on Sublimity and
Morality.151
The problem with Nauckhoff’s interpretation is that she conflates Kant’s accounts of the
power of choice. The passage Nauckhoff cites as the basis of Allison’s Incorporation Thesis is
147
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situated in Kant’s account of intelligible Willkür’s supreme maxim adoption. Such an account of
the “absolute spontaneity of the power of choice (of freedom)” (R 6:24) cannot be attributed to
the incorporation of incentives into particular maxims insofar as the adoption of particular
maxims is a conscious activity of the phenomenal agent and so can only be attributed to that
agent’s sensible Willkür. This is precisely why Paul Guyer resists such an interpretation of
respect playing a role in the free self-determination of the agent to “abide by the moral law,
which must be a noumenal ‘event’.”152 Guyer offers an interpretation where respect plays a role
in the “phenomenal etiology of morally worthy action.”153 According to Guyer, the noumenal
determination of the will effects a feeling of respect, which is an empirical feeling, and it is only
through such a feeling that “a flesh-and-blood human being [can] be impelled to [moral]
action.”154 Whereas Nauckhoff took the “determination of the will” to signify the judgment of
the authority of the moral law, Guyer takes this to be the “noumenal determination of the will, as
a power of choice (Willkür), to make the moral law its fundamental maxim.”155 Thus, on
Guyer’s view, the free act of self-determination to abide by the moral law is a noumenal act of
intelligible Willkür, which produces an empirical feeling of respect that plays a causal role in
moving the agent to action in a way consistent with natural necessity. This is not to say,
however, that Guyer rejects the notion that the will must first be commanded by the moral law
such that the will is subordinated to the supreme normative authority of the moral law. Guyer
accepts this aspect of volition, and then thinks that, additionally, it must also be the case that
Willkür’s act of incorporating the moral law into its maxim must also be noumenal. And so there
is a terminological discrepancy between Nauckhoff and Guyer insofar as Nauckhoff uses
152
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“determination” to refer to the will being made susceptible to acting on the moral law by means
of the representation of the law as supremely authoritative whereas Guyer uses “determination”
in a causal sense. There is substantive discrepancy insofar between these scholars insofar as
Nauckhoff thinks that the self-determination of the will in light of this recognition of the
authority of the moral law occurs at the level of consciousness, whereas Guyer holds that this
activity must be noumenal, producing an effect that plays a causal role at the phenomenal level.
Nauckhoff’s and Guyer’s interpretations of respect illustrate the tension between the kind
of self-determination performed by agents who can consciously choose to act for the sake of the
moral law and the kind of self-determination permissible in Kant’s critical framework.
Nauckhoff’s interpretation provides a robust account of moral agency, but is inconsistent with
Kant’s metaphysical commitments, which require him to posit the executive function of volition
in the noumenal. Guyer’s interpretation is consistent with Kant’s metaphysical commitments,
but results in all of our choices consciously performed at the phenomenal level having already
been causally determined as the effect of a supposed free choice by a noumenal Willkür. Let us
more closely examine Kant’s commitment to this intelligible capacity for self-determination, free
Willkür.

3.2.2 No Room for the Intentional Subject to Perform the Act of Self-determination
Despite Kant’s frequent claims that we can overcome our inclinations and determine ourselves in
accordance with the moral law, there seems to be no faculty for such self-determination in Kant’s
account that would be consistent with his requirements for free agency. That is, to “overcome”
inclination by choosing to act morally presupposes that the agent can be subject to the demand of
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inclination and nevertheless choose to act independently of this demand.156 The first time Kant
really gestures toward such a capacity for rational self-determination is in Religion within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason. In this work Kant argues that only that which is our own deed is
morally imputable (R 6:31). He also claims in Religion that an incentive (be it an incentive to act
on the basis of inclination or on the basis of the moral law) can only determine free Willkür
insofar as Willkür has incorporated the incentive into its maxim (R 6:23–24). Accordingly, like
Nauckhoff, one might have thought that the subject himself through Willkür, or the power of
choice, adopts a maxim as a determining ground for action either out of recognition of the
authority of the moral law or for the sake of pleasure, broadly construed. However, Kant’s
account precludes such a role of the intentional subject. In Religion, the act of Willkür is
intelligible. As Henry Allison notes, “it can be thought but not experienced.”157 In Metaphysics
of Morals Kant claims that free Willkür is a “supersensible object” that cannot be made
understandable through appearances (MM 6:226). Furthermore, Kant differentiates between an
intentional subject, which he calls “psychological personality” and defines as “the ability to be
conscious of one’s identity in different conditions,” and “moral personality” or “the freedom of a
rational being under moral laws” (MM 6:223). This “moral personality” must pertain to the
rational being qua noumenon insofar as Kant’s account of inner sense entails phenomenal
determinism.
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See, for example, CPrR 5:30: “Suppose someone asserts of his lustful inclination that, when the
desired object and the opportunity are present, it is quite irresistible to him; ask him whether, if a gallows
were erected in front of the house where he finds this opportunity and he would be hanged on it
immediately after gratifiying his lust, he would not then control his inclination. One need not conjecture
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Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 5. It is clear that Allison does not employ “experience” in
the Kantian technical sense (Erfahrung), but rather in the everyday sense of something that is available to
an intentional subject via consciousness (Erlebnis).
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Kant thinks that all appearances under temporal conditions—including the self as we are
conscious of it through inner sense, i.e. empirical apperception—are subject to natural
necessity.158 Furthermore, Kant holds that all representations are subject to inner sense:

Wherever our representations may arise, whether through the influence of external things or as
the effect of inner causes, whether they have originated a priori or empirically as appearances –
as modifications of the mind they nevertheless belong to inner sense, and as such all of our
cognitions are in the end subjected to the formal condition of inner sense, namely time, as that in
which they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relations. (CPR A98–9)

A free intentional act performed by an intentional subject is not possible in Kant’s framework
precisely because the intentional subject is bound by inner sense. For this reason, Kant posits the
free activity of Willkür as intelligible, or “supersensible.”159 I am not arguing that intelligible
Willkür qua noumenon, or rather the noumenal self connected to noumenal Willkür, has no
consciousness of any kind. The noumenal self would presumably have to be conscious in some
way of the representation of the moral law in order to incorporate that law into its maxim.
However, we have no access to noumenal consciousness, should it even exist.160 In fact, the
notion that the noumenal self has its own consciousness and ‘mental states’ on the basis of which
it freely acts and then supposedly effects our phenomenal character raises serious concerns about
the identity of the finite rational being who is supposed to be both sensible and intelligible, not
158
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completely bifurcated into each the phenomenal and the noumenal. At the same time, neither
can we simply regard the noumenal as the “space of reasons” such that incorporation of
incentives into maxims is taken to be a rational and therefore noumenal process:

While the fact that adherence to a certain principle justifies or excludes action on a certain
incentive may not itself be a temporal fact, the fact that a particular agent holds a certain principle
and has justified or excluded action on a given incentive on the basis of holding this principle is
just as temporal a fact as the fact that a certain desire occurs in the agent.161

Thus, all of our mental states are necessarily bound by inner sense, and are for that reason
subject to empirical causality, regardless of whether our representations are connected such that
the relations of justification are non-temporal. If there our noumenal selves have consciousness,
it is not the same as the consciousness we experience insofar as 1) our consciousness is bounded
by inner sense and therefore temporal and 2) noumena are necessarily non-temporal.
Consequently, freedom amounts to intelligible self-determination that is not available to
our consciousness and therefore cannot be performed by the intentional subject.162 This
preclusion of the intentional subject in moral action undermines the kind of intentional selfdetermination that agents such as ourselves take ourselves to perform. If the free selfdetermination to a particular course of action can only be performed by intelligible Willkür, then
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there is a fundamental disconnect between our consciousness of the moral law as necessarily
binding upon us, and our capacity to obey that law by virtue of this consciousness.

3.3

THE WILL IS NOT THE FACULTY OF DESIRE: REINHOLD’S
ACCOUNT OF THE INTENTIONALITY OF INTENTIONAL ACTION

K.L. Reinhold’s theory of free will has received considerable attention in recent years.163 While
Reinhold’s divorcing of the will from practical reason has been well documented, the
independence of the will from the faculty of desire has received less attention.164 According to
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Reinhold’s account of the will, the independence of the will from the faculty of desire, as well as
from practical reason, is a necessary condition for consciousness of possible courses of action as
occasioning grounds (veranlassende Gründe), to which the intentional subject can determine
himself through an intentional act of choice. For Reinhold, this self-determination by the
intentional subject is a necessary condition for moral agency.

3.3.1 Reinhold’s Account of the Will and the Break with the Faculty of Desire
Although the secondary literature on Reinhold’s theory of free will has made note of the role of
the self, or what Reinhold calls the “person,” in the intentional act of decision to satisfy or not
satisfy the demand of the faculty of desire given the demand of the moral law, most
commentators have overlooked the fact that the demand of the faculty of desire (by providing the
matter) along with the demand of practical reason (by providing the formal constraint of
lawfulness) are necessary conditions for the person to be aware of his capacity for selfdetermination, i.e. to be aware of his freedom in a given situation.
Reinhold considers the will’s reciprocal independence from both practical reason and the
faculty of desire to be a condition for the possibility of the agent’s awareness of his capacity for
free self-determination. The person is subject to two opposing laws to which he can conform: the
natural law of desire and the moral law. According to Reinhold, the awareness of these two
opposing laws is a necessary condition for awareness of the capacity to determine himself in
conformity with one or the other: “The person can become conscious of the capacity to
determine himself only insofar as he is conscious of the capacity to determine himself according
to two different laws, and consequently insofar as he is conscious of these different laws
themselves” (LII 190/276). This consciousness for self-determination enables the intentional
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subject to perform an act of decision (Entscheidung or Entschluss) via Willkür to choose to act
for or against the moral law.165

3.3.2 Self-determination of the Person qua Intentional Subject
While Kant unwittingly presupposes an intentional act performed by an intentional subject as a
condition for the possibility of the moral worth of an action, Reinhold is explicit about this
requirement. Reinhold claims that volition comprises an intentional act of decision “as the
special act of our I (the person in us), and particularly as that act, through which we indeed
neither establish nor abolish the demand of desire, but can grant or deny the satisfaction of the
same” (LII 173/245). He calls this act of decision a “free self-determination” (LII 140/189). For
Reinhold, every act of volition is both a free act and a moral act. Insofar as every act of volition
has moral significance and every act of volition necessarily includes a constituent free act of
decision by an intentional subject to choose to satisfy or not satisfy the demand of desire (as it
relates to the demand of the moral law), it follows that for Reinhold the intentional act of selfdetermination by an intentional subject is a necessary condition for the possibility of the moral
worth of an act.166
165

Reinhold’s position that the act of decision to obey the moral law must be performed by the intentional
subject may be indicative of his sympathy with Rehberg’s criticism (discussed in Chapter 1) that it is not
clear in Kant’s account how the purely formal moral law could function as a principium executionis for
moral agents such as ourselves.
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For Reinhold, the will (Wille) is a generic term for the faculty of volition. This faculty includes a
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the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of a demand of the selfish drive, i.e. a demand of desire, in light of the
demand of the unselfish drive, i.e. the demand of the moral law expressed by practical reason. Every such
act includes a constituent act of decision whereby an intentional subject by means of Willkür makes one
of these demands, which Reinhold describes as occasioning, or prompting, grounds (veranlassende
Gründe), into a determining ground (bestimmenden Grund) of volition. Accordingly, Reinhold defines the
freedom of the will (Wille) in the negative sense as independence from both the selfish and unselfish
drives and freedom of the will in the positive sense as Willkür, or “the capacity to determine itself to one
of the two demands” (LII 206/307). A brief clarification of Reinhold’s Wille/Willkür distinction is in
order to guard against a few misinterpretations. First, Reinhold’s employment of the terms is not the same
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Admittedly, Reinhold’s account of the free self-determination of the person qua
intentional subject raises questions with respect to how this free act is supposed to be reconciled
with natural necessity. To be sure, although it led to a tension between his account of free will
and the conditions for moral agency, it was precisely Kant’s commitment to transcendental
idealism that enabled him to posit transcendental freedom independent of natural necessity.
Given that Reinhold rejects the postulation of free Willkür as a noumenal faculty and instead
posits the free act of self-determination in an intentional subject, which for Kant would be bound
by inner sense and a mere appearance subject to natural necessity, how is this intentional subject
to be characterized with respect to Kant’s phenomenal/noumenal distinction? Reinhold’s answer
to this question may seem unsatisfactory insofar as he simply claims that the subject is a being
that is both intelligible and sensible:

Moreover, it never occurred to me to define the freedom of man as an intelligible being. I
am concerned only with freedom of the human will; for me man is neither an intelligible
being nor a sensible being, but rather both at the same time; and I only consider him free
because and insofar as he is both at the same time, while Kant appears to consider him
free only to the extent that he is an intelligible being. The subject of the transcendental
faculties is simultaneously the subject of the empirical faculties if those faculties are to be
not transcendent, but rather transcendental—that is, if they are to apply a priori to the
empirical. (“SR” 150–51/393)

as Kant’s later distinction first made explicit in 1797, according to which Wille is the legislative
component of volition synonymous with practical reason and Willkür is the executive component of
volition (MM 6:213–14). For a discussion of Kant’s employment of this distinction see Henry Allison,
Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 129–32. Second, Reinhold’s distinction is in part grounded in a difference in
standpoint. Wille designates the general faculty of volition of an individual and is referred to from the
standpoint of examining an individual’s actions and the moral worth of those actions. Willkür designates
the capacity of an intentional subject to perform an act of decision to make a possible Handlungsweise a
determining ground of a volitional act. Willkür is thus referred to from the standpoint of examining the
activities that comprise an act of volition, e.g. the activity of the selfish drive of expressing the demand of
desire, the activity of the unselfish drive (i.e. practical reason) expressing the demand of the moral law,
and the activity of Willkür in making an occasioning ground into a determining ground of volition.
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It is difficult enough to establish the metaphysical implications of the phenomenal/noumenal
distinction for Kant, let alone a reappropriation of that distinction which may not be consistent
with its original use.167 Indeed, it is likely that Reinhold was not committed to transcendental
idealism when he made the remark about the subject being simultaneously intelligible and
sensible.168 Nevertheless, Reinhold maintains a consistent doctrine of free will from 1792–97.
This doctrine is proposed from the standpoint of practical philosophy and stands on its own
independent of Reinhold’s systematic transitions in theoretical philosophy. Reinhold’s
prioritization of the practical in his account of free will is what offers insight into his gnomic
expression that the subject of freedom is neither sensible nor intelligible, but rather both at the
same time.
In his “Attempt at a New Presentation of the Fundamental Concepts and Principles of
Ethics and Natural Right” from the Letters II, Reinhold asserts that his presentation of the
concepts and principles of ethics and natural right, which includes a presentation of his theory of
free will, is a mere presentation that will be completed by a future and more precise explication
(LII 134/181). Reinhold had planned on eventually deriving the results of his practical
philosophical endeavors from a self-evident first principle grounding a philosophical system that
would encompass both theoretical and practical philosophy.169 While he never got around to
completing this derivation before he abandoned the project of his philosophical system, the
Elementarphilosophie, he consistently maintained that the results of his practical endeavors were
independent from theoretical concerns. Thus, Reinhold was thoroughly perplexed when Fichte
accused him of not taking natural necessity into account in his doctrine of freedom, responding
167
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that he had remained silent on that point precisely because such questions belong not to practical
philosophy, but to metaphysics.170 Taking as our cue Reinhold’s position that the results of
practical philosophical inquiry cannot justifiably be burdened with the task of having to provide
determinate solutions to theoretical concerns, we might interpret Reinhold’s stance on the
metaphysical status of the will, viz. its sensible or intelligible nature, to be outside the scope of
practical philosophy. Given that the necessity of self-determination by an intentional subject for
moral agency is discovered from the standpoint of practical philosophy, a theoretical
understanding of this process may be unknowable for us. Thus, while Kant too takes beings such
as ourselves to have both sensible and intelligible natures, he attempts to maintain this distinction
in his practical philosophy so as to be consistent with his theoretical commitments. Reinhold’s
view can be seen as an expression of a strong commitment to the practical/theoretical distinction
and the contention that practical philosophical investigation need not be beholden to
metaphysics.
I do not wish to claim here that Reinhold’s theory of free will is ultimately correct. Nor
do I wish to make the general claim in philosophy of action that intentional acts presuppose a
conscious intentional subject to perform them.171 I have merely argued that 1) given Kant’s own
framework, the moral law loses its binding force without an intentional subject to perform an
intentional act of choice, and 2) Reinhold’s conception of free will accounts for such an
intentional act performed by an intentional subject. I would like to respond to two objections
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against Reinhold’s assertion that an intentional subject, which Reinhold dubs “the person,”
determines himself to a given course of action through an intentional act of choice.172

3.4

REFUTATION OF THE OBJECTIONS CONCERNING REINHOLD’S
CONCEPTION OF THE INTENTIONAL SUBJECT

Reinhold’s conception of the person qua intentional subject has come under fire recently from
several commentators, most notably Gerold Prauss and Günter Zöller. Given the significance of
this conception for not only Reinhold’s account of free will but also the present work whose aim
is to suggest a development of Kant’s theory of free will that is more successful than Kant’s own
theory in meeting the criteria for moral agency, it is incumbent upon us to consider these
objections. Prauss questions the intelligibility of Reinhold’s account of self-determination given
that Reinhold’s employment of “person” is inconsistent. Prauss’ objection can be dealt with
rather swiftly. It is not my intention to create a straw man. Given the stature of Prauss as a Kant
scholar and his connection to scholarship on Kant and Reinhold on free will, it is important to
consider Prauss’ objection despite its shallow import.173 Zöller raises concerns that Reinhold’s
account of the person as the locus of decision in intentional action is guilty of the homunculus
fallacy. Although Reinhold’s account need not necessarily lead to an infinite regress, there are
concerns connected to his postulation of a “person in us” that performs the self-determining act
of decision.
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3.4.1 The Ambiguity of the Person
Gerold Prauss argues that Reinhold’s conception of free will is untenable because his account of
the unity of the subject, or the person, falls asunder.174 According to Prauss, Reinhold sometimes
identifies the “person qua person” (Person als Person) as the necessary self-activity of practical
reason, and sometimes identifies the person as the will and its free self-determination.175 This is
supposedly irreconcilably problematic insofar as it is precisely the distinction between the will
and practical reason (and, as we have seen, the will and the faculty of desire) that is so
fundamental to Reinhold’s account. The contradiction between these notions of “person” and the
consequent breakdown of the distinction between will and practical reason, which is essential to
Reinhold’s theory of free will, allegedly amounts to the breakdown of Reinhold’s entire account
of the will. Prauss is correct that Reinhold sometimes conflates two conceptions of “person.”176
However, he is incorrect in properly identifying the conflation. While Prauss claims that
Reinhold identifies the person with (1) the will and its freedom of self-determination, and (2) the
self-activity of practical reason, only the former is correct. Rather than identifying the person
with the self-activity of practical reason, Reinhold’s second conception of person is a generic
notion for the individual and all his constituent faculties. Nevertheless, I contend that this
equivocation is not ultimately problematic and that Prauss has thrown the baby out with the
bathwater.
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Reinhold’s lack of consistency in his use of the term “person” does not necessarily
undermine the claim that in any act of volition, there must be a constituent intentional act of
decision whereby the intentional subject determines itself to a particular course of action. There
are numerous passages where Reinhold employs “person” as the self, i.e. the intentional
subject.177 There are indeed other passages where he seems to employ “person” not merely as the
intentional subject, but rather as a general term for the individual.178 In the latter usage, “person”
is as an aggregate term for all of the individual’s faculties, including those whose activities are
not intentional acts of the self-conscious subject, but rather sub-conscious activities, the effects
of which are presented to the intentional self.179 The inconsistency in these two uses is not
necessarily indicative of a doctrinal contradiction. It simply does not follow from terminological
carelessness that Reinhold’s entire account of free will falls apart. Indeed, there is no substantive
difficulty in quickly resolving this apparent semantic oversight. There is no contradiction in
maintaining a conception of an individual as the aggregate of his constituent faculties while also
maintaining a conception of an intentional subject. Giving one or the other a different name
would alleviate this superficial inconsistency. In this way, it is clear that in drawing attention to
Reinhold’s conflation of terms, Prauss has conflated a terminological inconsistency with a
doctrinal contradiction.

3.4.2 The Homunculus Fallacy and the “Person in Us”
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considers these activities to be involuntary (Reinhold, LII 134/182).
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Günter Zöller claims that Reinhold’s account of the will is guilty of smuggling a homunculus
into his theory of subjectivity.180 The suspicion is that Reinhold’s installation of a faculty of
choice (Willkür) in the individual responsible for choosing to act for or against the moral law is
tantamount to the homunculus fallacy, viz. an infinite regress of “little men” postulated as a
locus of decision in an individual. Daniel Breazeale argues that Zöller’s concern is really based
on the “incomprehensibility of a radically free choice on Reinhold’s account.”181 I concur with
Breazeale’s analysis. It is precisely Reinhold’s claim that the ground of a free act is freedom
itself (LII 193/282), i.e. that freedom is its own ground, that has led some commentators to
accuse Reinhold of positing a groundless freedom.182 The suspicion that Reinhold’s account of
free will amounts to an infinite regress of free acts of decision made by homunculi within us may
be the vestige of the reluctance to accept at face value Reinhold’s assertion that freedom itself is
simply its own self-contained ground. Although there is no need to posit an infinite regress given
that Reinhold postulates the free act as a first cause, some of Reinhold’s characterizations of the
“person” resemble the postulation of a homunculus. While Zöller does not refer to any specific
passages, a textual analysis is certainly worthwhile given the centrality of the person in
Reinhold’s account of free agency and the potential problems they pose.
As I already had occasion to cite, Reinhold refers to the act of decision as “the special act
of our I (the person in us)” (LII 173/245). This language of a “person in us” might well raise
180

Günter Zöller, “Von Reinhold zu Kant,” 82. For a reiteration of this charge see Jörg Noller, Die
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ground. As Breazeale notes, to say that a free act is “groundless” and to say that it is “grounded in
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Ethics (“The Fate of Kantian Freedom,” 110). F.H. Jacobi claimed as early as 1789 that the absolute selfactivity of freedom is not necessarily groundless freedom (Über die Lehre des Spinoza, XXXVI–
XXXVII). On this point see Martin Bondeli, LII 382 n252.
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concerns that Reinhold’s account of the will is guilty of the homunculus fallacy. If in each of us,
there is a “person” performing an act of decision, there is a worry that within the “person in us”
is another person making the act of decision, ad infinitum. I admit that Reinhold may be guilty of
this charge. Nevertheless, the difficulty is removed on a charitable interpretation of what
Reinhold might mean by “the special act of our I.” The problem is resolved if by “the I” and “the
person in us,” we take Reinhold not to assign metaphysical significance, but rather to assert a
necessary condition for the intentional act of self-determination, namely that it be consciously
performed. On this reading, the “person in us” is no metaphysical postulation; rather, it merely
designates the intentional subject as a necessary condition for self-determination. To be sure, this
is the interpretation of Reinhold’s account of free will I have been trying to defend here.

3.5

CONCLUSION

I have argued that although Kant rejects determination of the upper faculty of desire by pleasure
and establishes through the transcendental turn the possibility of this determination by pure
practical reason, viz. the moral law, there remains a serious worry that his framework of
transcendental idealism leaves no room for an intentional subject to perform an intentional act of
choice to determine himself to a given course of action. On Kant’s account, the intentional self,
as an appearance, is determined by natural necessity. Thus, only the person considered as a thing
in itself and the intelligible capacity for choice, i.e. intelligible Willkür, can perform the act of
self-determination that Kant himself affirms is a necessary condition for moral imputability. The
result, however, is a fundamental disconnect between our awareness of the moral law, as the
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ratio cognoscendi of our freedom, and our free capacity to obey or transgress that law on the
basis of that awareness.
Reinhold’s account of the will is able to alleviate this tension. His theory of free will
stipulates that an intentional act of self-determination performed by an intentional subject is a
necessary condition for the possibility of the moral worth of an action. In this way, Reinhold
preserves the relation between our awareness of the moral law as binding upon us, our awareness
of the veranlassende Gründe to obey or transgress that law, and our awareness of our freedom to
determine ourselves accordingly.
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Chapter 4
Reinhold’s Theory of Free Will in Relation to Kant’s Religion

Following the publication of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of
Practical Reason, the issues of how Kantian freedom is to be reconciled with phenomenal
determinism and how Kant’s theory of freedom is to account for free immoral acts were widely
debated.183 Although not considered a canonical work of Kant’s practical philosophy, his
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason is significant in regard to his theory of free will
and his account of moral responsibility for immoral acts. It is in Religion that Kant first
introduces the Wille/Willkür distinction he more fully develops in Metaphysics of Morals,184 and
first explicitly discusses free will with respect to immoral acts. Although one might be tempted
to interpret Kant’s treatment of free Willkür in Religion as pertaining only to his rational religion
and thus as distinct from his considered view of free will, such an interpretation neglects the
historical context of Religion, viz. the debates concerning Kantian free will and the possibility of
free immoral acts. As we saw in Ch. 1, J.A.H. Ulrich claimed in his Eleutheriology that Kant
183

For works preceding Kant’s Religion see: J.H. Abicht, “Über die Freyheit des Willens”; K.H.
Heydenreich, “Über die moralische Freiheit”; L.H. Jakob, “Über die Freiheit des Willens”; J.G.K.C
Kiesewetter, Über den ersten Grundsatz der Moralphilosophie; C.C.E. Schmid, Versuch einer
Moralphilosophie; C.W. Snell, Über Determinismus und moralische Freiheit; J.A.H. Ulrich,
Eleutheriologie: oder über Freyheit und Nothwendigkeit.
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Although Kant discusses practical freedom in connection with free Willkür in the Critique of Pure
Reason (A801/B829–A802/B830), his use of “Willkür” is a translation of the Latin “arbitrium” employed
by Christian Wolff and Alexander Baumgarten rather than an instance of Kant’s later distinction between
the executive and legislative functions of the will.
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only avoids natural necessity insofar as natural necessity involves determination by temporally
preceding conditions, and the intelligible transcends temporal conditions; however, Ulrich notes
that this does not entail that the intelligible character is not determined by other, non-temporal
grounds, in which case the intelligible character would still be necessitated.185 We also saw in
Ch. 1 that in his Versuch einer Moralphilosophie, C.C.E. Schmid offered an interpretation of
Kantian free will as pertaining only to moral acts.186 Thus, Kant’s account of free Willkür in
Religion can, at least in part, be seen as a response to his contemporaries and an attempt to
establish moral responsibility for free immoral acts.
The relation between K.L. Reinhold’s theory of free will to Kant’s account of free
Willkür in Religion is multifaceted. In 1792 Reinhold also emphasized the possibility of free
immoral action in his own theory of free will presented in the Letters on the Kantian Philosophy
Volume II. Part One of Kant’s Religion was first published as an essay, “The Radical Evil in
Human Nature,” in April 1792 and was first sent to the Berlinische Monatsschrift by the end of
February 1792.187 Thus, Kant could not have been influenced by Reinhold’s Letters II, which
was published in October of 1792. However, Reinhold’s letters that address free will were
written between the publication of Kant’s essay on evil and October 1792. And so it is
theoretically possible that Reinhold could have been influenced by Kant with respect to the
relation between free will and moral responsibility. It is more probable, however, that Kant and
Reinhold independently developed some common features in their theories as a result of the
philosophical discussion at that time. Personal correspondence from Reinhold to Jens Bagessen
185
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from March 1792, one month before the appearance of Kant’s essay, suggests the independence
of Reinhold’s developments on this matter: “I distance myself entirely from Kant and the
Kantians concerning the concept of the will, which I regard as neither the causality of reason nor
the capacity to act according to represented laws, etc. but rather as a capacity of the person,
equally independent of reason and sensibility, to determine himself.”188 In 1797 Reinhold cites
Kant’s Religion as a justification of his own theory of free will in his essay “Some Remarks.”
Reinhold claims that his concept of freedom is transcendental and, like Kant’s concept of
morally evil action in Religion, derived from our awareness of the moral law itself, from the
categorical imperative alone (“SR” 150–51/392–93). Furthermore, Reinhold claims that it is
precisely in relation to Kant’s Religion that Kant’s elucidations on the faculty of desire, the will,
the power of choice, and freedom found in the introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals are
either “unintelligible” or “untenable” (“SR 141/365–66).
While the debate between Kant and Reinhold on free will has received some attention in
recent scholarship189 and the relation between Reinhold’s theory of free will and Kant’s remarks
in Religion have been investigated by several scholars, an in-depth analysis of the relation of
Reinhold’s theory to Kant’s Religion is needed. Accordingly, the present investigation will
bracket the Kant-Reinhold Controversy of 1797, and focus on Reinhold’s theory of free will in
relation to Kant’s conception of free Willkür in Religion.
This chapter argues that while both Kant and Reinhold are committed to the claim that
free agency, viz. the free adoption of a maxim as a determining ground for action, is a necessary
condition for moral responsibility (4.1), Kant’s conception of this free maxim adoption is limited
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to a 2nd order intelligible act (4.2). It is argued further that while Reinhold’s conception of free
agency as pertaining to 1st order acts is better able to accommodate a robust notion of moral
responsibility, Reinhold fails to recognize this fundamental difference in his review of Kant’s
Religion (4.3). Lastly, it is argued that Kant faces a difficulty regarding his conception of the
ground of free self-determination whereas Reinhold’s conception of the ground of freedom as a
Selbstgrund faces no such difficulty (4.4).

4.1

THE RESPONSIBILITY THESIS

Kant and Reinhold hold that free will, specifically the free activity of Willkür in choosing a given
course of action, is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. Furthermore, both of these
thinkers understand this freedom in such a way that the agent could have acted otherwise.
According to Kant, only that of which we are the author can be attributed to us: “nothing
is, however, morally (i.e. imputably) evil but that which is our own deed” (R 6:31). Indeed, the
subjective ground of the exercise of freedom must “itself always be a deed of freedom (for
otherwise the use or abuse of the human being’s power of choice with respect to the moral law
could not be imputed to him, nor could the good or evil in him be called ‘moral’)” (R 6:21).
More specifically, the subjective ground of freedom must be a “rule that the power of choice
itself produces for the exercise of its freedom, i.e. in a maxim” (R 6:21). Support for Kant’s
commitment to a libertarian notion of free will as including the capacity to do otherwise can be
found in the Critique of Practical Reason as well as Religion:

95

a rational being can now rightly say of every unlawful action he performed that
he could have omitted it even though as appearance it is sufficiently determined in
the past. (CPrR 5:98)
For whatever his previous behavior may have been, whatever the natural causes
influencing him, whether they are inside or outside him, his action is yet free and
not determined through any of these causes; hence the action can and must always
be judged as an original exercise of his power of choice. He should have
refrained from it, whatever his temporal circumstances and entanglements; for
through no cause in the world can he cease to be a free agent. (R 6:41)190
Thus, Kant holds that Willkür’s free adoption of a maxim, such that this free activity could have
been omitted, is a necessary condition for moral imputability. I will henceforth refer to the thesis
that an agent can only be held morally responsible for those acts that follow from the free
adoption of a maxim by Willkür as the Responsibility Thesis (RT).
Reinhold also claims that free will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility
insofar as the moral law is inconceivable without the presupposition of freedom:

Freedom, which announces itself to us through the law and which is presupposed by the
concept of the law, as the moral law, [and] which can be assumed only for the sake of the
law, cannot be comprehended from the law, but must be thought, for otherwise the law
necessary through itself would not be conceivable as the moral law. (“SR” 149–50/390)
Reinhold’s conception of freedom, which for him necessarily includes the free activity of Willkür
to decide for or against the demand of the moral law, simply entails that an agent could do
otherwise. His theory of free will is such that Willkür is completely independent of
determination by natural necessity as well as by the demand of the moral law. (LII 188/272) It
simply follows from the independent self-activity of Willkür that in choosing for the moral law, it
could have equally chosen against, and vice versa. Moreover, Reinhold asserts that moral
190
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responsibility for a given act is connected to this aspect of freedom, viz. capacity to do
otherwise. In the “Tenth Letter” of his Letters on the Kantian Philosophy Volume II, Reinhold
asserts that in spite of the subterfuge that “he was not able to act otherwise,” even the vicious
man, in being aware of his freedom, is aware that “he ought to have acted otherwise” (LII 234–
35/357).
In the following it will be shown that despite this shared commitment to RT, Kant’s and
Reinhold’s respective positions on the precise relation of this activity of Willkür to moral
responsibility are quite distinct.

4.2

KANT’S DOCTRINE OF SUPREME MAXIM ADOPTION

One of Kant’s aims in Religion is to account for the possibility of moral evil. Because moral evil
must be able to be imputed to humans (otherwise we could not be morally responsible for being
evil), the ground of evil must be represented as freely adopted (per RT). Accordingly, Kant
postulates a freely adopted supreme maxim that serves as the ground of the possibility of evil in
human beings insofar as it is the ground of the adoption of all particular maxims (R 6:25). As
partly sensible, partly intelligible beings, our will is subject to both sensible and intelligible
incentives, i.e. self-love and the moral law (G 4:412–13). Neither incentive can be fully removed
and so both incentives must be incorporated in the supreme maxim. The incorporation of these
incentives in the supreme maxim consists in a hierarchical ranking of the incentives that
concerns not the material of the supreme maxim, but rather the form, whereby one of the
incentives is made the supreme condition of the other (R 6:36). For Kant, the free act of Willkür
to adopt the supreme maxim is an intelligible act “posited as antecedent to every use of freedom
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given in experience” (R 6:22). The act is necessarily intelligible, i.e. noumenal, because
phenomenal acts and events are governed by natural necessity. Although Kant does not
explicitly use this terminology, the supreme maxim functions as a second-order maxim that
conditions all first-order maxims.191
The supreme maxim is a second-order maxim insofar as it is a higher order principle that
serves as the ground of the adoption of particular, first-order maxims. Whereas the second-order
maxim is a formal prioritization of the incentive to self-love over the incentive to morality, or
vice versa, first-order maxims are particular maxims whose adoption is morally evaluable on the
basis of the second-order maxim.192 First-order, particular maxims are the subjective principles
for action that we consciously represent to ourselves in moral agency. It is important to note that
this first-order/second-order distinction pertains to volition and the moral evaluation of volitional
acts, and not to the relation of particular maxims to the moral law as the supreme principle of
morality. That is, one could regard the moral law as a higher order principle on the basis of
which particular maxims have moral worth as obligatory or impermissible. While this may well
be true, the doctrine of supreme maxim adoption in Religion takes for granted the results of the
Groundwork and is instead concerned with giving an account of a freely adopted hierarchical
ranking of the incentives to morality and self-love, which conditions the moral evaluability of the
adoption of first-order maxims (and not the moral worth of the maxims themselves, viz. their
fitness for universalizability).
According to Kant, the subordination of the moral incentive to the incentive to self-love
constitutes the propensity to evil, which is immanent in humanity, i.e. radical. This propensity to
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evil, i.e. the subordination of the moral law to self-love in a supreme maxim, “corrupts the
ground of all maxims” (R 6:37). As a result, moral acts are impossible until one undergoes a
reversal of the order of these incentives in the supreme maxim. Given that all first order maxims
are conditioned by the second order subordination of the moral law to self-love, and that this
subordination “makes the incentives of self-love and their inclinations the condition of
compliance with the moral law,” (R 6:36) it follows that until such a reversal, all first order acts
are heteronomous. Because only those acts that are performed out of duty, i.e. out of respect for
the moral law, have moral worth, and because such acts are precluded by the propensity to evil, it
follows that a reversal of the order of incentives established in the supreme maxim is a necessary
condition for the possibility of moral action. Indeed, Kant notes that the individual may perform
acts that are externally consistent with the moral law; however, such acts are not performed out
of respect for the law, i.e. from duty alone, but rather out of satisfaction of the incentive to selflove (R 6:36–7). According to Kant, the possibility of being not just legally good, but rather
morally good, can only be effected through a revolution in the order of incentives in his supreme
maxim (R 6:47–8). This revolution consists in a “single and unalterable decision” (R 6:47–8).
However, this ‘decision’ is not one that the agent consciously performs.193 Kant asserts:
“Assurance of this [revolution] cannot of course be attained by the human being naturally,
neither via immediate consciousness nor via the evidence of the life he has hitherto led, for the
depths of his own heart (the subjective first ground of his maxims) are to him inscrutable” (R
6:51). While this passage may seem to only suggest that assurance, and not consciousness, of
this revolution are precluded from the human being, examination of the last clause of the passage
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cited directly above suggests that this is not the case. The revolution is inaccessible to us
because the subjective first ground of our maxims, i.e. the supreme maxim that grounds all of our
particular maxims, is inscrutable to us. This reading is also confirmed when Kant first
introduces the doctrine of supreme maxim adoption: “Whenever we therefore say, “The human
being is by nature good,” or, “He is by nature evil,” this only means that he holds within himself
a first ground (to us inscrutable) for the adoption of good or evil (unlawful) maxim” [my
emphasis] (R 6:21). Furthermore, Kant claims that the disposition brought about my adopting a
supreme maxim to either subordinate the incentive of self-love to that of the moral law, or vice
versa, “has not been earned in time” (R 6:25). Thus, assurance of the revolution cannot be
attained by us because, as we saw in Chapter 3, it is an intelligible act of noumenal Willkür,
which, as noumenal, can never be accessible to our consciousness which is bound by inner sense.

4.3

REINHOLD’S REVIEW OF KANT’S RELIGION

While for Kant a revolution in the order of incentives prioritized by the adoption of the supreme
maxim is the condition for the possibility of moral acts, Reinhold’s theory of free will as
presented in the Letters II has no place for a second order maxim that conditions all first order
acts. Reinhold defines free will as “the capacity of the individual, to determine himself
according to or contrary to the demand of the unselfish drive with respect to the satisfaction or
non-satisfaction of the selfish drive” (LII 185/137). The selfish drive expresses the demand of
desire (or in expressly Kantian terms the demand of self-love and the associated inclinations),
and the unselfish drive expresses the demand of the moral law. Every act of volition satisfies or
does not satisfy the selfish drive given the demand of the unselfish drive, i.e. every act of volition

100

is either in accordance with or contrary to the moral law, is either a moral or immoral act.194
Thus, according to Reinhold every free first-order act of volition is a moral or immoral act.
As mentioned above, according to Kant the prioritization of incentives is incorporated
into a supreme second-order maxim. However, for Reinhold such a prioritization takes place not
in a second-order volitional act, but rather in every first-order volition:

There are then two distinct impulses, two equally involuntary demands opposed to one
another present in him that can only be united through the person himself, only through
his freedom, and only insofar as through the person, the one is subordinated to the other
or vice versa, the demand of the selfish [drive] is fulfilled at the expense of the unselfish
[drive] or vice versa. (LII 197–98/291)
According to Reinhold, every act of volition subordinates the incentive of self-love to the
incentive of the moral law or vice versa. A second-order subordination of these incentives that
conditions all first-order acts would undermine the utter freedom of self-determination of each
act that is the hallmark of Reinhold’s theory of free will. Interestingly enough, Reinhold
supports such a second-order supreme maxim adoption in his 1794 review of Kant’s Religion.
Reinhold begins his review with a discussion of the concept of the moral law in relation
to those moments that immediately concern the entire content of Kant’s doctrine of religion.195
According to Reinhold, the concept of the moral law as presented in the Critique of Practical
Reason must be presupposed in order to understand the doctrine of religion. In his preliminary
discussion, Reinhold repeats his own definitions of free will as the capacity “to determine
oneself, either through the moral law or contrary to it through pleasure or displeasure, to the
satisfaction or non-satisfaction of a desire, or what is the same: to act morally good or morally
evil” (CII 189/303–55). He explains further that “one will have to find everything in the
194
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following presentation either unintelligible or absurd” (CII 190/305–6) if this conception of
freedom is not presupposed. Ironically, it is precisely because of this presupposition that
Reinhold’s advocacy of Kant’s doctrine of radical evil is inconsistent.
In Part 1 of the review on the origin of moral evil, Reinhold writes:

Freedom of the human will, to whose nature belongs the inseparable unification of the
capacity of the person to determine himself through the law – and the capacity to
determine himself contrary to the law through pleasure or displeasure, takes on the
property and designation of a propensity to the extent it exercises only one of these two
capacities and lets the other rest. (CII 191/306–8)
Reinhold’s characterization of propensity (Hang) is predicated upon the supposition that in any
first-order act of volition only one of the capacities to obey or transgress the moral law is
exercised. This characterization of propensity is not consistent with Kant’s, which is brought
about by a second-order act of volition. Reinhold is seemingly unaware of this discrepancy. He
affirms Kant’s various expressions of the human propensity to evil as “ground of the possibility
of evil” (CII 191/306–8), which must consist in an evil maxim “that functions as the ground of
all other evil maxims, as a universal evil maxim under which particular evil maxims are
contained” (CII 194/311–14). Thus, Reinhold advocates Kant’s claim that particular evil
maxims stand under and are conditioned by the second-order supreme maxim. Furthermore,
Reinhold advocates Kant’s claims that the propensity to evil consists in making pleasure and
displeasure the condition for fulfillment of the moral law and that a revolution, viz. a reversal of
the priority of incentives incorporated into the supreme maxim is a necessary condition to be not
merely legally good, but morally good. Of course, this is irreconcilable with Reinhold’s doctrine
of free will presented in the Letters II, according to which the satisfaction of the selfish drive
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with respect to the unselfish drive is not conditioned by a supreme second-order maxim, but
rather is a free self-determination present in every first-order volitional act.
It is not surprising that as late as 1793 Reinhold wrote to Jens Baggesen that he did not
fully understand Kant’s doctrine of radical evil:

Despite having now repeatedly thoroughly studied the work on radical evil, it
nevertheless remains essentially incomprehensible to me, above all because I
cannot conceive any other ground of a maxim than freedom itself, and I therefore
fear Kant has gotten himself into an investigation – in order to elevate dogmatic
Christianity to moral Christianity without sacrificing dogma – that is impossible
according to his own principles: namely, [investigation] of the ground of free
acts, which can have no ground except freedom itself. However, I still hope to
learn to understand him better even on this issue.196
Even if Reinhold later learned to understand Kant better, he apparently was not able to recognize
how Kant’s account of free Willkür with respect to his doctrine of radical evil relates to
Reinhold’s own theory of free will. The letter to Baggesen provides a good opportunity to shed
light on a fundamental systematic difference in these thinkers’ respective accounts of free will,
namely the difference in their respective conception of the ground of a free act.

4.4

THE GROUND OF FREEDOM

In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims:

Since the concept of causality brings with it that of laws in accordance with which, by something
that we call a cause, something else, namely an effect, must be posited, so freedom, although it is
not a property of the will in accordance with natural laws, is not for that reason lawless but must
instead be a causality in accordance with immutable laws but of a special kind; for otherwise a
free will would be an absurdity. (G 4:446)
196
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A lawless free will would be an absurdity, because such a will would be “a cause operating
without any law at all…and this is a contradiction” (R 6:35). According to Kant, it is inherent to
the concept of causality that every cause must have a law of its causality (CPR A539/B567).
Kant asserts further: “In respect of what happens, one can think of causality in only two ways:
either according to nature or from freedom” (A532/B560). Because the causality of freedom is
intelligible causality, the moral law is the sole possible law that could be the law of the causality
of freedom. Indeed, herein consists the problem for Kant.
There is no lawful rule according to which Willkür would adopt the supreme maxim
constituting the propensity to evil. Kant attempts to hide this problem behind the inscrutability
of a first ground for the free adoption of the supreme maxim:

That the first subjective ground of the adoption of moral maxims is inscrutable
can be seen provisionally from this: Since the adoption is free, its ground (e.g.
why I have adopted an evil maxim and not a good one instead) must not be sought
in any incentive of nature, but always again in a maxim; and, since any such
maxim must have its ground as well, yet apart from a maxim no determining ground of the free
power of choice ought to, or can, be adduced, we are endlessly referred back in the series of
subjective determining grounds, without ever being able to come to the first ground. (R 6:21)

Kant claims that we must presuppose this first inscrutable ground, for otherwise evil in man
would not be imputable (per RT). The first ground of evil is inexplicable to us, because we
cannot have any cognition of it, i.e. the adoption of a first maxim cannot be explained insofar as
it leads to an infinite regress. We may nevertheless presuppose a first ground, because the
infinite series does not stand under temporal conditions, as in the solution to the Third Antinomy
in the Critique of Pure Reason. However, it is not immediately clear why Kant claims that any
given maxim must have a ground that is also a maxim. Given that the free act of Willkür to

104

adopt a supreme maxim is already intelligible, it is not subject to empirical causality and there is
no need to posit an infinite regress of grounds. Although on an epistemological reading the first
ground is a presupposition for moral agency, there is a difference between representing a first
ground and representing an infinite regress of grounds that, out of convenience, is regarded as a
first ground. There is a serious worry that the latter cannot satisfy RT. This tension is alleviated
if one removes the premise that the ground of Willkür’s adoption of a maxim must itself be a
maxim. Kant’s requirement that a cause operate according to a law should only pertain to the
concept of causality as applicable to possible experience, not to noumenal causality. In fact, in
the Critique of Pure Reason Kant characterizes transcendental freedom as “the capacity to begin
a state from itself” (CPR A533/B561).197 Thus, there is no contradiction in maintaining that
empirical causes must operate according to laws and that an intelligible cause, even though it can
never be cognized by us, may be represented as absolutely spontaneous.
Similarly, if the causality of freedom must operate according to a law, there is no law
adequate for the adoption of the supreme maxim constituting the propensity to evil. Kant
confuses the inscrutability of a first ground with the impossibility of a first evil maxim adopted
by Willkür:

The rational origin, however, of this disharmony in our power of choice with
respect to the way it incorporates lower incentives in its maxims and makes them
supreme, i.e. this propensity to evil, remains inexplicable to us, for, since it must
itself be imputed to us, this supreme ground of all maxims must in turn require the
adoption of an evil maxim. Evil can have originated only from moral evil (not
just from the limitations of our nature); yet the original predisposition (which
none other than the human being himself could have corrupted, if this corruption
is to be imputed to him) is a predisposition to the good; there is no conceivable
ground for us, therefore, from which moral evil could first have come in us. (R
6:43)
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In this second quotation, this first ground of evil is inconceivable (unbegreiflich) to us not only
in the sense that it is not able to be conceived by us, rather, it is impossible for two reasons.
First, if the original predisposition in us is a predisposition to the good, and evil can only
originate from evil, then the perversion of the predisposition to the good would be impossible. In
fact, the proposition that evil can only originate from evil leads to an infinite regress by itself.
Second, if the act of adoption of the supreme maxim must operate according to a law, there is no
possible law commensurate to such an act. As an instance of intelligible causality, the law of
this causality would have to be intelligible itself. But as Kant argues in the Groundwork, the
only possible intelligible law is the moral law since it is purely formal. It is impossible that the
moral law function as the law of causality for the adoption of a supreme evil maxim. Just like
the general issue of a first ground addressed above, these problems are resolved if one permits an
absolutely spontaneous first ground. Once this is granted, one can do away with the claim that
evil must originate from evil. Instead, evil can be represented as originating in a first free act.
Furthermore, there is no need for a law commensurate to the first free act of adopting evil.
Instead, the first free act does not operate according to a law, but is a self-activity beginning from
itself.
Due to Kant’s claim that every causality must operate according to a law, and his claim
that the law of natural necessity or the moral law are the only laws suitable to the will’s activity,
he had difficulty responding to his contemporaries regarding the inability of his theory to account
for free immoral acts. Kant had no recourse to appeal to a rule grounding the free adoption of a
supreme immoral maxim. For this reason, he attempted to hide this impossibility in mere
inscrutability and inconceivability. The only way to maintain Kant’s account of free Willkür and
RT is to abandon his claim that the causality of freedom must operate according to a law.
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Reinhold’s theory of freedom already includes the absolute spontaneity required for moral
responsibility.
For Reinhold, the ground of a free act is freedom itself, i.e. freedom is the self-contained
ground (Selbstgrund) of its own activity (LII 193/282). Of course, this claim is not
uncontroversial. The issues of whether such a representation of free will is tantamount to
freedom of chance, and how such a representation of free will is to be reconciled with natural
necessity have been problematized.198 These are serious concerns. However, the intelligibility
of a self-contained first ground of self-determination is beyond the scope of the present work.
We have merely shown that such a spontaneous first ground is a necessary presupposition for
moral responsibility (per RT). Whether this doctrine faces other difficulties is another matter.
For now we can say that because this free act is represented as intelligible, it is not immediately
obvious that it must operate according to a law, as do events under temporal circumstances.

4.5

CONCLUSION

Both Kant and Reinhold made developments to their theories of free will around 1792 as a
response to interpretations of Kantian freedom.199 Both thinkers emphasized free will as a
necessary condition for moral responsibility. While both Kant and Reinhold are committed to
RT, they have different accounts of the free self-determination required for moral responsibility.
198

Salomon Maimon accused Reinhold of reducing free will to a freedom of chance (Freiheit des
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Fate of Kantian Freedom,” 115.
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Kant conceives this freedom as the adoption of a second-order maxim. Reinhold’s theory of
free will pertains to first-order acts, i.e. the acts that follow from the conscious choice of the
agent, and not a noumenal act of supreme maxim adoption that in turn conditions the adoption of
first-order maxims. However, as evidenced by Reinhold’s review of Kant’s Religion, Reinhold
was seemingly unaware of this fundamental difference between the two theories. There is also a
tension between these thinkers’ respective conceptions of the ground of free self-determination.
For Reinhold, this ground is a Selbstgrund of absolute spontaneity. Kant seems to face a tension
within his own account of free will on this score insofar as he takes transcendental freedom to be
a cause beginning from itself, but also rejects what he considers lawless causality.
Bracketing these differences, we saw in Chapter 2 that both Kant and Reinhold are
committed to the freedom of immoral actions as a necessary condition for moral imputability.
Let us now turn to the Kant-Reinhold Controversy of 1797 where, to Reinhold’s astonishment,
Kant denied that free will could be defined as choosing against the moral law.
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Chapter 5
Reinhold’s Reply to Kant

In the Introduction to the Doctrine of Right of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant denies that free
will can be defined as choosing for or against the moral law (MM, 6:226). This denial may have
been directed toward Reinhold.200 Reinhold took the passage to be directed toward him and just
two months later, responded vehemently in his 1797 essay, “Some Remarks,” reasserting his
claim that free will must be defined as choosing for or against the moral law and claiming that
Kant’s position is either incomprehensible or untenable (“SR” 141). Henry Allison and Manfred
Baum have attempted to vindicate Kant from Reinhold’s criticisms.201 Both Allison and Baum
hold that free will necessarily involves the capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims; however,
both deny that the capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims contrary to the moral law is a
necessary feature of the concept of free will. In this chapter, I argue that given this assumption
of the spontaneity of maxim adoption, Allison and Baum overlook the necessity of this capacity
for moral culpability. Following our examination of Reinhold’s implicit argument in Chapter 2,
I argue that the capacity to choose against the moral law is a condition for the intelligibility of

200

See Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 133; Manfred Baum, “Positive und Negative Freiheit
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the moral law as an a priori fact of reason. It will be shown on the basis of Kant’s own account
of definitions that, contrary to the dominant view in the scholarship, Kant should have conceded
to Reinhold that free will be defined as choosing for or against the moral law.
This is philosophically significant in that Kant’s own definition of free will undermines
the possibility of moral agency. The Reinholdian deduction of free will from analysis of the
conditions for the intelligibility of our awareness of the moral law secures the concept of
freedom, which Kant famously declared the “keystone of the whole structure of a system of pure
reason” (CPrR: 5:4). This work is historically significant in that we can finally resolve a
controversy that was the culmination of seething debate on the correct conception of free will
throughout the 1780s and 1790s.202
I first present Kant’s claims in the Metaphysics of Morals that free will cannot be defined
as choosing for or against the moral law, along with a consideration of Allison and Baum’s
interpretations. Next, I utilize Reinhold’s reply to Kant to show that such choice is indeed a
necessary feature of the concept of free will insofar as it is a necessary condition for the
intelligibility of our awareness of the moral law as an a priori fact of reason. Lastly, I respond to
the objection that the capacity to adopt maxims contrary to the moral law is conceptually
subordinate to the capacity to adopt maxims on the basis of the moral law, and for that reason
does not belong among the necessary features of the concept of free will, given Kant’s account
of definitions.203
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5.1

5.1.1

KANT’S ACCOUNT OF FREE WILL IN METAPHYSICS OF MORALS

Kant’s Claims

In the Introduction to Metaphysics of Morals, Kant introduces the Wille/Willkür distinction in an
attempt to remove the ambiguity between the legislative and the executive functions of the
will.204 He designates Wille as the lawgiving function of the will, which he identifies with pure
practical reason, and designates Willkür as the executive function of the will. Kant denies that
the legislative function of Wille can be considered free, reserving instead the notion of freedom
for the executive function of Willkür.205 Kant defines free Willkür as “independence from being
determined by sensible impulses; this is the negative concept of freedom. The positive concept
of freedom is that of the ability of pure reason to be of itself practical” (MM, 6:213–4). While
this positive concept of freedom seems to pertain solely to reason, and thus to Wille, it actually
pertains to Willkür. Pure reason is practical if and only if pure reason can be a possible
determining ground of the will. If free will is not to be conceived as the mere activity of reason,
which would be tantamount to the intelligible fatalism of C.C.E Schmid, then legislation of the
moral law must be accompanied by an executive component of the will to make the moral law a
determining ground for action.206 Indeed, this requirement underlies Kant’s account of Willkür

Kant a definition is simply an exhaustive and precise concept. And so the correct concept of free will, i.e.
the concept exhaustively and precisely determined, is tantamount to the definition of free will.
204
For clarity, I will refer to the German in discussing Wille and Willkür. For translation issues on this
distinction see: Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 129; and Ralph Meerbote, “Wille and Willkür
in Kant’s Theory of Action.”
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legislation is spontaneous and independent of natural necessity. On this point see: Manfred Baum, “Prior
Concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals,” 129–30; and Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 131–32.
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in Religion as well as his more explicit distinction between Wille and Willkür in MM. The ability
of pure reason to be practical is tantamount to the capacity of Willkür to make the moral law a
determining ground for action.207 The moral law of itself has no matter (Materie), but rather is
completely formal. Thus, Willkür cannot simply adopt the moral law as a determining ground.
To make the moral law a determining ground for action is to adopt a maxim on the basis of the
moral law, i.e. to adopt a maxim on the basis of that maxim’s conformity to the formal condition
of universal lawgiving. And so while Kant’s definitions are “hardly models of philosophical
lucidity,”208 we can see that Kant’s positive concept of freedom amounts to the capacity of
Willkür to spontaneously adopt maxims on the basis of the moral law. Or, rather, following the
results of our examination of Religion, the positive concept of freedom amounts to the capacity
of Willkür to spontaneously adopt a supreme maxim that incorporates the incentive of the moral
law as superior to the incentive of self-love. In what follows, I will presuppose this difference
between Kant and Reinhold, namely that Kant’s account of the spontaneous adoption of a maxim
is an intelligible act of noumenal Willkür to adopt a supreme maxim that serves as the ground of
the adoption of particular maxims, and that Reinhold’s account of spontaneous maxim adoption
takes place at the phenomenal level and pertains to particular maxims themselves. Our
207

Allison also holds that the positive concept of the freedom of Willkür is tantamount to Willkür’s
“capacity to act on the basis of the dictates of pure reason or, equivalently, pure Wille” (Kant’s Theory of
Freedom, 132). Allison takes Kant’s published definition – “the ability of pure reason to be of itself
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investigation concerns whether, this difference aside, Kant’s and Reinhold’s commitment to free
immoral actions commits them to a concept of free Willkür that includes choosing against the
moral law as a necessary feature.
Kant and Reinhold are in agreement on the negative concept of freedom, i.e.
independence from sensible determination. The matter at hand is the proper concept of freedom
in the positive sense. Through exegesis of Kant’s claims in the Metaphysics of Morals, we have
established that the positive concept of freedom consists at least in the capacity to spontaneously
adopt maxims on the basis of the moral law. If it can be established that the capacity to
spontaneously adopt maxims contrary to the moral law is a necessary feature of the concept of
free will, then we would be left with a positive concept that consists in the capacity of Willkür to
spontaneously adopt maxims on the basis of the moral law or contrary to the moral law.
Obviously, which determining ground Willkür makes the basis of its maxim adoption, namely the
moral law or inclination, must be the result an intentional act, i.e. a choice, for otherwise it would
be completely coincidental whether we acted in accordance with or contrary to the moral law.
Furthermore, intentionality is a necessary condition for acting morally, i.e. acting from duty (as
opposed to merely acting in conformity with duty). Thus, the positive concept of freedom as the
capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims on the basis of the moral law or contrary to the moral
law is tantamount to choosing for or against the moral law. Consequently, our investigation will
be focused on whether the capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims contrary to the moral law is a
necessary feature of the concept of free will.
Kant goes on to argue that freedom of Willkür cannot be defined as the ability to choose
for or against the moral law, giving two primary reasons: 1) we cannot present freedom in this
way as “a positive property,” i.e. we cannot “present theoretically freedom as a noumenon”; and

113

2) choosing against the moral law is not a necessary feature of the concept of free will and that
we do choose against the moral law is instead derived from experience (MM, 6:226–7). In
Section 5.2 of this chapter, where it is argued that the capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims
contrary to the moral law is a necessary feature of the concept of free will, it will be shown that
the ability to choose for or against the moral law is not to present freedom theoretically as a
noumenon, but rather respects Kant’s theoretical/practical distinction. It is not obvious why the
capacity to choose against the moral law must be derived from experience and why it cannot be
considered a necessary feature of the concept of free will. Allison and Baum offer different
accounts to justify Kant’s exclusion of this capacity from the concept of free will even though
both accounts assume that Willkür has the capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims on the basis
of as well as contrary to the moral law. Both accounts thus argue that although this capacity is a
feature of Willkür, it is not a necessary feature of the concept of Willkür.

5.1.2

Allison’s Interpretation

Allison maintains that the spontaneity of Willkür is a necessary condition for rational agency:
“the intentional actions of a rational agent are never “merely” the causal consequences of the
agent’s antecedent psychological state (or any other antecedent conditions for that matter) but
require, as necessary condition, an act of spontaneity.”209 This thesis will henceforth be referred
to as the Spontaneity Thesis.210 I follow Guyer in his characterization of Allison’s thesis as:

the act of adopting a principle, whether moral or not, as well as that of incorporating a
desire into one’s ends on the basis of such a principle, cannot be understood as a
209

Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 5. See also: ibid, 45, 63–5; Henry Allison, Idealism and
Freedom, 124–28.
210
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Spontaneity Thesis, because I wish to emphasize the spontaneity of Willkür.
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deterministic effect of some antecedent cause but can only be understood as a
manifestation of transcendental freedom.211

Thus, Willkür’s adoption of a maxim cannot be seen as the result of empirical determinism, but
rather must be an act of transcendental freedom, which is “the capacity to begin a state from
itself” (CPR A533/B561).212 That an act of spontaneity is an act of transcendental freedom
simply follows from Kant’s conceptions of the terms. Kant characterizes “spontaneity” as a
causality “through which something happens without its cause being further determined by
another previous cause” (CPR A446/B474) and “to act from itself, without needing to be
preceded by any other cause that in turn determines it to action according to the law of causal
connection” (CPR A533/B561).
In Kant’s Theory of Freedom, Allison summarizes Reinhold’s assertion from “Some
Remarks” that free will is to be conceived either as the mere self-activity of reason or as the
capacity of the person for self-determination on the basis of or contrary to the moral law.213
According to Reinhold, if the former conception is granted, then free immoral action is
impossible. If the latter conception is granted, then Reinhold’s own conception is correct.
Allison subsequently refutes this charge by referring to the Spontaneity Thesis. According to
Allison, Kant does not deny that Willkür has the capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims for
both autonomous and heteronomous acts, but merely denies that the capacity to adopt maxims
contrary to the moral law “be included in the definition of freedom.”214
Allison affirms Kant’s position that the capacity to choose for or against the moral law
cannot be a universal criterion, i.e. a necessary conceptual feature, for distinguishing free Willkür
211
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from animal Willkür. According to Allison, while the latter indeed cannot choose to act against
the moral law, this is only because it also cannot choose to obey the law.215 As such, only beings
with freedom to follow the moral law can have the freedom to disobey it:

Only a being with freedom, positively construed as the capacity for self-determination on
the basis of rational grounds (the capacity to act according to the conception of law), can
be meaningfully conceived to have a corresponding capacity to deviate from the dictates
of reason. In a word, only a being with freedom, positively construed, can be regarded as
capable of misusing that freedom. Nevertheless, deviation from the law constitutes a
misuse of such freedom rather [sic] the absence of it because, as we have seen repeatedly,
even our heteronomous actions involve the spontaneity of Willkür.216
It is not clear what Allison is claiming with respect to Reinhold’s critique. If Allison is merely
showing that the capacity to act on the basis of the moral law is the “universal criterion” (MM
6:227) for distinguishing free Willkür from arbitrium brutum, then he has not thereby
demonstrated that the capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims contrary to the moral law does
not belong to the definition of free will. There could be other reasons for needing to include this
capacity in the definition of free will outside of its relation to arbitrium brutum. Indeed, in 5.2 of
this chapter I argue that this capacity is a necessary feature of the concept of free will insofar as
it is a condition for the intelligibility of our awareness of the moral law.
If Allison is drawing upon the Spontaneity Thesis to claim that the capacity to deviate
from the moral law is a misuse of the same capacity exercised in obeying the moral law, then it is
unclear why Allison would only consider the capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims on the
basis of the moral law a necessary feature of the definition of free will. Per the Spontaneity
Thesis, Allison considers Willkür’s capacity to adopt maxims (both on the basis of and contrary
to the moral law) a necessary condition for rational agency, and yet he only considers the
215
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capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims on the basis of the moral law a necessary feature of the
concept of free will. Given that the Spontaneity Thesis entails that all instances of rational
agency are instances of free volition (insofar as the spontaneous adoption of maxims is a
manifestation of transcendental freedom), it is odd that Allison would consider the capacity to
spontaneously adopt maxims contrary to the moral law a necessary property of free will but not a
necessary conceptual feature of its definition. Perhaps Allison takes the capacity to
spontaneously adopt maxims contrary to the moral law to be subordinate to the capacity to
spontaneously adopt maxims on the basis of the moral law, making only the latter a necessary
feature of the definition of free will. This position will be treated in Section 5.3.

5.1.3

Baum’s Interpretation

Like Allison, Baum is committed to the Spontaneity Thesis and is explicit in stating that Willkür
is independent of determination by Wille and that Willkür’s adoption of maxims both for and
against the moral law is spontaneous.217 He claims that Willkür’s choosing against the moral law
cannot be considered a necessary feature of the concept of free will because that choice is always
contingent:

Such a choice (Wahl) is an act of spontaneous choice (Willkür), which experience shows
happens, but which does not belong in a definition (cf. MS 6:226.32-36) of the freedom
of the faculty of choice (Willkür), since it cannot belong to the necessary properties of
free choice (Willkür) as such. For nothing would prevent the faculty of choice (Willkür)
in its free choice (Wahl) from always taking up the maxims that conform to law and
making them its own…Thus the decision for a maxim contrary to law remains also a
merely contingent if also frequent special case of choosing (Wahl) by the faculty of
choice (Willkür), which should in no way be cited among the necessary and enduring
features that are united in the definition of the concept of free choice (Willkür).218
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In this way, Baum confirms Kant’s claim that although Willkür may choose against the moral
law, such a capacity does not necessarily belong to the concept of free Willkür.
Baum is correct that any given instance of Willkür’s choosing against the moral law is
contingent; however, he mistakenly conflates the contingency of any given instance of Willkür’s
choosing with the necessity of Willkür’s capacity to choose. It simply does not follow from the
contingency of any instance of choosing that the capacity to choose be contingent.219 If it turns
out that the capacity to choose against the moral law can only be derived from experience, then it
admittedly can only be established a posteriori and thus contingently. Following Reinhold and
our treatment of his position in Chapter 2, I argue in the next section that this capacity is
necessary and can be derived a priori.

5.2

REINHOLD’S REPLY TO KANT

In his Letters on the Kantian Philosophy Volume II (Letters II), Reinhold develops a theory of
free will in order to correct what he took to be the mistaken interpretations of Kant’s theory by
some of his followers.220 By defining free will only in terms of the self-legislation of practical
reason and its independence from natural necessity, Reinhold thinks these interpretations
preclude free immoral acts (LII 185/267). By separating the will from practical reason and
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defining free volition as self-determination for or against the moral law, Reinhold believes to
have secured the concept of freedom of the will from those interpretations that abolished moral
culpability, i.e. from C.C.E Schmid’s interpretation. Reinhold had sent Kant a copy of the Briefe
II and requested Kant’s judgment on the same, particularly in regard to his theory of the will and
freedom.221 In Kant’s reply, he assured Reinhold that he agreed with his principles of natural
right for the most part, but was conspicuously silent concerning Reinhold’s account of free
will.222 Thus, Reinhold may have felt that Kant’s denial in the Introduction to Metaphysics of
Morals that free will can be defined as choosing for or against the moral law was a belated and
perfidious answer to his original 1793 request for Kant’s commentary.223
In his 1797 essay, “Some Remarks,” Reinhold defends his view of freedom as consisting
in choosing for or against the moral law, and repudiates Kant’s charge that such a definition
would derive the concept of free will from experience. Instead, Reinhold claims that his
definition is transcendental (“SR” 150–51/393).224 Reinhold maintains that his concept is
derived from the moral law (just like Kant’s concept of moral evil from Religion within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason):

My concept of freedom as a capacity to act according to or contrary to (not whatever kind
of law of reason, but rather) the moral law, consequently [the capacity] to act not legally
or illegally, but rather morally good and morally evil is absolutely not derived from
experience, deduced from appearances, nor drawn from illegal acts. Like the concept of
morally evil action, which Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason puts forth
according to (as it puts it) the mere law of freedom, my concept of freedom is derived
221
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simply from awareness of the moral law itself, from the categorical imperative alone
(“SR” 150/392–93).

Reinhold’s concept of freedom is derived from the moral law insofar as it must be assumed as a
necessary condition for the conceivability of the moral law:

Incomprehensible freedom is…that freedom which announces itself through the law and
which is presupposed by the concept of the law as the moral law, which can be assumed
only for the sake of the law, cannot be comprehended from the law, but must be thought,
for otherwise the law necessary through itself qua moral law would not be conceivable
(“SR” 149–50/390).225
Thus, according to Reinhold the concept of freedom announces itself through the moral law as a
necessary assumption for the latter’s conceivability. Insofar as the concept of freedom is derived
as a necessary condition for the conceivability of the moral law, of which we are a priori
conscious as a fact of reason, the concept of freedom is obtained a priori and transcendentally as
a condition for the possibility of consciousness of the moral law. Reinhold’s position in “Some
Remarks” demonstrates his reliance on the argument elucidated in Chapter 2 as his considered
position. Here he makes no appeal to facts of consciousness and instead takes himself to be
making roughly the same argument as Kant in Religion, namely arguing for freedom as a
necessary condition for morality.
Admittedly, Reinhold’s position in “Some Remarks” is not completely fair to Kant. As
Bondeli notes, Reinhold accuses Kant of defining the will merely as the self-activity of reason, a
charge that is more aptly attributed to C.C.E Schmid.226 Reinhold characterizes Kant’s position
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By “incomprehensible freedom” Reinhold simply means that we cannot theoretically conceive how
this freedom is possible. It is, instead, something that we must posit as a result of our awareness of the
moral law.
226
See Martin Bondeli, “Einleitung: Vermischter Schriften II,” LXIX

120

as claiming that acts are free only insofar as they obey the moral law, thereby precluding the
possibility of free immoral acts and, according to Reinhold, turning the moral law into a mere
law of nature (“SR” 144f/375f). Nevertheless, Reinhold’s point that choosing for or against the
moral law is a necessary condition for the conceivability of the moral law still stands and we can
construct an argument in the spirit of Reinhold’s claim.
The argument hinges on the claim that the Spontaneity Thesis is a necessary condition for
moral responsibility. Let us in turn call this the Responsibility Thesis. In order to demonstrate
that Kant ought to have considered the capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims contrary to the
moral law a necessary feature of the concept of free will, it is necessary to show that Kant is
committed to the Responsibility Thesis. In fairness to our unwitting interlocutors, Allison and
Baum, it is also necessary to show their commitment to the thesis. While we have already
established Kant’s commitment to this thesis in Chapter 4, let us briefly review this commitment
as a backdrop for showing Allison and Baum’s commitment to the same. Moreover, insofar as
Kant, Allison, and Baum hold that the capacity of Willkür to spontaneously adopt maxims
contrary to the moral law is a property of Willkür, but not a necessary feature of its concept, it
will be necessary to briefly address Kant’s account of concepts and definitions.

5.2.1

The Responsibility Thesis Revisited

Kant’s commitment to the Responsibility Thesis is clear and is established by the following three
passages from Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason:

This subjective ground [of the exercise of freedom] must, in turn, itself always be a deed
of freedom (for otherwise the use or abuse of the human being’s Willkür with respect to
the moral law could not be imputed to him, nor could the good or evil in him be called
“moral”). Hence the ground of evil cannot lie in any object determining Willkür through
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inclination, not in any natural impulses, but only in a rule that Willkür itself produces for
the exercise of its freedom (R: 6:21).
Nothing is morally (i.e. imputably) evil but that which is our own deed (R: 6:31).227
The human being must make or have made himself into whatever he is or should become
in a moral sense, good or evil. These two [characters] must be an effect of his free
Willkür, for otherwise they could not be imputed to him and, consequently, he could be
neither morally good nor evil (R, 6:44)

Thus, the activity of Willkür, viz. its spontaneous adoption of maxims, is a necessary condition
for moral responsibility.
Allison and Baum are also incontrovertibly committed to the Responsibility Thesis.228
Allison claims that in order for an act to be attributed to an agent, “the action must be regarded as
something the agent “does” of itself, as opposed to being the result of something “done” to the
agent.”229 As we have seen, Allison takes the Spontaneity Thesis to be a necessary condition for
agency. Given that agency is a necessary condition for imputability, it follows that the
Spontaneity Thesis is a necessary condition for imputability, which is tantamount to the
Responsibility Thesis. Baum uses the Responsibility Thesis as grounds for accepting the
Spontaneity Thesis:

This deviation from law, though – be it from the subjective (the maxim), or from the
objective law of pure practical reason for the adoption of maxims by choice – cannot be
explained as its action ‘according to a law of nature’ (VAMS 23:248.27, trans K.S.),
since it then would be unambiguously determined by this law of nature, the maxim
227

This particular passage admittedly only establishes that Kant is committed to the claim that we are
only morally culpable for immoral acts that are our own deed, i.e. that are freely carried out. This is,
however, certainly the more controversial point that needs to be established. No one, to my knowledge,
has ever claimed that Kant was not committed to freedom as a necessary condition for moral
responsibility for moral acts.
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contrary to law would thus be predetermined and so one could not attribute it to choice
itself. It is also for this reason that deviation from the law in choice (Wahl) of maxims by
the faculty of choice (Willkür) must remain inexplicable.230

Thus, because the adoption of maxims and accordant courses of action determined by laws of
nature would undermine the imputability of acts to Willkür, this capacity must be spontaneous.

5.2.2

Kant on Concepts and Definitions231

For Kant, a concept is a set of marks, or necessary features, that serve as a rule for “ordering
different representations under a common one” (CPR A68/B93).232 Without proffering a
particular interpretation of Kant’s account of concepts and their role in judgment and perceptual
apprehension of objects of experience, it is sufficient for our purposes to recognize that the set of
constituent conceptual features serve as a general rule to subsume those particular
representations that share those features and are thus instantiations of the concept whose features
they share.233
A definition is an exhaustive concept (CPR A727/B756), i.e. a concept that “is
sufficiently distinct and precise” (Log 9: 140). A concept can be made completely distinct by
making all of its marks clear and can be made precise by not having too many marks, i.e.
superfluous marks (Log 9: 142). The marks, or constituent conceptual features, must be
“necessary, and hence not added through experience” (Log 9: 145). Thus, the definition of free
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will must be an exhaustive elucidation of only those necessary features sufficient to distinguish
it.234 Kant claims that these necessary features cannot be subordinate to one another, i.e. they
cannot be contained in one another, for otherwise the subordinate feature is superfluous (LLog/Blomberg 24: 264). Should it turn out that the capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims
contrary to the moral law be parasitic on the capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims on the
basis of the moral law, then there would be good reason to exclude the former capacity from the
definition of free Willkür. This point is, in part, raised by Baum and is addressed in Section 3 of
this work.
Paul Guyer has recently claimed that Kant’s remarks in Metaphysics of Morals concern
Kant’s position on the definition of free will. Guyer claims that Kant is conceiving free will as a
real definition, which must include its ratio cognoscendi.235 This explains why Kant restricts the
definition to our capacity to act for the sake of the moral law. However, given the Spontaneity
Thesis, if it turns out that the capacity to act contrary to the moral law is not analytically
contained in the capacity to obey it, then Kant has provided an incomplete concept.

5.2.3

The Reinholdian Argument

The Spontaneity Thesis establishes that Willkür can spontaneously adopt maxims both for and
against the moral law. Our exegesis of Kant’s claims in Metaphysics of Morals established that
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Some of Kant’s statements in the Critique of Pure Reason conflict with his account in Logic and the
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that the concept has been exhaustively developed (CPR A 728/B 757). Nevertheless, Kant claims in
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the positive concept of free will is tantamount to the capacity of Willkür to spontaneously adopt
maxims on the basis of the moral law (and this is consistent with our interlocutors Allison and
Baum). The question is whether the capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims contrary to the law
is a necessary feature of the concept of Willkür. Here it will be argued that the capacity to
spontaneously adopt maxims contrary to the moral law is a necessary feature of this concept, and
therefore belongs in the definition of free will.
In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant asserts that we are a priori conscious of the
moral law as a fact of reason (CPrR 5:31; 47; 55).236 Our awareness of the moral law is an
awareness of that law as the supreme principle of morality, and therefore an awareness that the
moral law is binding upon us. As binding, awareness of the moral law commands what ought to
be done (or not done), and when its command is not heeded we are capable of awareness that it
ought to have been, i.e. in the case of transgression of the moral law we can be aware that we
ought to have obeyed it, that we could have obeyed it, and that we are responsible for having not
obeyed it.237 Thus, awareness of the moral law entails awareness that it is binding upon us,
which in turn entails an awareness that we are morally responsible for our acts.238
Because our awareness of the moral law as a fact of reason is a priori and therefore
necessary (CPrR 5:47), the concept of free will cannot make the moral law unintelligible.239 If
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moral responsibility is to be intelligible, then so too must moral culpability for immoral acts. Per
the Responsibility Thesis, the capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims contrary to the moral law
is a necessary condition for moral culpability, and therefore a necessary condition for moral
responsibility in general. To preclude Willkür’s capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims
contrary to the moral law from free will would preclude the possibility of moral culpability,
which would undermine moral responsibility and with it the intelligibility of the moral law as a
fact of reason. Admittedly, defining free will only in terms of the capacity to spontaneously
adopt maxims on the basis of the moral law does not necessarily preclude the capacity to
spontaneously adopt maxims contrary to the moral law; however neither does the former
capacity necessarily entail the latter. Given Kant’s account of definitions as an exhaustively
determined concept, a definition of free will that omits the capacity to spontaneously adopt
maxims contrary to the moral law, while not inherently contradictory, is indistinct insofar as it
omits a necessary feature of the object to which it is supposed to refer. Such a definition does
not exclusively distinguish free will for a being (such as ourselves) who is not always determined
by the representation of the good. Instead, such a definition may also refer to a perfectly good,
or holy will, which is “determined only through the representation of the good” (G 4:414).
Therefore, in order to have a definition of free will that is “sufficiently distinct and precise” (Log
9:140), we must include Willkür’s capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims contrary to the moral
law among the necessary features of the concept of the same.
Furthermore, this necessary conceptual feature is not merely gleaned from experience,
but rather is derived a priori through analysis of the necessary conditions for moral responsibility
given our awareness of the moral law as a fact of reason. Whereas Kant seemed to think that
positing the spontaneity of Willkür outright would be to make a theoretical claim about the
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nature of the will (MM: 6:226), our derivation of the spontaneity of Willkür from analysis of the
necessary conditions for moral responsibility given our awareness of the moral law as a fact of
reason was gleaned from the practical standpoint. Thus, including choosing against the moral
law in the concept of free will is consistent with Kant’s apparent insistence that the definition
must include its ratio cognoscendi. That is, the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of the
capacity to adopt maxims pertaining to morally relevant actions, be those actions moral or
immoral. The capacity to adopt maxims with moral significance analytically contains the
capacity to adopt maxims for the sake of the moral law and the capacity to adopt maxims
contrary to the moral law (such that the agent is aware that the adoption of such a maxim is a
transgression). The former capacity does not analytically entail the latter. Therefore, the
definition of free will cannot be restricted to the former capacity, but rather must be defined by
the generic capacity analytically containing both constituent capacities. And this is precisely
Reinhold’s concept of free will.
It is no surprise then that Reinhold was thoroughly vexed by Kant’s claims in
Metaphysics of Morals. Rather than baldly assert theoretically a property of the will, there is
evidence throughout 1792–97 that Reinhold took his definition of free will to be grounded in the
practical perspective. The Reinholdian definition of free will as the capacity to choose for or
against the moral law is practical insofar as it is justified only on the basis that the moral law
presents itself as binding upon us as a possible determining ground for action, and on the basis
that this concept of freedom is a necessary condition for the intelligibility of the moral law. In
“Letter Eight” of the Briefe II Reinhold claims:

In this respect, philosophizing reason completely comprehends through precise
explication of the various faculties of the mind active in volition that the will is free, but
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not how this freedom is possible, and this is something philosophizing reason must leave
at that (LII 193/283).

Thus, we cannot explain how freedom is possible from a theoretical perspective; however, from
the practical perspective, that we are free is something philosophizing reason understands and
must leave at that.240
Furthermore, in 1794, Hermann Coch, a student of Reinhold’s in Jena, described
Reinhold’s own position to a fellow student: “Reinhold says the conceivability of the possibility
of freedom is merely an object of faith, but real freedom, without which the moral law cannot be
conceived at all, is however an object of knowledge.”241 Disregarding the epistemic concerns
surrounding the knowledge claim, it is clear that Reinhold respects Kant’s theoretical/practical
division. From the theoretical perspective, the possibility of freedom is merely an object of faith;
however, from the practical perspective, real freedom, as it is announced through the moral law,
is an object of ‘knowledge’ for Reinhold, which Kant sometimes refers to as practical cognition
in the Critique of Practical Reason.242 Moreover, the passage reveals that here Reinhold also
held the transcendental position on free will that he explicitly espouses in “Some Remarks.” The
fact that the relative clause ‘without which the moral law cannot be conceived at all’ qualifies
‘real freedom’ suggests that this is significant to Reinhold’s justification for calling freedom an
object of ‘knowledge’. That is to say, it is because freedom is a necessary condition for the
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conceivability of the moral law – where that law can only be understood with a workable notion
of moral culpability in place – that it is therefore justified as ‘knowledge,’ or practical cognition.

5.3

OBJECTION TO THE FOREGOING

It could be objected that although the capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims contrary to the
moral law is indeed necessary, it is a feature that is conceptually subordinate to the capacity to
spontaneously adopt maxims on the basis of the moral law. Given Kant’s claim that necessary
conceptual features cannot be subordinate to each other, it would follow that the capacity to
spontaneously adopt maxims contrary to the moral law should not be included among the
necessary features of the definition of free will. Baum seems to raise this objection (though he is
not entirely clear on the matter), and it is possibly what Allison has in mind when he claims that
“only a being with freedom, positively construed as the capacity for self-determination on the
basis of rational grounds (the capacity to act according to the conception of law), can be
meaningfully conceived to have a corresponding capacity to deviate from the dictates of
reason.”243
Baum asserts that Willkür stands under the law of pure practical reason.244 He claims that
the absolute spontaneity of self-legislation of the moral law by Wille is logically prior to the
limited spontaneity of Willkür to adopt maxims in light of the law given by Wille.245
Accordingly, so the reasoning seems to go, our awareness of the moral law makes possible our
capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims on the basis of that law. The capacity to spontaneously
adopt maxims contrary to the moral law would therefore be dependent upon the capacity to adopt
243
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maxims on the basis of the moral law, which, according to Kant’s account of definitions, would
preclude the former capacity from being a necessary feature of the definition of free will.
Yet this line of thought only establishes that our awareness of our capacity to
spontaneously adopt maxims on the basis of the moral law comes before our awareness of our
capacity to spontaneously adopt maxims contrary to the moral law. Thus, the capacity to
spontaneously adopt maxims on the basis of the moral law precedes the capacity to adopt
maxims contrary to the moral law in the order of knowing. This does not, however, entail that
the former capacity is prior in the order of being. As per the Spontaneity Thesis, neither capacity
is subordinate to the other, but rather both are manifestations of Willkür’s capacity to
spontaneously adopt all maxims as a condition for rational agency. Thus, both capacities are
necessary as constituent capacities of the freedom of Willkür to spontaneously adopt maxims
both on the basis of and contrary to the moral law, without which, our awareness of the moral
law as an a priori necessary fact of reason is no longer intelligible.

5.4

CONCLUSION

This chapter attempts to demonstrate, contrary to recent commentators, that Reinhold had a point
worth supporting in his dispute with Kant over free will, namely, that the concept of freedom
must consist in choosing for or against the moral law. I argue that given Allison and Baum’s
assumptions of Willkür’s spontaneity to adopt maxims both on the basis of and contrary to the
moral law, their justifications for Kant’s restriction of the conceptual bounds of the definition of
free will are invalid. Given the Responsibility Thesis, the Reinholdian argument shows that the
conceptual feature of choosing against the moral law is not derived from experience, but rather is
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justified a priori as a necessary condition for the intelligibility of our awareness of the moral law
as a fact of reason. Reinhold’s deduction of free will from analysis of the conditions for the
intelligibility of the moral law is grounded in the practical perspective and thus vindicates
Reinhold of Kant’s charge that such a definition is to present freedom theoretically as a
noumenon. Given Kant’s account of definitions, to omit the capacity to choose against the moral
law would result in an indistinct definition that obfuscates awareness of the moral law. Only
when the executive function of the will to spontaneously adopt maxims on the basis of and
contrary to the moral law is properly delineated can the moral law be intelligible as a possible
determining ground for action. Only then can pure reason be shown to be practical and the
concept of freedom serve as the keystone to the Critical philosophy.
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Conclusion

Focusing on Reinhold’s line of reasoning for his conception of free will shows, contrary to the
dominant view in the scholarship, that his argument for free will is not merely a bald assertion of
a psychologistic fact, but rather takes seriously the conditions for moral imputability and the
intelligibility of the moral law. Chapter 1 sets the historical stage for (1) the presentation of
Reinhold’s theory and the disambiguation of his argument from the prevailing view in the
scholarship and (2) the new elucidation (if not outright revision) of Kant’s own theory of free
will in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Rehberg’s criticism that Kant’s merely
formal moral law cannot serve as the principium executionis of moral agency may have
contributed to Reinhold positing free agency as pertaining directly to particular acts. Reinhold
responded to Ulrich’s and Schmid’s deterministic philosophies by declaring such views as
entailing the abolishment of morality. Indeed, Kant’s formulation of free Willkür in Religion as
choosing a fundamental maxim constituting the agent’s moral disposition (Gesinnung) as a
ground for the adoption of particular maxims can be seen as a response to Ulrich and Schmid
who interpret Kant’s theory of free will as tantamount to the efficacy of pure reason. In Chapter
1 we also had occasion to clarify some misunderstandings concerning Schmid’s doctrine of
intelligible fatalism and his position concerning the (attempted) reconciliation of thoroughgoing
necessity, freedom, and moral responsibility.

132

Having considered some of the most significant influences on Reinhold’s development of
his theory and Kant’s new presentation of his theory in Religion, in Chapter 2 we examined these
developments as they relate to moral imputability. In this chapter we had occasion to shed new
light on Reinhold’s argumentative strategy as attempting to ground free will in its relation to
morality as a necessary condition for the same. We saw that Reinhold presupposes the results of
Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and accepts his argument for free will from “ought implies
can.” However, Reinhold takes Kant’s formulation to be incomplete. Reinhold supplements the
2nd Critique by arguing for freedom to act immorally as a necessary condition for moral
imputability, and therewith, as a necessary condition for morality as such. We also saw that
while Kant took himself to establish freedom to act morally by appeal to the premise that “ought
implies can” and asserting our a priori consciousness of the authority of the moral law as a fact
of reason, he employed a different strategy to establish freedom to act immorally by appealing to
the conditions for imputability. Both premises of the 2nd Critique argument are asserted without
argument and the biconditional premises between freedom, moral obligation, and imputability
presupposed in Religion and put forth in the 1793/94 lectures on moral philosophy according to
the Vigilantius notes are also presented without argument. While the philosopher who is not
convinced of the a priori status of the moral law as supremely authoritative may not be
convinced by Kant’s arguments, this dissertation has been concerned with the explication of
Kant’s reasoning and not the evaluation of its persuasive power.
While Chapter 2 brings to light the common thread in Kant’s and Reinhold’s conceptions
of free will and its relation to moral imputability, Chapter 3 examines the role of consciousness
and the relation of the will to the faculty of desire as a backdrop to illustrate the disparity
between these conceptions. We saw that Kant maintained a direct role for consciousness in free
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agency in his Leibnizian conception of free will in the Nova Dilicudatio as well as in his preCritical conception of free will presented in his lectures on moral philosophy in the 1770s as
evidenced by the Kaehler manuscript. The metaphysical commitments of Kant’s transcendental
turn required him to posit freedom as noumenal. This move precluded the role of consciousness
in free agency that had previously featured in Kant’s conception of free will. While Kant’s
Critical conception of free will consisted in the activity of a noumenal faculty of choice that
serves as the supposed ground of our phenomenally determined selves, Reinhold posited free
will as constituted by a choice performed by the Person, or intentional subject, to determine
oneself for or against the moral law.
Chapter 4 more closely examines the nature of the noumenal capacity for choice, Willkür,
that Kant posits in his theory of free will. We saw that the noumenal free act of Willkür serves as
the ground for particular maxim adoption. Interestingly, it seems Reinhold was not aware of the
disparity in the scope between his own theory and that of Kant’s. Reinhold certainly became
aware of the contrast between the two accounts of free will when he read the Introduction to
Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, instigating the Kant-Reinhold Controversy of 1797.
Chapter 5 examines the Kant-Reinhold Controversy. It was argued that, following the
results of Chapter 2 that established freedom to act immorally as necessary to morality, Kant
should have included this capacity in his concept of free will. It is odd that he did not,
considering Kant himself affirmed the necessity of free immoral action for morality in Religion.
At any rate, given Kant’s position in Religion and his account of definitions as including those
necessary features that cannot be derived from other marks, it seems clear that even if Kant did
not accept the metaphysical presuppositions (or lack thereof) of Reinhold’s theory, he ought to
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have considered freedom to transgress the moral law as a necessary feature of the concept of free
will.
Reinhold’s theory is not without its problems. Most notably, Reinhold has no apparent
way to reconcile freedom with natural necessity. To be sure, the need to provide a solution for
this problem contributed to Kant’s Critical conception of free will as noumenal. In this way,
Kant could maintain determinism at the phenomenal level and also claim that our actions are free
by appealing to a noumenal activity independent of the temporally determined causal series of
the phenomenal world. Kant’s ingenuity in seeking a solution to the tension between freedom
and determinism is not to be overlooked. At the same time, it is unfair to reject Reinhold’s
theory as inferior because he does not provide such a solution. Reinhold’s theory lends itself to a
meta-level reevaluation of the relation of theoretical and practical reason. On such a view,
theoretical concerns are not superior to practical concerns. Thus, it would not be the case that a
tension between theoretical and practical reason, between freedom and determinism, should be
arbitrated by ultimately conceding the authority of theoretical reason. That is to say, because on
a loosely Kantian view the causal necessity of temporal events is ultimately attributable to the
epistemic conditions of cognition that we bring to bear on experience, we might simply say that
our cognitive faculties are such that we are constrained to understand mere events as causally
connected. Similarly, given our a priori awareness of the moral law as a fact of reason, we are
constrained to conceive our actions, or at least our morally significant actions, as free. This is
not to say that we are merely under the illusion that our actions are free but that they are really
determined. Such a line of thought gives priority to a physical description of the world as
ultimately authoritative. In this way, Reinhold’s position lends itself to the idea that the
normative cannot be reduced to the physical. This position is not dissimilar to the ‘Kantian’
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inspired position of Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism. Perhaps contemporary naturalists
would do well to take a page from Reinhold’s book. Furthermore, Reinhold’s position can be
seen as a meta-level commitment to the significance of our lived experience, a commitment that
would become popular among existentialists and phenomenologists. In this way, while
Reinhold’s theory of free will might be bemoaned by adherents to the questionably unpleasant
metaphysics of Leibniz and Kant, it might be equally praised by philosophers more sympathetic
to the special status of consciousness in human experience. As Reinhold would have it, it is not
some other-worldly noumenal self that deserves praise and blame for my actions, but me, the I
that chooses a particular course of action. With respect to how this is possible, perhaps we can
only say “es kömmt lediglich drauf an, so absurd das auch sey!”
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NOTES ON TRANSLATIONS

All translations of Kant’s works refer to the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.
Passages from the Critique of Pure Reason are cited according to the first (A) and second (B)
editions respectively. Passages from Kant’s other works are cited according to the volume and
pagination of the Akademie Ausgabe (29 vols., Berlin: De Gruyter, 1900–). Translations of
J.A.H. Ulrich and C.C.E. Schmid are co-translated by myself and Jörg Noller and taken from the
volume under contract with Cambridge University Press, Kant’s Early Critics on Freedom of the
Will. All other translations are my own.
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